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C O M M E N T A T I O N E S

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PLATO ON EVIL-DOING, *EUDAIMONIA*, AND THE ELENCHUS: RECONSIDERING SOCRATES' ENCOUNTER WITH POLUS IN THE *GORGIAS*

by

KONSTANTINOS STEFOU

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I attempt to shed new light on the much-debated exchange between Socrates and Polus in Plato's *Gorgias*, particularly focusing on three major concepts that run throughout it: evil-doing, *eudaimonia*, and the elenchus. Upon close examination of the "Polus episode", it turns out that such concepts as virtue, benefit, and *eudaimonia* are literally treated as *defined-by-their-opposites* concepts whose main significance derives from their serving to signal either abstinence or relief from the greatest evil. There are many cases where things are beyond human control, and even the person preserving the virtue of his soul is forced to suffer either injustice or some accident, thus becoming deprived of his knowledge and affected in respect to his soul's health. Yet, as far as human control is concerned, one can attain a state of non- or less wretchedness by directing all his efforts towards (a) guarding against being wronged, (b) keeping on refraining from injustice and vice of soul as a whole, and (c) propagating the significance of both being refuted and refuting others, with the ultimate aim of disseminating the truth-knowledge of good and evil.

INTRODUCTION

On first reading, the *Gorgias* seems to be among the most complex of Plato's dialogues in both a literary and philosophical sense. This is far from being the case, however. When digging deeper into the text and sharpening the focus of inquiry, one cannot fail to see how the main ideas of the *Gorgias*, in their simplicity and comprehensiveness, unfold very organically. This paper is concerned with Socrates' exchange with Polus. Although several studies have been published on the Polus episode, none of them, as far as I can tell, has adequately shown how and to what extent the arguments set forth in the episode are related to the dramatic "plot" of the dialogue. My emphasis is not on examining Socrates' arguments exclusively on the basis of what they leave out, thus judging them as lacking, insufficient, contradictory, or even illogical, but on exploring what they actually include, treating them as integral parts of the dramatic structure. Besides, arguments must always be evaluated in conjunction with the

literary-dramatic framework within which they occur. To that end, I have decided to narrow down the focus to three things: the elenchus, evil-doing, and *eudaimonia*; yet all the related concepts will be examined thoroughly. Staying close to the Greek text, I hope to show that Socrates' encounter with Polus testifies to the idea that such concepts as virtue, benefit, and *eudaimonia* are literally treated as *defined-by-their-opposites* concepts whose main significance derives from their serving to signal either abstinence or relief from the greatest evil. I also hope to lay bare Socrates' confidence that once knowledge of good and evil has been attained through the elenchus, humans will always, insofar as it depends upon them, refrain from injustice, concentrating their efforts on transmitting that knowledge to others.

THE VALUE OF THE ELENCHUS

In his conversation with Gorgias, Socrates defends the value of his persistent use of the elenchus:

> And what kind of man am I? One of those who would be pleased to be refuted if I say anything untrue, and who would be pleased to refute anyone who says anything untrue; one who, however, wouldn't be any less pleased to be refuted than to refute.
> (458 A, 2–5, transl. by D. Zeyl)[1]

Then, he adds:

> For I count being refuted a greater good, insofar as it is a greater good for oneself to be delivered from the worst thing there is than to deliver someone else from it. I don't suppose there's anything quite so bad for a person as having false belief about the things we're discussing right now.
> (458 A, 5–B, 1, transl. by D. Zeyl)[2]

Socrates regards the elenchus as the greatest good for human beings[3], since it causes them to be delivered from the greatest evil, false beliefs about the "greatest things". However, what Socrates actually says is that getting rid of the

---

[1] ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγξάντων εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μεντἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγξάντων. Dodds (1959: 214) notes that the shift from εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω to εἴ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι manifests "the modesty of Socrates' expectations: he refers the case of his being refuted to the present occasion, but the case of 'somebody else' being refuted he treats as a remote possibility". However, as I hope my analysis here will show, Socrates not only takes seriously the possibility of "somebody else" being refuted, but even more bases his argumentation on the mutual benefit derived from elenctic examination.

[2] μεῖζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι, ὅσῳπερ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι τοσοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευδὴς περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὤν.

[3] Cf. 506 C, 1–3: καί με ἐὰν ἐξελέγχῃς, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί σοι ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράψῃ; *Euthyd*. 304 D, 1 f. Burnet: τῶν ἥδιον ἂν ἐξελεγχομένων ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἢ ἐξελεγχόντων; Democr. 68 [55] B 60 DK: κρέσσον τὰ οἰκήϊα

greatest evil is the greatest good for oneself, or, in other words, that the greatest good amounts to deliverance from the greatest evil. It seems, then, that the former is defined by the latter, or, much better, by the absence of the latter: the good is defined in terms of non-evil. Let us see how this takes place.

The Socratic elenchus is all about being refuted and refuting. Socrates explicitly says that he gets more pleasure out of being refuted than refuting others. But what does this actually mean? To borrow the terminology used in 476 B ff., refuting is doing something (ποιεῖν), while being refuted is suffering something (πάσχειν). Therefore, to be refuted, namely to suffer the greatest good (*patient*), the elenchus, and thus be freed from the greatest evil, is a greater good for oneself than to refute, namely to do the greatest good (*agent*). Similarly, in both cases, it is from the elenchus that both the agent and the patient derive pleasure proportionate to the good-benefit they receive. But being refuted, as a greater good for oneself, gives the patient proportionately greater pleasure than that given by refuting. To sum up:

to be refuted = to suffer the greatest good, namely the elenchus = to be freed from the greatest evil, namely false beliefs about the "greatest things"

is a greater good for oneself than

to refute = to do the greatest good, namely the elenchus = to deliver one from the greatest evil, namely false beliefs about the "greatest things",

and gives more pleasure than the latter can give.

One can easily observe that, since the greatest good amounts to deliverance from the greatest evil from which the greatest pleasure comes, then it follows that the greatest pleasure in turn amounts to deliverance from the greatest pain.

BAD THINGS ARE SHAMEFUL

Socrates defines rhetoric as an "image of a part of politics" (πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον), but Polus insists on bringing up the question of "whether rhetoric is something admirable or shameful" (Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;, 463 D, 3, cf. 462 C, 8). This stands in contrast to Socrates' customary view that one cannot judge whether something is admirable or shameful unless he first knows what it is (cf. *Grg.* 462 C, 10–D, 2; *Prt*. 361 C–D; *Men.* 86 D–E). In this context, Socrates rejoins:

> I'm saying that it's a shameful thing – I call bad things shameful – since I must answer you as though you already know what I mean.
>
> (463 D, 4 f., transl. by D. Zeyl)[4]

ἐλέγχειν ἁμαρτήματα ἢ τὰ ὀθνεῖα; Dodds 1959: 214. Cf. also *Ap.* 38 A; *Lach.* 187 E; *Prt.* 333 C; Kahn 1983: 75 f.; Kahn 1996: 133–142.

[4] Αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε – τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ – ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἰδότι ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.

Why is it so important to insist on the identification of bad with shameful (cf. *Tim.* 87 C, 4 f. Burnet: πᾶν δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν)? Here, for the first time, such a sort of identification comes up and should constantly accompany the occurrence of the term κακόν in the remainder of the dialogue, at least each time Socrates takes the floor. But arriving at an impasse, the discussion reaches the verge of total uncommunicativeness, thus urging Socrates to analyse and elucidate the aforementioned identification at 474 D, 3 ff.

THE URGENT NEED FOR THE ELENCHUS AND ITS PRACTICAL APPLICATION

Socrates directs the discussion towards the point where the elenchus emerges as a rhetorical tool at Polus' disposal, capable of providing him with the necessary means for fortifying his view (466 E, 13). Interestingly enough, there is a lot at stake here; if Polus does not refute Socrates, his argument will collapse: it will be established that (a) rhetors do not have intelligence, (b) rhetoric is merely flattery (not a craft), (c) rhetors and tyrants have not gained any good by doing what they see fit/seems good to them (δόξα) in their cities, (d) and, while power (δύναμις) is a good thing, as Polus says, doing what one sees fit/seems good to him without intelligence is bad (and shameful, according to Socrates), and therefore is no power at all. Consequently, doing what one seems good to him will be proved to be not only bad and shameful, but also weakness (cf. above, pp. 8f.).

HUMANS WISH (ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ) FOR GOOD THINGS (467 C, 5 FF.)

In the light of the above clarification, we are left with some crucial questions: what types of actions are good and admirable? How can power be discerned and in what does it actually consist? In view of the urgency of the situation, Socrates has Polus subscribe to a division of things into good (such as wisdom, health, wealth, and the like), bad (their opposites), and neither good nor bad, namely those that sometimes partake of the good, sometimes of the bad, and sometimes of neither (such as sitting, walking, running, sailing, or again stones, sticks, and the like). He then proceeds to give an account of human action and motives. Whenever humans do things, they actually do the intermediary things (τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα) for the sake of the good ones, since they exclusively wish the latter, not the former. In other words, they do not wish the actions themselves, which serve as means to something else, but rather those things for the sake of which (οὗ ἕνεκα) their actions take place, the ends themselves, the successful and beneficial results of their actions. Therefore it is in the pursuit of good (τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες) that people do what they do whenever they do it, believing (οἰόμενοι) that doing it is better (βέλτιον) for them than not doing

it[5]. Within this scope, they put a man to death or banish him and confiscate his property in the belief that doing these things will result in the greatest benefits to them.

However, a little further down, Socrates says:

> Hence, we don't simply want to slaughter people, or exile them from their cities and confiscate their property as such; we want to do these things if they are beneficial, but if they're harmful we don't.
>
> (468 C, 2–5, transl. by D. Zeyl)[6]

This claim seems to be contradictory to the previous one. After all, do we wish to do the actions that we do or not? A careful examination of the text, however, reveals that the contradiction is only superficial. First, it should be noted that, without Socrates' intervention, what was deemed (by Polus) good and indicatory of a tyrant's power would not have been co-accepted as either good nor bad, serving as a means towards the presumed good of the agent. Thus Socrates goes a step further, seizing the opportunity to clarify the concept of "will" (βούλησις) and establish the idea that there is a very important condition that has to be fulfilled in order for people to *wish* to do the actions that they do. We do not wish to do what we do unless our actions result in the greatest benefit to us. In other words, people do not actually wish their actions "just like that" (ἁπλῶς οὕτως), without qualification, the actions themselves; they may wish them, but only under the condition that they result in consequences beneficial to them, namely under the condition that these actions, as neither good nor bad, partake of the good by producing it[7]. In short, in order to become the object of our will, our actions must be good-oriented and result straightforwardly in it, since we only wish the things that are good for us, not those that are neither good nor bad, nor those that are bad.

---

[5] I cannot follow Dodds (1959: 236) in thinking that unlike in the *Gorgias*, in the *Protagoras* (358 C–D) and *Meno* (77 C) Plato "puts the doctrine in the more plausible form that all men desire 'good things' in the plural". On the contrary, in view of the conventional list of ἀγαθά put forward at 467 E, 4 f., it seems that the two phrases, "in the pursuit of good" (put in the singular: τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες) and "all men desire good things" (put in the plural), can be used interchangeably to convey the same idea (hence the title of this section). Irwin (1979: 143 f.), on the other hand, takes Socrates to be describing the object of preference and wanting in three ways: (a) it is *a* good, (b) it is *the* good, and (c) it is better. Cf. McTighe 1984: 193–204. For studies almost exclusively concerned with Socrates' argument here, see, for example, McTighe 1984; Penner 1991; Weiss 1992; Dalfen 2004: 251–264; Doyle 2007; Ostenfeld 2007: 109–113; Wolfsdorf 2008.

[6] Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα.

[7] This strongly indicates (*pace* Dodds 1959: 236) that the distinction between ends and means found in the *Gorgias* is far from absolute. Cf. also *Lys*. 219 E–220 B; Dodds 1959: 237; Irwin 1979: 141 f.

The above considerations lead to the conclusion that if a tyrant or a rhetor does one of the aforementioned – intermediary – actions, namely puts someone to death or drives him out of a city or deprives him of his property, believing that doing so is better for himself although it is in fact worse, then this man acts as it seems good to him (ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ), not as he wishes. Such a man, under these circumstances, cannot be said to have great power in the city, since great power is inextricably linked with doing what one wishes, namely doing good.

DEGREES OF WRETCHEDNESS AND PITY

(i) Who is enviable?

Faced with what Polus takes for granted, that, in a case such as the one described above, no one would ever reject the power to do what seems good to him in the city, and that, by doing so, one's own condition is an enviable one[8], Socrates hedges the discussion and, particularly, Polus' claim with a proviso based on the following question: "Do you mean justly or unjustly?" (468 E, 10)[9]. Noteworthily, the scope of the discussion is restricted to "doing what seems good to someone", which, as we have already seen, has been detached from "doing what one wishes". Nevertheless, if a man puts someone to death, as it seems good to him, and does so justly, a crucial question arises as to whether or not his action is motivated by particular knowledge, namely, that this particular action will produce certain results. But this is by no means possible. Such a man cannot be characterised as "just", since he does not know what "just" is and thereby does not wish it, but rather acts as it seems good to him. This interpretation is also supported by Socrates' concluding remarks at the end of his conversation with Gorgias:

> S. And, on this principle, isn't a man who has learned what is just a just man too? G. Yes, absolutely. S. And the just man, I suppose, does just things. G. Yes. S. Now isn't the orator necessarily just, and doesn't the just man necessarily wish to do just things? G. Apparently so. S. Therefore the just man will never wish to do injustice. G. Necessarily.
>
> (460 B, 6–C, 4)[10]

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[8] On the idea that to most Greeks of the time Socrates' view would appear "paradoxical in its loftiness", see Dodds 1959: 237 f. Cf. also Dilman 1979: 47; Irwin 1979: 147; Kahn 1983: 94 f.

[9] Δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;

[10] – Σω. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος; – ΓΟΡ. Πάντως δήπου. – Σω. Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει. – ΓΟΡ. Ναί. – Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν; – ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεταί γε. – [Σω. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὅ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν. – ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη] (for comments on the text enclosed in square brackets, see Dodds 1959: 219).

In the text above, one can identify two basic assertions: (a) a man who has learned what is just is a just man; (b) the just man wishes (βούλεσθαι) to do just things and therefore acts in this way. Since the verb βούλομαι, as we saw earlier, is inextricably connected with good and totally disentangled from "what seems good to someone", it follows that the just man wishes for good things, namely just things, and does them. And, because the same term, βούλησις, is linked with some type of knowledge or knowledge acquisition through learning (μεμαθηκώς), it also follows that the just man is one who has learned/knows the good-just things and pursues them exclusively.

Polus' response to Socrates' question (Δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;) reflects his persistent concern with achieving practical results without considering the ways in which they can be achieved. A quick look at 448 A, 9–B, 1 and the current passage, 468 E 10–469 A, 1, may verify this. In the first case, in response to the question of whether or not he can give more admirable answers than Gorgias, Polus rejoins that such a question is actually irrelevant [only people or people's attitudes are generally described as "indifferent"], as long as his answers are indeed sufficient enough to the interrogator; while in the second case he claims that a man who has the power to do what seems good to him in the city holds an enviable position in the esteem of the whole community, regardless of whether he is just or unjust in his actions. Nevertheless, Socrates' question is a crucial one: if a man does what seems good to him, then it really matters whether he does this justly or not. If he does it justly, he is unenviable (οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός); if, on the other hand, he does it unjustly, he is wretched (ἄθλιος). At any rate, he who does what seems good to him, whether justly or unjustly, is in fact to be pitied (469 A, 5). In the latter case Socrates' point is clear enough. But in the former one, where a man does justly what seems good to him, the agent cannot properly be characterised as "just", and thereby his condition is not an enviable one. What qualifies a person as "just" is his having the will (βούλησις) for the good-just; this will in turn comes from knowledge already acquired through learning, knowledge of the good-just. Therefore, it is now evident that, under Socrates' guidance, Polus and we readers are meant to draw the following conclusion: if one of the aforementioned actions, namely either putting someone to death or banishing him or depriving him of his property, is to be performed justly by an agent, one condition must obviously be satisfied: he must himself be just. But this means nothing other than to know the just-good, and thereby to wish for it and do it. The unjust man, by contrast, fails to wish the just-good and perform it, since he is ignorant of it.

(ii) The scale of wretchedness and pity

Socrates' clarification of the nature of "doing what seems good to me" and its role as a motivating factor makes plain the fact that any sort of wretchedness (-pity) scale must now be based upon a more solid foundation such as βούλησις,

stemming from knowledge of good. Thus, taking "acting as it seems good to me" as the fixed point of reference and viewing it as the main motivating factor, we can now see more clearly on what basis the ranking scale is devised and constructed. More specifically, the one who puts someone to death unjustly ranks at the top of the scale; he is followed by the one who is put to death unjustly, while at the bottom of the scale lies he who is justly put to death. But such a ranking is roughly the inverse of that suggested by Polus, namely that the one who unjustly puts someone to death is less wretched and piteous than he who is justly put to death, and less so than the one who is unjustly put to death. However, what holds for the case where one justly puts someone to death? What conclusion shall we deduce from his not being mentioned in the ranking list set forth by Socrates? Once he has shown that, in acting as it seems good to him, one who justly puts someone to death is not a just person, Socrates does not feel any further need to insist on this. He must now focus upon his newfangled wretchedness scale, illuminating what was the most important determinant/key factor of its constitution.

The above ranking model is mainly attributed to the fact that doing injustice is the greatest of evils. It may seem surprising that what was considered in section one the greatest evil, namely false belief about "the greatest things", is now replaced with doing injustice. But how do these two references relate to each other? Section one opens with Socrates urging knowledge coming from the elenchus as a remedy against false belief about τὰ μέγιστα; this false belief, as it now appears, causes the greatest evil, namely doing injustice. By characterising false belief about important matters as the greatest evil, Socrates actually highlights the need to shift the focus from the production of a certain result to the very cause of its production. But this presupposes that a man knows what will truly benefit him. Thus Socrates recommends that we turn our attention to what causes us to do what we do. False belief about "the greatest things" is the greatest evil inasmuch as it partakes of the greatest evil, (doing) injustice, by perpetuating its existence. However, in view of Polus' declaration that suffering injustice (ἀδικεῖσθαι) is a greater evil than doing it, Socrates explicitly states that he wishes (βούλησις) neither of them. It is not only that humans wish for good things; the just man wishes for just things and performs them. Both doing injustice and suffering it are evils; but were it necessary either to do injustice or to suffer it, Socrates would certainly opt for the latter, the lesser evil, thus being ranked as the lowest step in his newly-suggested wretchedness-pity scale.

(iii) With a dagger under my arm: introduction of the notion of punishment

Upon Socrates' diminution of ἀδικεῖν in favour of ἀδικεῖσθαι, Polus refocuses on the tyrant archetype in order to extol the license he has to do whatever seems good to him in the city. He therefore does not seem to give sufficient attention to the distinction made by Socrates between "doing what seems good to me" and "doing what I wish", but rather to insist that what matters most to people is

the power to do whatever they think fit, to act as it seems good to them. Thus the discussion seems to have arrived at an impasse. If the inquiry is to proceed, a way must be found to get beyond Polus' stubborn persistence with the tyrant and his supposed power or, in other words, beyond his misconception of "power" and "good". Socrates has to resort to the use of an *ad hoc* explanatory device in order to make clear what motivates the one who does what seems good to him to act in the way he does, and what consequences his action has.

Therefore, the case of the hidden dagger serves as an example to illustrate further the implications of δοκεῖν-based actions. Against the supposed power supplied by a hidden dagger, providing someone with the opportunity to act as he thinks fit in the city, it might be objected that, in such a case, "doing what seems good to me" involves lacking great power, since a man who acts this way is necessarily punished. But what is perhaps most intriguing and surprising is that Socrates himself induces Polus to agree that "being punished", precisely the state which the former will subsequently affirm as the sole means by which the soul can be rid of the greatest evil, injustice, is a bad thing (τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν; 470 A, 7). Why is this happening?

(iv) Partial conclusion

It is incontrovertibly true that "doing what seems good to me" has overshadowed the whole discussion, but it is less clear that Socrates, who trenchantly set βούλεσθαι off from δοκεῖν-based actions, has vouchsafed to do this. Having laid the foundation for the idea that a man who acts as it seems good to him fails to do just things since he lacks knowledge of what is just and unjust, Socrates now emphasises the fact that δοκεῖν-based actions necessarily produce a bad result, leading the agent toward a state of being punished, with the intention of substantiating the view that if doing what seems good is accompanied by acting beneficially, it is not only good, but also, plausibly enough, what having great power is; on the contrary, if it is attended by acting harmfully, which in the present case measures up to being punished, it is bad and amounts to having little power. It seems, then, that Socrates seeks to highlight that δοκεῖν-based actions, however different they may be from βούλεσθαι-based actions, are judged as good solely on the basis of their consequences, namely on the basis of whether or not they bring about beneficial outcomes[11].

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[11] What is important to note here is that the text leaves open the possibility that there may be ways of bridging the gap between δοκεῖν-based actions and βούλεσθαι-based actions. This seems to partly jeopardise Dodds' claim (1959: 236) that Plato should be charged with inconsistency in using βούλεσθαι in the restricted sense of 'true will' (I refer, most notably, to his comment on *Resp.* 445 B, 1). Generally speaking, I cannot agree with Irwin (1979: 141 f.), as my analysis so far has hopefully shown, that Socrates does not suggest "any distinction between what a person thinks he wants and his 'true will', which is taken to express what he 'really wants', whether or not he thinks he wants it". Cf. above, p. 11, n. 5.

THE HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF ARCHELAUS – EDUCATION (ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑ) AND JUSTICE (ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ): THE DETERMINING FACTORS IN EUDAIMONIA

Yet there still remains a need for further clarification of the above conclusion. Socrates therefore proceeds to point out that there are times when it is better (ἄμεινον) to do such things as putting people to death and banishing them and confiscating their property, but there are also times when it is not (470 B, 1–4). But his point leaves us readers wondering whether he really means what he says, or whether he has a definite plan underlying his attempts to gloss over his unacquaintance with such practices. When encountering this question, one should also bear in mind that Socrates has, quite unexpectedly, granted that being punished is a bad thing (470 A, 7). But how can his seemingly paradoxical stance be explained? Socrates' argument seems to bring to light certain assumptions that are not embraced nor sustained by him, but are still able to draw Polus' attention to the implications of δοκεῖν-based actions and bring back to the fore the issue of justice.

There must therefore be, as far as the actions described above are concerned, a boundary line sharply distinguishing these actions from one another. And this line must be drawn on the basis of the way, just or unjust, in which these actions are performed. Socrates explicitly states that it is better (ἄμεινον) when someone performs these actions justly, but when unjustly, worse (κάκιον). In other words, the goodness of these actions is determined in terms of whether or not they have been justly performed. But what actually does the term "goodness (of, specifically, the aforementioned actions)" mean and how does it sound to the ears of Socrates and Polus? While the latter strongly adheres to the idea that the phrase "it is better to do this" involves bestowing benefits upon me, the former, in distinguishing between two different ways of performing it and, consequently, declaring that goodness presupposes justice, actually advocates that the above phrase should be rephrased as "it is better when one does this justly" and construed as involving conferring benefits upon both the agent and the patient[12].

Socrates' broadening of the scope of benefit to cover both agent and patient is followed and, in a sense, completed by a reminder of the value of the elenchus originally heard at an earlier point in their discussion, a reminder which amounts to praise and postulating its role as most conducive to doing good to a friend (μὴ κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, 470 C, 7 f.). This seems to echo the traditional Greek belief that one should help one's friends and harm one's enemies

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[12] *Pace* Dodds 1959: 241. I take ἄμεινον here to refer to the benefit produced by the implementation of justice; yet this concerns both agents and patients. By reflecting on killing, banishing, and confiscation of property, Socrates in fact foreshadows the discussion of the nature of punishment (cf. below, p. 29), and by extension, of just punishment. Cf. McKim 1988: 35.

(the second part is not yet mentioned)[13]; but while this idea, from now on, runs through Socrates' conversation with Polus, its first appearance, admittedly, marks the rather conspicuously unconventional and radical form it takes when appealed to by Socrates: doing good to a friend, namely benefiting him, means nothing more or less than refuting him.

Refuting Socrates (and therefore benefiting him) may at first seem an easy task to Polus, since a recent historical example, that of Archelaus, offers, as he claims, strong evidence against Socrates' opinion, yet it confronts many difficulties as, in claiming that many men who do injustice are *eudaimones* (πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονές εἰσιν, 470 D, 2 f.)[14], Polus not only introduces the concept of *eudaimonia*, but also puts forth the very controversial issue of the relationship between injustice and *eudaimonia*. Thus in contrast to Polus' conception of *eudaimonia*, specifically, an *eudaimonia* growing out of injustice, Socrates promulgates the idea that there are two major factors that determine a person's *eudaimonia*: education and justice. This is made abundantly clear by the texts quoted below:

> [T1] P. It is obvious, then, Socrates, that you won't even say you know that the Great King is happy. S. Yes, and I'll be telling the truth; for I don't know how he stands in regard to education and justice.
>
> (470 E, 4–7, transl. by D. Zeyl, modified)[15]

> [T2] For I say that the fine and good man and woman are happy, but the unjust and wicked are wretched.
>
> (470 E, 9–11, transl. by R.E. Allen, slightly modified)[16]

T2 would assuredly strike aristocratic readers as counterintuitive, or even nonsensical. It does not only denude the phrase καλὸς κἀγαθός of any aristocratic colouring whatsoever, excluding its social meaning, while at the same time extending it to apply to both sexes[17]; even more, it does bespeak that, by

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[13] Cf. 480 E, 5 ff. On the idea that the maxim "helping friends and harming enemies" "was conventional Greek morality", see Dodds 1959: 259. Cf. Dilman 1979: 75; Irwin 1979: 168; Plochmann-Robinson 1988: 370, n. 19. Cf. also below, p. 37, n. 35.

[14] Dodds (1959: 241) provides a helpful overview of the problem of the ἄδικος εὐδαίμων, a problem that had greatly concerned Greek moralists. For Socrates, however, as Dodds puts it, this is a pseudo-problem, "since there can in reality be no ἄδικοι εὐδαίμονες", cf. Santas 1979: 230–233. Needless to say, therefore, that in condemning Archelaus Plato condemned Athenian public opinion (see Dodds 1959: 242). Cf. also Irwin 1979: 148.

[15] ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης.

[16] τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.

[17] On the traditional use of the phrase καλὸς κἀγαθός and its transvaluation by Socrates, see Dodds 1959: 242 f. Cf. Irwin 1979: 149 f.

the antithesis with the unjust, καλὸς κἀγαθός imbibes justice as its most essential and distinguishing feature. Both texts seem to testify that being a fine and good man and woman consists in practically proving the way one stands in regard to the right sort of education and justice. These two criteria, when implemented in practice successfully, lead a person toward a state of *eudaimonia*; they must therefore be conceived of as the determining factors in *eudaimonia*. Following this line of thought, Archelaus' being unjust involves essentially his being wretched.

The above are admittedly two diametrically opposed views about human *eudaimonia*, but Socrates' deeper purpose here is surely to expand the discussion beyond the narrow framework of the just or unjust doing of such things as putting people to death, banishing them, or confiscating their property. Thus Socrates shifts the focus of the discussion from the just or unjust performance of the above actions to the actions themselves. But for Polus these actions represent certain manifestations of wrongdoing leading to *eudaimonia*; refraining from doing these would inevitably contribute to a person's wretchedness. It is now evident that the whole problem has to be redefined. It does not concern the issue of whether these things are to be done justly or unjustly, but rather the question of whether or not they do have to be done. Socrates has subtly managed to build up the idea that there is only one way to "do" the aforementioned things justly: by abstaining from them.

DOES ANYONE CARE ABOUT JUSTICE? SOCRATES' DISTINCTION BETWEEN TWO TYPES OF ELENCHUS

No doubt the above conclusion, as fostered by Socrates, does need further substantiation, especially when considering Polus' rather rhetorical citing of the example of Archelaus. It should be particularly noted that in his narration, Polus resorts to a set of rhetorical devices to sway Socrates' opinion to his side: he does not rely solely upon antithesis in order to spotlight the contrast of ideas expressed by words which are the opposite of each other (ἄδικος, τὰ μέγιστα ἠδικηκώς – τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, εὐδαίμων – ἄθλιος, ἀρχή – δοῦλος, cf. Smyth, Messing 1956: 674); even more, his language is strongly ironical, while the use of devices such as polysyndeton (καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον [...] καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο [...] καὶ ἦν εὐδαίμων, 471 A, 6–8; καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας [...] καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, 471 B, 6 f.) or pleonasm (in particular, parallelism of positive and negative, see ἀθλιώτατός ἐστιν πάντων Μακεδόνων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, 471 C, 7 f.) produces the effect of vividness, enriching the thought by adding greater picturesqueness, vigour and emphasis (Smyth, Messing 1956: 681 f.). Focusing on the ideas conveyed by the passage, one cannot fail to see how shrewdly Polus tackles the interaction of βούλεσθαι and τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν. While ironically underlining what Socrates has taken pains to highlight, the inseparable connection

between βούλησις and δίκαιον[18], he proposes exactly the opposite behaviour, that of the unjust man, which, according to him, safely leads to *eudaimonia*, thereby being most acceptable – and meritorious – to the Athenians.

However, being strongly rhetorical in its character, Polus' speech is perfectly indicative not only of his rhetorical education, but also of his dialectical incompetence (ἔγωγέ σε ἐπήνεσα ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδεῦσθαι – τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἠμεληκέναι, 471 D, 3–5[19]). Note that the phrase πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδεῦσθαι recalls Socrates' earlier statement at 470 E, 6 f., where he says οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης. There seems to be a sort of education Polus is in want of or totally ignores, thus undermining it, rather inadvertently, in favour of his rhetorical competence. What stands at the very core of Socrates' criticism is actually the effect Polus' narration brings out, considering that he eventually subdues dialectic by putting it under rhetoric. This is evident from the way in which he attempts to refute Socrates. Plato allows two types of elenchus to be clearly distinguished before his readers' eyes: on the one hand, there is a type which, though a counterfeit one (cf. ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν, 471 E, 3; δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, 471 E, 4), is most frequently used in court; being widely accepted among Athenians and foreigners, it consists in providing a large number of well-esteemed but quite often false witnesses in substantiation of the things one says. However, behaviour of this type implies deviation from truth in such a way as to, as far as the latter is concerned, prove the unworthiness of the former. On the other hand, Socrates' elenchus pertains essentially to truth; it brings forward but one witness, the interlocutor himself, to testify to the truth of what one says, thus forming a dialectical milieu into which the most effective means of persuading others is through logical arguments. And this attests to the true character of the type of elenchus Socrates employs, by means of which his interlocutor is to be genuinely benefited (cf. above, pp. 8 f.). In other words, what determines the genuineness or spuriousness of the elenchus each time is whether or not it truly benefits its recipient. Therefore, from this point until the end of the conversation with Polus, Socrates' leading aim is to clearly demarcate the boundaries of the above-mentioned types of elenchus and subsequently elucidate each one's objectives with a view to entrenching the idea that there is only one proper type of rhetoric: that which is at the service of dialectic.

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[18] See, for example, κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δοῦλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ἐδούλευε ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον (471 A, 6–8); οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ (471 C, 2–4).

[19] Cf. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πῶλος παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους (448 D, 1 f.); δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι (448 D, 8–10).

TWO TYPES OF ELENCHUS IN COMPARISON

(i) Disagreement about "the greatest things" (τὰ μέγιστα)

Socrates' distancing himself from the type of elenchus Polus is most acquainted with in fact reflects their different views with respect to matters which are hardly trivial (οὐ πάνυ σμικρὰ ὄντα, 472 C, 6 f.; cf. τὰ μέγιστα, *Alc*. I 118 A–B; *Ap.* 22 D–E; *Grg*. 451 D, 7; *Plt*. 285 E; *Soph*. 218 D–E), thereby revealing much about their deeper disagreement. The cruciality of the moment is further proclaimed by the very fact that two diametrically opposed views on human *eudaimonia* essentially provide the gauge for determining whether one has or lacks the relevant knowledge, and therefore whether the former or the latter condition is most admirable. One cannot miss the point that there is a significant rhetorical move – on Socrates' part – being made here with a view to highlighting that this case is by no means of slight importance, but rather has everything to do with what is mostly either admired or disapproved of by the multitude. But the move is astutely conveyed by the ambiguity in the use of the word κάλλιστον (and its opposite, αἴσχιστον), which is sophistically employed to denote, on the one hand, what Polus accepts as preferable on account of the opinion of the many, and, on the other hand, what Socrates sets forward as rigidly tied up with the knowledge of "the greatest things". At the same time, it is to the careful and astute reader that Plato reveals his deeper threefold intention in having Socrates speak of the most admirable thing: namely, to imply, firstly, that Socrates is the possessor of the relevant knowledge, since to judge whether something is admirable or shameful presupposes knowing what it is (cf. above, p. 9); secondly, that lacking knowledge of what man's *eudaimonia* consists in is most harmful and, therefore, most shameful (αἴσχιστον) (cf. above, pp. 9 f.: τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ); thirdly, that the only legitimate method of seeking that knowledge is the Socratic elenchus, wherein καλόν is determined solely by and is strictly proportionate to the participant's accrued benefit.

(ii) Summarising the points in dispute; for what reasons does the discussion keep coming to a standstill?

Understanding the significance of the issue discussed requires a fairly straightforward reformulation of the points in dispute. In fact, three things remain unclear: firstly, whether doing injustice is worse than suffering it (473 A, 4 f., cf. 469 B, 8; note that, for Socrates, the above premise takes the form: doing injustice is worse and, therefore, more shameful than suffering it, since bad things are shameful, cf. above, pp. 9 f.); secondly, whether it is possible (οἷόν τε εἶναι, Polus' view, 472 D, 2, cf. 470 D, 2), or not possible (ἀδύνατον, Socrates' view, 472 D, 6), for a man who does injustice and who is unjust (ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος, 472 E, 4 f.) to be *eudaimon*; thirdly, whether such a man will be *eudaimon* if he does not pay the penalty and is not punished (Polus' view, 472

D, 9), or not *eudaimon* at all, but rather utterly wretched, the more so if he does not pay the penalty and undergoes no punishment for his wrongdoing, the less so if he does pay and finds requital from gods and men (ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, Socrates' view, 472 E, 4–7, cf. 473 D, 7–E, 1).

Given that two sharply opposed views have emerged in the manner described above, one must suspect that Plato does not want us to focus entirely on the views themselves but rather to concentrate on the methods of elenchus Socrates and Polus use in their attempts to convince each other of the validity of their position. On the one hand, Socrates' elenchus (a) has truth as its patrimony and is always directed towards it (cf. 472 B, 6), (b) expresses itself through joint examination of a subject (σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ, 473 A, 4, cf. *Resp*. 403 D, 1; *Tht*. 147 E, 3; cf. also συσκοπεῖν, *Lach*. 189 C, 2; 197 E, 8; *Phd*. 89 A, 7), (c) amounts to an attempt on Socrates' part to refute a friend, namely, to benefit him by ridding him of false opinions, thus constituting a friendly service (473 A, 2 f., cf. above, pp. 8 f., and 480 A ff.; note that the last part of the conversation with Polus is concerned with what one should do if it ever were necessary to do evil to an enemy, see 480 E, 5), (d) produces one witness to what Socrates says, namely, his fellow discussant (474 A, 5 f., cf. 472 B, 6–C, 2), (e) is a reliable vehicle for discovering the truth, (f) finally, determines whether something is possible (οἷον) or impossible (ἀδύνατον, 472 D, 6; 473 B, 10) on the basis of the *logos* emerging through dialectical examination, the only *logos* that stands unrefuted, since it is directly related to the truth, and what is true is never refuted (473 B, 10 f.; on the relationship among δύναμις, βούλησις, and knowledge, cf. above, pp. 12 f.). Polus, on the other hand, covers up his dialectical incompetence by a variety of rhetorical tricks used in a circular way: (a) invocation of a multitude of witnesses (472 C), (b) spooking (473 D, 3), during which he appears to disregard (cf. 473 B, 12–D, 2) Socrates' comments about βούλησις and ζηλωτός (cf. above, pp. 12 f.), (c) laughter (473 E, 2), and again (d) invocation of a multitude of witnesses (473 E, 4 f.). But these are neither genuine nor truth-based attempts to refute others. Plato aims to show that the failure of the discussion between Socrates and Polus, and its continuous restarting, is due to the latter's erroneous and profoundly rhetorical methods of elenchus. But in order to make this clearer, a literary device is necessary. Thus, he proceeds to invest Socrates' speech with some strongly ironical elements. More specifically, Socrates (a) ironically accepts Polus' claim that he refuted him (473 A, 10), (b) ironically challenges Polus to re-refute him (473 B, 7), and, (c) in general, takes part in a game of irony against Polus which reaches its climax when they both appear to remain stubbornly adherent to their views (cf. 474 B, 2–10). Socrates' irony is beyond all doubt a rhetorical instrument used here to show that the type of rhetoric in which Polus seems to have been well educated (cf. above, p. 19) essentially distorts and conceals the truth, whereas dialectic, of which he has been neglectful, reveals it. By employing

rhetoric against rhetoric, Socrates actually turns it against itself with a view to underscoring its distorting power now being displayed not against the truth, but against what Polus and the majority of people consider to be good. He thus manages to make rhetoric subservient to dialectic by turning it into a means of disseminating the truth about the real good to those having false opinions about it. Nevertheless, one is left to wonder what value is to be put upon it, or whether any value at all, when its main task is accomplished.

RETURNING TO GROUND ZERO

A. Re-examining the first part of the discussion: τὸ ἀδικεῖν vs. τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι

(a) Which of these two evils is worse?

Faced afresh with the question of whether doing injustice or suffering it seems to him worse (κάκιον), Polus gives preference, as one would expect from what he has said so far, to the former. But what does it actually mean to Polus to avoid suffering injustice, it being worse than doing it? It definitely means, as his example of Archelaus shows, that suffering injustice produces harm to someone in the sense that it deprives him of the license to use any means necessary to acquire vast tyrannical power; to put it another way, it withholds from him the power, as Polus puts it, to do whatever he wants to whomever he wants. On the other hand, doing injustice is the only means to achieve this objective; it benefits man in the sense that it helps him seek and gain absolute power over others, and thus become enviable, eventually attaining *eudaimonia*. Nevertheless, the very manner in which Socrates' question is formulated ("which seems to you worse, doing injustice or suffering it?", 474 C, 5), closely akin to his objection at 473 D, 7 ff., is of critical importance to the outcome of the dialectical process of knowing (ἵν' εἰδῇς, 474 C, 4). This is a trick question of the type rhetors might pose; it presupposes that both doing injustice and suffering it are evils. But for Polus this is surely belied by the fact that the example of Archelaus strongly supports the idea that the doing of injustice can by no means be evil.

(b) Which of these two shameful things is more shameful?

Socrates subsequently draws upon a similar but slightly different question in order to more deeply ensnare Polus in the framework of his admissions. This time, αἴσχιον is used instead of κάκιον, and particularly in such a way that Polus cannot help but assert the distinction between these two terms. Not unexpectedly, Polus claims that τὸ ἀδικεῖν is more shameful than τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. His position becomes more understandable, if one conjures up the picture drawn by Plato in the *Protagoras*, where the sophist Protagoras states that:

> in justice and the rest of political virtue, even if they know that something is unjust, yet still, if he himself tells the truth about himself in front of many people, honesty which they elsewhere count as temperance they here count as madness; they say

> that everyone ought to claim to be just whether they are or not, or that anyone who doesn't pretend to justice is mad. Because they think everyone without exception must necessarily partake of it somehow or other, or not exist among men.
>
> (323 B, 2 ff., transl. by R.E. Allen)[20]

It turns out, then, that doing injustice produces shame, since virtually everyone agrees that one ought to pretend to be just regardless of whether he is just or not. But in posing a new question ("which seems to you more shameful, doing injustice or suffering it?", 474 C, 7) in exactly the same way as before, Socrates sets a similar trap for Polus: he in fact takes for granted that both doing injustice and suffering it are shameful things[21]. It is rather questionable whether Polus fully grasps the significance and implications of such questions. But he would definitely suggest that this is hardly the case: suffering injustice is not a shameful thing but rather perfectly compatible with what the vast majority of people approve: seeming justice.

(c) Exploring the interrelations between αἴσχιον and κάκιον

Polus' vigorous rejection of Socrates' identification of κάκιον with αἴσχιον ("if more shameful, then also worse?", 474 C, 8, cf. 474 D, 1) has the following implications:

(i) Polus distinguishes between what most people deem shameful and what they deem necessary in order to benefit from it; these two seem to oppose each other or be in deep conflict with each other. In other words, αἴσχιον refers to what is inconsistent with common/conventional morality, the morality of the multitude, while κάκιον refers to the individual harm. Polus' stance highlights the alleged conflict between what violates the dictates of conventional morality, thus being branded as disgraceful, and what conforms to them, and can thus be pursued by everyone in his own interest. One can easily suspect that, despite his apparent rejection of the identification suggested by Socrates, Polus is essentially bound to accept it: those seeking to imitate Archelaus in order to become enviable must ineluctably engage in unjust acts; failure to do so is shameful and would only bring on even more shame by bringing one into disgrace among his peers. Therefore, the discussion literally takes place at two levels: (1) a "seeming" level at which αἴσχιον opposes κάκιον, (2) a "being" level at which αἴσχιον is

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[20] ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ, ἐάν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός ἐστιν, ἐὰν οὗτος αὐτὸς καθ' αὑτοῦ τἀληθῆ λέγῃ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, ὃ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἡγοῦντο εἶναι, τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μανίαν, καί φασιν πάντας δεῖν φάναι εἶναι δικαίους, ἐάντε ὦσιν ἐάντε μή, ἢ μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον [δικαιοσύνην]· ὡς ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα ὄντιν' οὐχὶ ἁμῶς γέ πως μετέχειν αὐτῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις. Cf. Kahn 1983: 94; Shaw 2015: 115.

[21] This should prevent us from translating αἴσχιον as 'less admirable' (*pace* Dodds 1959: 248; cf. also Hall 1971: 207; Irwin 1979: 157).

identical with κάκιον. Plato shifts the discussion from one level to the other, and vice versa, each time focusing on where he wants us to do so;

(ii) Polus' distinction between αἴσχιον and κάκιον basically reflects the gap separating what most people display as outward behaviour from what they actually believe and eventually do; this involves a contradiction between one's inner state and his outward behavioural manifestation. In essence, Socrates' subsequent attempt to propose a definition of καλόν and αἰσχρόν aims at bridging that gap by exposing hypocritical behaviour and revealing truth. To that end, Socrates switches from the comparative degree (αἴσχιον, κάκιον) to the positive (καλόν, αἰσχρόν): before answering the question "which is more admirable (κάλλιον) or more shameful (αἴσχιον) of two things", one must know what καλόν or αἰσχρόν is.

(d) Defining καλόν and αἰσχρόν

Yet what people call καλόν[22]? Socrates underscores that for something to be called καλόν, it must meet one of the following criteria:

(i) usefulness: something is called καλόν *according to* its use or usefulness (κατὰ τὴν χρείαν, 474 D, 6; note that the pairs of terms χρεία/χρήσιμον [474 D, 6 f.] and ὠφελία/ὠφέλιμον [474 E, 3; 474 E, 7] are used interchangeably here), relative to whatever it is that it may be useful for;

(ii) pleasure: something is called καλόν *according to* a type of pleasure (κατὰ ἡδονήν τινα, 474 D, 7 f.), if it causes delight to the beholder in looking at it;

(iii) both usefulness and pleasure.

Criteria (i) and (ii) are accompanied by the preposition κατά, while the third is introduced at a point when κατά is being replaced with διά (474 E, 3). To be entirely accurate, however, staying closely to the Greek text in order to illustrate the interchangeability of κατά and διά (+ accus. = 'on account of'), we should put it in the following way:

(i_n) something is useful; therefore, it is according to, and on account of, its usefulness that it is called καλόν;

(ii_n) something is pleasant; therefore, it is according to, and on account of, its pleasantness that it is called καλόν;

(iii_n) something is both useful and pleasant; therefore, it is according to, and on account of, both its usefulness and pleasantness that it is called καλόν.

Polus seems to readily approve of Socrates' definition of καλόν, wittily – and to some extent ironically – punning on the words/phrases καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζῃ and ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν (475 A, 2–4). But looking closer at the exact formulation of the phrase ("You now give an admirable definition, Socrates,

[22] For a discussion of the notion of καλόν in ancient Greek thought, especially in Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon, see Dodds 1959: 249–251; Irwin 1979: 154–156. Cf. Kahn 1983: 93 f.; Plochmann, Robinson 1988: 90.

defining καλόν by pleasure and good", 475 A, 2–4[23]), we see that he virtually makes an additional admission: he identifies ἀγαθόν with the term χρήσιμον (or ὠφέλιμον; cf. also the terms χρεία and ὠφελία completing the two pairs respectively) used before by Socrates; and he seems to find no problem in substituting the former for the latter. Yet there is a considerable problem facing that identification; when applied to i_n, it brings about a certain result: "something is good (ἀγαθόν); therefore, it is according to, and on account of, its goodness that it is called καλόν" (i_{nn}). In doing so, Polus appears to contradict himself by endorsing the identification of ἀγαθόν with καλόν, which, however, he did reject at 474 D, 2. One may wonder whether he is aware of the contradiction here, or whether Plato portrays him as being so blindly driven by his ideas that he ultimately proves dialectically incompetent. The answer lies in the manner in which Plato chooses to construct the arguments of the passage under scrutiny: while Socrates' premises are formulated in a disjunctive construction signifying dissociation among three given terms (ἡδονή, ὠφελία, and ἀμφότερα, 474 E, 2 f., cf. 474 E, 7), Polus' response is placed in the conjunctive construction τὲ καί, often serving to unite either similar or opposite things (Smyth, Messing 1956: 667). One could argue that Polus, instead of favouring i_n, and, by extension, its revised version, namely, i_{nn}, is in fact a true advocate of iii_n. Suppose that this is the case: Polus must still offer a satisfactory explanation of the relationship between ἀγαθόν and καλόν; apart from this, he also has to clarify how (if at all) the terms ἀγαθόν and ἡδονή are related to each other. Nevertheless, Plato gives us a hint of how we should interpret this passage by having Polus respond in the conjunctive construction τὲ καί, which unravels a deep connection between the terms ἡδονή and ἀγαθόν. This particular construction leads one to suspect that Polus considers the terms identical: the pleasure derived from committing injustice may be considered the greatest benefit.

Polus' dialectical recklessness enables Socrates to specify what happens in the case of the opposite of καλόν, αἰσχρόν, by imitating his language: "then αἰσχρόν is defined by the opposite, by pain and evil?" (475 A, 4 f.)[24]. Let us waive for a moment Socrates' mimetic way of expressing himself, and imagine how he would have argued, had Polus not responded in the way he did:

(I_n) something is useless-harmful (we would have expected such words as βλάβη/βλαβερόν, and perhaps ἀ-χρεῖος/ἄχρηστος); therefore, it is according to, and on account of, its uselessness-harmfulness that it is called αἰσχρόν;

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[23] καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.

[24] Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ; Cf. Vlastos 1967: 455, n. 3; MacKenzie 1982: 84, n. 3; Kahn 1983: 88; Archie 1984: 168 f.; Johnson 1989: 202 f. For the whole argument here, cf., for example, Archie 1984; Berman 1991; Vasiliou 2002; Dalfen 2004: 290–295; Bensen Cain 2008: 214–225; Tarnopolsky 2010: 68–78.

(II_n) something is painful; therefore, it is according to, and on account of, its painfulness that it is called αἰσχρόν;

(III_n) something is both useless/harmful and painful; therefore, it is according to, and on account of, both its uselessness/harmfulness and painfulness that it is called αἰσχρόν.

Nevertheless, in mimetically adhering to Polus' style and language, Socrates highlights precisely the identification between ἡδονή and ἀγαθόν, which was formerly implied by Polus, through their opposites, λύπη and κακόν respectively. Yet straightaway he returns to his own manner of expression in order to concentrate upon the hitherto insurmountable problems; he therefore reverts to a disjunctive construction. Observe the following examples:

(i) of two admirable things (καλά), one is more admirable *because* it surpasses (ὑπερβάλλον) the other *either* in pleasure, *or* in benefit, *or* in both (ἤτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελίᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις, 475 A, 5–7);

(ii) of two shameful things (αἰσχρά), one is more shameful *because* it surpasses the other *either* in pain, *or* in evil, *or* in both (ἤτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ, 475 A, 8–B, 2. The last part, "*or* in both", though not mentioned at 475 B, 1, can be easily inferred from the context, cf. 475 B, 5–7).

Why does Socrates switch back and forth between his own manner of expression and that of Polus? And what has he managed to do so far? There are at least four aims that can be considered as having been accomplished:

(I) he elucidates that whenever we say that one thing is more admirable (κάλλιον) or more shameful (αἴσχιον) than another, we presuppose that both things are admirable (καλά) or shameful (αἰσχρά) respectively. This seems not to have been well considered by Polus (cf. 473 D, 7; 474 D), whose arguments allow for the possibility that one of two shameful things might be more admirable than the other;

(II) he introduces the definition of καλόν and αἰσχρόν with the ultimate aim of establishing a clear identification of ἀγαθόν with καλόν – and of κακὸν with αἰσχρόν – in which the former (ἀγαθόν/κακόν) is prior to the latter (καλόν/αἰσχρόν): something is καλὸν precisely because it is ἀγαθόν; similarly, something is αἰσχρόν precisely because it is κακόν (cf. above, pp. 20 f.);

(III) he makes clear that in endorsing his (Socrates') definition of καλόν and αἰσχρόν, Polus falls into self-contradiction. But at a deeper level, Socrates' mimetic irony, together with the introduction of ἡδονή undertaken in this part of the dialogue, underlines the identification of ἀγαθόν and κακόν with ἡδονή and λύπη advocated by Polus;

(IV) it is noteworthy that while Socrates switches back to a disjunctive construction, he makes one small change in the situation: though he resorts to the term he initially used, namely, ὠφελία (475 A, 7, cf. 474 E, 3), setting aside the word ἀγαθόν with which Polus replaced it (475 A, 3), he nonetheless sticks to the use of the term κακόν (475 B, 1, cf. 475 A, 5). Imitating Polus' language, Socrates

decides upon the term κακόν, whereas one would expect a term, such as βλάβη, corresponding to ὠφελία. He thus takes full advantage of the close relationship between these terms (ἀγαθόν-ὠφελία, κακόν-βλάβη) (to which his interlocutor actually contributed most fundamentally, aiming at identifying ἀγαθόν with ἡδονή) in order to dialectically countersign the development of a basis for identifying common ground upon which they can be not only intimately linked to each other, but probably identical and thereby freely interchangeable. Nevertheless, Socrates clings to the term κακόν for two main reasons: (1) it gives him a chance to re-ignite debate over which of these two evils, doing injustice and suffering injustice, is worse (κάκιον); (2) it fits perfectly into his disjunctive construction, which has the terms arranged in such a way that they are sufficiently wellmarked off from each other and no connection can be easily made between them. Thus, through the phrase ἤτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον, Socrates sharply distinguishes pain (λύπη) from evil (κακόν). In short, Socrates' ironic mimicry has not only revealed Polus' identification of ἀγαθόν and κακόν with ἡδονή and λύπη; it has opened the way for the incorporation of the term κακόν into disjunctive construction, thus obliging Polus to consent to a certain dialectical situation in which the two terms, λύπη and κακόν, are either separated or treated as distinct. If we also consider the possibility that Plato may want to lay particular emphasis on the alternative introduced by ἤτοι (see ἤτοι ἡδονῇ [...], 475 A, 7; ἤτοι λύπῃ [...], 475 B, 1), as is often the case in classical Greek (cf. Smyth, Messing 1956: 648; LSJ s.v. ἤ) and can be also supported by the construction at 475 B, 6 f. (ἤτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον), then we must suspect that he has a certain plan in his mind: his Socrates deliberately stresses the notion of pain, being fully aware of the significance Polus attaches to it; at the same time, however, he drives him, through the disjunctive construction, into a muddled stalemate, eventually forcing him to choose between pain (λύπη) and evil (κακόν).

(e) Application of the definition of καλόν and αἰσχρόν to the subject matter at issue

When it comes to applying the mutually agreed-upon definition of καλόν and αἰσχρόν to the idea Polus (like most people) promotes, namely, that doing injustice is more shameful (αἴσχιον) than suffering it, a number of implications can be observed:

(1) both doing injustice and suffering injustice are shameful things (αἰσχρά). It is strongly questionable whether Polus would applaud such an idea, were he not obliged by the agreed-upon definition to do so;

(2) upholding the idea that doing injustice is more shameful (αἴσχιον) than suffering it entails admitting that the former surpasses the latter (i) either in pain (λύπη), (ii) or in evil (κακόν), (iii) or in both (475 B, 5–7). Our previous suspicion is now further strengthened: through the use of ἤτοι (475 B, 6) and the rhetorical employment of a doublet comprised of the word λύπη and its cognate

(λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον, 475 B, 6 f.), Socrates places great emphasis on the notion of pain, thus putting Polus on the horns of a major dilemma. Choosing between λύπη and κακόν will inevitably have a detrimental effect upon Polus' identification of ἀγαθόν with ἡδονή, and of κακόν with λύπη. By no means, however, can he accept that doing injustice might exceed suffering it in pain: the vast amount of pleasure derived from committing injustice and gaining uncircumscribed power is surely not contemptible; on the contrary, it cannot but be, for Polus, the supreme good. Nevertheless, placed in such a force-choice dilemma, Polus ultimately becomes aware of the fact that he has to grudgingly make a choice. And this is clear from the variation in the answers he gives, which is evinced in terms of a gradation in certainty, from absolute confidence (in the idea that in no way can the doing of injustice surpass the suffering of it in pain) to answers roughly incomplete, hesitant and, to be sure, not entirely wilful (see 475 C, 3–9: Οὐδαμῶς → Οὐ δῆτα → Οὐ φαίνεται → Ναί → Ἔοικεν → Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι). Polus' obvious discomfiture is due to Plato's portraying the argument as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the thesis he originally proposed. He therefore has to concede that, in order for the doing of injustice (τὸ ἀδικεῖν) to be more shameful (αἴσχιον) than the suffering of injustice (τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι), it must exceed the latter in evil (κακόν). However difficult it may seem now, Polus must accept the newly-drawn conclusion; otherwise he could not remain firm in his idea that the pleasure of doing injustice is the absolute good.

How far, all things considered, has Socrates succeeded in achieving his aims? In establishing that doing injustice is worse (κάκιον), and on account of this more shameful (αἴσχιον), than suffering it, Socrates highlights not only the identification of κακόν with αἰσχρόν he himself *ab initio* set forth, but at the same time the causal/explanatory priority of the former over the latter. To achieve that end he actually needed a certain dialectical tactic: he applied the agreed-upon definition of καλόν and αἰσχρόν to the opinion of the many put forward by Polus, intending to prove that αἴσχιον can be determined solely through his dialectic, through the only *logos* remaining unrefuted; and this *logos* now dictates that what is κάκιον is αἴσχιον. What is most important here, however, is that Socrates manages to illuminate the identification of αἰσχρόν with κακόν by mulling over the notion of the former, yet without further reflecting on the latter (as he does at 477 A, 5). This is because the present part of the dialogue is largely devoted to constantly reminding us readers, whether covertly or overtly, of the role pleasure plays in Polus' way of thinking (cf. 465 A, 2: τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου), inevitably disqualifying him as dialectically competent interlocutor by rendering him profoundly entangled in self-contradiction.

(f) Vindication of the Socratic elenchus

The re-examination of the first part of the discussion (τὸ ἀδικεῖν vs. τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι) concludes with a verification of the truth of Socrates' utterances (475

E, 3, cf. above, pp. 19–22), together with the emergence of his type of elenchus – which brings forward only one witness, the interlocutor, to the truth of what one says (475 E, 7–476 E, 2, cf. above, p. 19) – as being sharply divergent from, and superior to, that of Polus. Conceding the present conclusion, the as yet unrefuted *logos*, no matter how rebarbative it may seem to Polus, and, by extension, to most people, will definitely turn out to their advantage (οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσῃ, 475 D, 6). However ironical it may sound, this is exactly what Socrates emphasises from the beginning of his conversation with Polus: being refuted is a great good for oneself (cf. above, pp. 8 f., 19–21). Thus, though not yet defined nor discussed in detail, κακόν actually serves to pave the way for the subsequent discussion of benefit and harm (477 A, 5 ff.). In view of this, it is very interesting to notice the impact κακόν creates when accompanied by the verb δέχομαι ('accept', 475 D, 4), a verb describing a state where the agent is unable to wish (βούλεσθαι) for good things (cf. above, pp. 10–12), and thereby has to choose between two evils. Therefore, choosing between doing injustice and suffering it is literally equivalent to choosing the lesser evil, namely, that which, as will be seen later, is less harmful to one's soul.

B. Re-examining the second part of the discussion: being punished for injustice (τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην) vs. not being punished (τὸ μὴ διδόναι)

(a) Which of these two evils is worse?

While the previous re-examination has more or less centred upon the definition of καλόν and αἰσχρόν, and their relationship with ἀγαθόν and κακόν respectively, this re-examination concentrates on κακόν *per se*, seeking to clarify how being punished and not being punished differ in respect of badness. There is no reason to doubt that Polus regards being left unpunished as no evil (κακόν); however, he is still obliged to treat it as such due to the dialectical requirement established at 475 E, 2 f. (Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον). Socrates' ironic presentation of not being punished for injustice as a greater evil than what Polus deems the greatest of evils, namely, being punished (476 A, 2–6), hints above all at the extremely high degree of badness characterising the state of being left unpunished. Yet in order to prove this assumption, Socrates must first launch into an extensive explanation of the nature of punishment.

(b) Determining the nature of punishment

Socrates' reasoning process comprises four steps: (i) identification of τὸ διδόναι δίκην ('being punished', literally 'giving right') with τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ('being justly chastised'); (ii) shift of emphasis to the way (δικαίως) in which punishment takes place; (iii) shift of emphasis to the nature of τὸ κολάζεσθαι; (iv) shifting back to τὸ διδόναι δίκην-conclusions. Let us examine each of these steps in more detail:

(i) identification of τὸ διδόναι δίκην with τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως: it is extremely noteworthy that Socrates proceeds to scrutinise the nature of τὸ διδόναι δίκην through its equivalent, τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως. In this way, he obviously attempts to ensure the necessary link between the previous discussion and the present one;

(ii) shift of emphasis to δικαίως: being just in its nature, the way punishment is inflicted upon the offender, as described by τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως, furnishes an appropriate occasion for speculating upon the nature of just things in connection with the previous definition of καλόν and αἰσχρόν. Within this framework, Socrates maintains that "all just things are admirable (καλά), insofar as they are just (δίκαια)"[25]. What is the aim of such a statement, which meets with Polus' approval, and what effect does it have upon him? First, Polus certainly cannot argue against the view that just things are admirable. As explained before (see above, pp. 22–24), this is a view all people must seem to share, irrespective of whether or not they actually follow it. Second, by integrating his previous definition of καλόν and αἰσχρόν into the investigation of the nature of τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως, Socrates alludes to the assumption that if just things (δίκαια) are admirable (καλά), then they must surely be *either* pleasant, *or* useful-beneficial, *or* both. He thus intimates, before even moving further in the discussion, that certain things are true of τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως: being justly chastised amounts to being admirably chastised, and thereby to being chastised *either* pleasantly, *or* usefully-beneficially, *or* both pleasantly and usefully;

(iii) shift of emphasis to τὸ κολάζεσθαι: delving deeper into the nature of τὸ κολάζεσθαι, one can see that it is actually a case of suffering something (πάσχειν). Yet one's suffering something presupposes that one inflicts (ποιεῖ, 476 B, 4) that suffering. This is to say that the quality of what is suffered is necessarily (ἀνάγκη, 476 B, 4; cf. 476 B, 7 f.; 476 C, 4; 476 D, 6; 477 A, 2) identical to that of the action causing the suffering (see τοῦτο [...] ὅ, 476 B, 5 f.; τοιοῦτον οἷον, 476 B, 6; cf. 476 B, 5–D, 4);

(iv) shifting back to τὸ διδόναι δίκην-conclusions: when switching back to τὸ διδόναι δίκην ('being punished'), it turns out that τὸ διδόναι δίκην (= τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως) is a case of suffering what is just (δίκαια πάσχει, 476 E, 3), necessarily presupposing that someone does what is just (δίκαια ποιῶν, 476 E, 1) by chastising correctly (Ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως κολάζει; 476 D, 8–E, 1). Yet, being identical to suffering what is just, τὸ διδόναι δίκην (= τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως) amounts to suffering admirable things (δίκαια = καλά, cf. 476 B, 1f.; 476 E, 3 f.), namely, *either* pleasant *or* useful-beneficial things, and thereby is equivalent to suffering good things (Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά; ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα, 477 A, 1 f.).

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[25] τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλά ἐστιν, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια (476 B, 1 f.).

Upon closer examination of the reasoning process, one cannot but acknowledge the masterful manner in which Socrates handles the discussion: he not only expressly joins together τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως and the previous agreed-upon definition of καλόν (= *either* pleasant, *or* useful, *or* both), but also reintroduces the identification of καλόν with ἀγαθόν (and of αἰσχρόν with κακόν) suggested at 474 D, 1 and proved at 475 D, 5. Yet what are the ultimate goals Socrates sets out to achieve? In order to show that suffering admirable things (καλά) amounts to suffering good things (ἀγαθά), he first resorts to the previous definition of καλόν, according to which something is καλόν on account of *either* its usefulness, *or* its pleasantness, *or* both. But we should be reminded here of the actual procedure that led to such a seemingly clear, agreed-upon definition: on the one hand, Socrates, in using a disjunctive construction, clearly ascertained and demarcated the boundaries between the terms ὠφελία and ἡδονή; Polus, on the other hand, replacing ὠφελία with ἀγαθόν, found recourse to a conjunctive construction in which ἡδονή and ἀγαθόν appeared identical but had eventually to split under the pressure of Socrates' dialectic. And while Socrates formerly employed the term κακόν (475 A, 5) to mimic Polus' language, his use of ἀγαθόν now seems at first sight rather strange: "Then if [they are] admirable things, [aren't they] good things? For [they are] either pleasant or useful-beneficial" (477 A, 1 f.)[26].

Socrates has shown that καλόν and ἀγαθόν are identical (the same also holds for their opposites, αἰσχρόν and κακόν), the latter being causally prior to (or, a causally sufficient condition for) the former. Accordingly, we would rather expect him, following the Greek text closely, to express himself as follows: "Then if [they are] admirable things, [they are] either pleasant, or useful-beneficial, or both", without making use of ἀγαθόν. Here, however, Socrates says: "Then if admirable things, good things? For either pleasant or useful-beneficial". Had he simply wanted to re-imitate Polus' language, he could have said something such as: "Then if [they are] admirable things, [aren't they] pleasant (ἡδέα) and good (ἀγαθά)?", but Socrates has no such intention here. Then what is the role and significance of ἀγαθόν in his own statement? A careful investigation of this passage reveals that Socrates throws himself into a series of actions: he maintains the disjunctive construction (clear distinction between the terms involved), cuts ἀγαθά off from their close interlocking with ἡδέα, puts ἀγαθά in a place where they can be considered as referring either to pleasant things (ἡδέα) or to useful-beneficial things (ὠφέλιμα), segregates and abolishes ἡδέα, and finally reaches the conclusion that "he who is punished (ὁ δίκην διδούς) suffers good things (ἀγαθά), and is therefore benefited (ὠφελεῖται)" (477 A, 2 f.). Such a conclusion: (1) seems consistent with everything that has been said before, but the actual way in which Socrates has arrived at it has eluded Polus' perception

[26] Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά; ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα.

altogether; (2) promotes Socrates' identification of καλόν with ἀγαθόν; (3) isolates ἡδύ, and finally displaces it; (4) establishes the identification of ἀγαθόν with ὠφέλιμον. What remains now is to identify the type of benefit Socrates is referring to and determine whether or not it is agreeable to Polus.

(c) Determination of the nature of benefit (ὠφελία) – definition of *eudaimonia*

(i) A quick reminder

Readers, if they are to fully apprehend all aspects or implications of the problems posed for the subsequent discussion, must bear in mind precisely what this very discussion recalls, namely, the disputation on the healthy condition (εὐεξία) of the body and soul that took place at 464 A, 2 ff.: given that a certain healthy condition exists both for body and soul, there are four crafts (τέχναι) serving what is best for each of these (ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν). In particular, gymnastics (γυμναστική) and medicine (ἰατρική) are two parts of a single craft serving the body. On the other hand, legislation (νομοθετική) and justice (δικαιοσύνη), as parts of the craft of politics (πολιτική), are devoted to the service of the soul. Paraphrasing the text, one can say that gymnastics and legislation refer to the preservation of the health (virtue) of the body and soul respectively, while medicine and justice definitely refer to its restoration.

(ii) Clarifying the type of benefit punishment produces

After this digression, let us now return to the analysis of the text. Socrates has undertaken the task of illuminating the type of benefit (ὠφελία) that being justly chastised brings to the sufferer: "his soul becomes better" (477 A, 5 f.)[27], Socrates explicitly states, and this is due to the fact that the sufferer is relieved from badness of soul (κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται). To put it another way, one's becoming better in one's soul (psychic improvement) is one's getting rid of one's soul's badness. This is strongly reminiscent of the conclusion we drew at 458 A, 2–5 (cf. above, pp. 8 f.), where the greatest good, as produced by the elenchus, amounts to deliverance from the greatest evil (false beliefs about "the greatest things"), the good being defined in terms of non-evil. Yet what is most noteworthy here is that getting rid of the badness of the soul amounts, according to Socrates, to getting rid of the greatest evil (τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ, 477 A, 8–B, 1). We can go one step further and notice the analogy Socrates draws between his elenchus and punishment[28]: just as the elenchus delivers one from the greatest evil, false beliefs about "the greatest things", so too punishment rids one of the greatest evil (= one's soul's badness), injustice. What Socrates gets us to see is the deep connection between false

[27] βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται.

[28] Cf. Moss 2007: 232–236.

beliefs about "the greatest things", namely, ignorance concerning τὰ μέγιστα and injustice.

(iii) Enumeration, estimation, and evaluation of vices (κακίαι)

Yet why is badness of the soul considered the greatest evil? In order to give a fully satisfactory answer to the question above, Socrates plunges into an enumeration, classification, and evaluation of human vices. More specifically, he goes on to say that in respect of three things, money, body, and soul, there are three vices, namely, poverty, disease, and injustice (477 B, 8–C, 2). It should be noted here that, while at 477 B, 4 f. Socrates speaks of various manifestations of bodily vices, including those of weakness (ἀσθένεια), disease (νόσος), and ugliness (αἶσχος), and at 477 B, 7 names three manifestations of the vice of soul, namely, injustice (ἀδικία), ignorance (ἀμαθία), and cowardice (δειλία), he nonetheless confines himself to using the terms νόσος and ἀδικία as the representatives of the vices of body and soul respectively. But this remains puzzling: why not stick with the various manifestations introduced instead of resorting to their representatives? To answer this question, one must keep in mind that the chief objective Socrates sets at 477 A, 7–B, 1 is to prove that badness of soul is the greatest evil. In view of such an overarching purpose, it seems to me that there are at least three factors which account for this resort: (1) the two terms, νόσος and ἀδικία, form a nexus of concepts which are denuded of the notions usually accompanying them; together with πενία, they appear so easily approachable to Polus that any agreement between them could be carried out without obstacles; (2) ἀδικία is without doubt the main topic of their discussion; this being so, any attempt on Plato's part to focus on it seems rather justifiable. Its conjunction with νόσος transpires from the analogy Plato wants to draw between disease in the body and injustice in the soul (cf. above, p. 32, i); (3) Socrates' brief reference to the various manifestations of the vice of soul was part of Plato's intention in this section of the dialogue not only to corroborate the relationship between injustice (ἀδικία) and ignorance (ἀμαθία) (cf. above, p. 32, ii), but also to allude to the Socratic view of the unity of the virtues.

Agreement established, Socrates then seems to deploy the same line of questioning as before in order to elicit the same answers. To be more precise, the question "which of these vices is the most shameful (αἰσχίστη)"[29] is closely akin, if not identical, to the one posed at 474 C, 7 ("which of the two, doing injustice or suffering it, is more shameful?"). Polus' answers therefore inevitably follow the pattern set by Socrates: as a matter of fact, what Polus there deemed more shameful (doing injustice) is absolutely consistent with what he now considers as the most shameful vice (injustice). This need not surprise us, considering what most people, as shown previously (cf. above, pp. 22–24, 30 f.),

[29] 477 C, 2 f.

would approve of as being the type of behaviour one should appear to display, regardless of whether one surreptitiously acts in a totally different way. Yet there are a couple of things to observe here: (1) there is a clear shift from comparative (αἴσχιον, 474 C, 7) to superlative form (αἰσχίστη, 477 C, 3), a locution shift intended to intensify the significance of the subject matter; (2) by subtly narrowing down the focus on one particular manifestation of the vice of soul, injustice, and reintroducing the notion of shame in a way similar to the one used before, Plato challenges his readers to try to realise on their own, before even reading further, how the subsequent line of reasoning will unfold. The careful reader therefore, reading Socrates' statement that "injustice and all vice of soul is most shameful" (477 C, 3 f.), will recall that Socrates from 474 C, 8 (Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἴπερ αἴσχιον) onwards was chiefly engaged in the enterprise of establishing the identification of αἰσχρόν with κακόν, and thereby expect that a similar procedure will be followed here. These expectations, generated through readers' success in following Socrates' lead, are eventually confirmed by the latter's own words: "If indeed most shameful, also worst?" (477 C, 4 f.)[30].

(iv) Getting across the assertion "injustice and all vice of soul, if indeed most shameful, is also worst"

The text makes it quite clear that Polus expresses great astonishment at Socrates' wording (Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις; 477 C, 5). As expected, Socrates' reasoning in the subsequent passage (477 C, 6 ff.) unfolds through a series of assertions resembling those formulated at 475 B, 3 ff., except that now three shameful things are mentioned, and the main debate revolves around which one among them is the most shameful. As regards Socrates' vocabulary here, it certainly looks as though Socrates sets aside for the moment the term κακόν, which he used at 475 A, 5, borrowing it from Polus' phraseology; he rather employs the term βλάβη, precisely because he wishes to conduct the discussion in terms of benefits and harms, with the ultimate aim of showing even more clearly that the two terms, βλάβη and κακόν, are so closely connected as to be indistinguishable (see 477 E, 3 f., cf. above, pp. 31 f.). Sticking to the disjunctive construction, Socrates distinguishes between pain (λύπη) and harm (βλάβη), these two being considered identical by Polus (cf. above, pp. 25–27, 31 f.). The emphasis Socrates particularly places upon λύπη (ἤτοι λύπην μεγίστην, 477 C, 6; ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνίᾳ ὑπερβάλλον, 477 D, 2; cf. 475 B, 6 f.) ingeniously leads Polus to deny that injustice and all vice of soul, namely, (the quality of) "being unjust, intemperate, cowardly, and ignorant" (477 D, 4 f.)[31], could be more painful (ἀλγεινότερον) than poverty or disease; to be sure, this is a claim Polus himself, as shown before, can hardly accept. Such being the case, one

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[30] Εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;

[31] τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ.

notes that Polus is deeply entangled in the net of Socrates' dialectic (*pace* Dodds 1959: 253) forcing him to concede – though he is loath to do so – that injustice, and vice of soul in general (namely, injustice, intemperance, and the other vices of the soul, cf. 477 C, 3 f.; 477 C, 9; 477 D, 4 f.; 477 E, 1; 477 E, 5), is the most shameful of all the vices, *precisely because* it surpasses the others by some monstrously great harm (ὑπερφυεῖ τινι [...] ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ) and extraordinary evil (καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ). No doubt there is a fondness for hendiadys here (βλάβῃ καὶ κακῷ) – if κακῷ θαυμασίῳ is to be retained (cf. Dodds 1959: 253), paronomasia (ὑπερφυεῖ [...] ὑπερβάλλουσα), and rhetorical hyperbole reverberating throughout the passage (477 D, 6–E, 2), by means of which Socrates tries to establish that it is *precisely because* vice of soul (as a whole) is the worst (κακίστη) of the vices, namely, exceeds the others in harm and thereby is the greatest of all evils (μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν, 477 E, 6; cf. above, p. 33, iii), that it is the most shameful (αἰσχίστη). One cannot fail to notice that in this passage Socrates makes strenuous efforts to (1) fortify the identification of αἰσχρόν with κακόν through arguments redolent of the causal/explanatory priority of the latter over the former (cf. above, pp. 28 f., 31 f.); (2) shed additional light on the identity of the greatest harm (μεγίστη βλάβη) and greatest evil (μέγιστον κακόν) (cf. above, pp. 24 f., 31 f.); (3) clear up the statement he made at 472 C, 7 f. ("[...] things about which it is most admirable [κάλλιστον] to know and most shameful [αἴσχιστον] not to know"[32]) in view of the idea that vice of soul as a whole is the greatest evil and therefore most shameful (cf. above, pp. 20 f., 32 f.); (4) elucidate the expressions ἀδικῶν ('he who does injustice') and ἄδικος (ὤν) ('he who is unjust') (472 D, 2 f.; 472 E, 4 f.), whose co-occurrence created a stunning impact on readers, through the use of the phrase τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ (477 D, 4 f.): ἄδικος (ὤν) refers to all vice of soul, while ἀδικῶν refers presumably to (the act of) doing injustice.

(v) Reasoning about the crafts relieving the above vices

After reflecting on the vices related to humans, Socrates immediately passes on to the crafts involved in getting rid of them, thus reminding us of the discussion conducted at 464 A, 6 ff. (cf. above, pp. 32 f.). One can naturally expect, following Socrates' reasoning, that the craft (τέχνη) relieving the worst and most shameful of all vices (vice of soul) is most admirable; or, in other words, that the greatest benefit actually consists in one's being delivered from the greatest harm. But let us not get ahead of ourselves and instead return to the text. At this point Socrates notes that there are three crafts, money-making (χρηματιστική), medicine (ἰατρική), and justice (δίκη), ridding people of the above-mentioned three vices, namely, poverty, disease, and vice of soul as a whole (injustice, intemperance, cowardice, and ignorance, the last two not being mentioned at

[32] ταῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἴσχιστον.

478 B, 1 but implied, cf. 477 E, 5), respectively. Once he has gained Polus' assent to that claim, Socrates can now (478 A, 7) define sufficiently the sense in which he used the expression ὁ ὀρθῶς κολάζων at 476 D, 8 (cf. above, pp. 31 f.): those who chasten correctly (οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες) certainly employ a type of justice (δικαιοσύνῃ τινὶ χρώμενοι) in doing so; accordingly, those being chastened correctly are being acted upon justly (cf. above, pp. 8 f., 28–30). It should be noted here that while Socrates makes use of both the terms κακία and πονηρία to refer to all human vices (cf. 477 A, 7–B, 5; 477 B, 8–C, 2), the term πονηρία is gradually restricted to vice of soul (see κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς, 477 A, 7; ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν, 477 B, 5 f.; cf. 477 C, 3f.; 477 C, 9; 477 E, 1; 477 E, 5; 478 A, 1). More specifically, from 478 A, 1 onwards πονηρία seems to be deliberately used instead of ἀδικία or vice of soul in general (see, for example, τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; 478 A, 1; τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας, 478 D, 4 f.; καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη, 478 D, 6 f.). The reason for this is that Plato wants to draw our attention to what must above all be placed at the centre of human concern, namely, how to avoid or get rid of the greatest evil (vice of soul).

As stated above (cf. pp. 33–35), the astute reader knows, before being told, how Socrates' reasoning about the most admirable (κάλλιστον, 478 B, 3) of the crafts under discussion is to be unfolded. It seems very likely that Plato bids us readers to take part in the discussion as additional voiceless but scrupulous interlocutors. Such meticulous listeners, following each step of Socrates' previous reasoning processes, cannot but expect to hear that of the three aforementioned crafts, one is the most admirable (κάλλιστον) *precisely because* it is the best, producing the greatest benefit by relieving the greatest harm; and this (craft) cannot be other than justice (δίκη). To be sure, this is now the third time (cf. 475 B, 3 ff.; 477 C, 6 ff.; cf. also 474 D, 3 ff.) Socrates follows (478 B, 3 ff.) more or less the same pattern of argumentation: in order for something (here a craft) to be most admirable (κάλλιστον), it must produce *either* the greatest pleasure (ἡδονὴν πλείστην), *or* (the greatest) benefit (ὠφελίαν), *or* both. Grabbing the opportunity arising from Polus' admission that justice (δίκη) far excels (πολὺ διαφέρει, 478 B, 5) the other crafts, Socrates tries to definitively consolidate its excellence through the use of the same phraseology he used before. In particular, he preserves the disjunctive construction, while his preference for ἤτοι (478 B, 6) as the most suitable means of introducing the first part of the disjunction lays bare his intention to re-emphasise the notion of pleasure (ἡδονή) for the sake of Polus (cf. above, pp. 24–29). At the same time, however, if he is to get down to the nitty-gritty of his argument and deflect the focus away from pleasure, Socrates has to pick up an example that is both easily apprehensible to Polus and too hard to question. This explains why he appeals to the example of disease (478 B, 7 ff.): being medically treated, though certainly not pleasant, is beneficial (ὠφέλιμον) *precisely because* one gets rid of a great evil (μεγάλου γὰρ

κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, 478 C, 1), disease, and is therefore worth one's while. By means of such a strong and incontrovertible example, Socrates manages now to firmly separate pleasure (ἡδονή) from benefit (ὠφελία), redirecting the focus away from the former towards the latter (cf. above, pp. 25–28, 31 f.). The conclusion Socrates eventually reaches is that a craft is admirable *precisely because* it produces great benefit (or, in other words, *precisely because* it is good) by relieving a great evil. This serves a twofold purpose: (1) to provide – through defining what is meant by 'good' and therefore 'admirable' craft – an implicit but clear answer to Polus' initial assertion (448 C, 8 f.) that Gorgias, being among the best men getting a share of the best crafts, partakes of the most admirable of the crafts[33]; (2) to pave the way for the body–soul analogy and the subsequent emergence of justice (δίκη) as the most admirable craft relieving the greatest evil.

(vi) Socrates' definition of *eudaimonia*

Yet there is still an important parameter to be specified in order for the above conclusion to be more comprehensive: not being ill to begin with is indicative, as far as the body is concerned, of one's being *eudaimonestatos*. With this utterance Socrates actually exemplifies his definition of *eudaimonia*, which holds that *eudaimonia* does not consist in relief from evil but rather in its non-acquisition to begin with[34].

Admittedly, the example of bodily disease helps us to grasp what happens in the case of a sick-unjust soul by drawing an analogy between body and soul (cf. above, p. 33)[35]: if the craft getting rid of disease (medicine) produces great benefit by relieving a great evil (cf. 478 C, 1), then the craft getting rid of injustice (justice) definitely produces the greatest benefit by relieving the greatest evil. This not only *explains why* justice is the most admirable (κάλλιστον) of the crafts, but also prompts further observations about Socrates' overall strategy: firstly, through the body–soul analogy, Socrates succeeds in showing us how much more significant is the case of the soul being faced with the greatest evil, a fact which becomes even more evident when at 478 D, 5 the use of the term πονηρία is unequivocally restricted to vice of soul; secondly, the element of pleasure dwindles in significance compared to the greatest benefit derived from gaining relief from the greatest evil through justice-punishment (cf. 479 A, 5–C, 6); thirdly, it eventually turns out that being justly punished, namely, relieved of the greatest

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[33] [...] τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι· ὧν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὅδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν. Cf. Plochmann, Robinson 1988: 81, 94.

[34] Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις (478 C, 5 f.).

[35] In Dodds' words (1959: 254), "Plato's medical approach to the problem of delinquency represents an immense moral advance both on the primitive *lex talionis* and on the irrational conception of guilt as an infectious pollution which so deeply influenced early Greek law".

evil, amounts to becoming temperate and more just (Σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ, 478 D, 6; cf. 477 A, 3–B, 1).

Yet the body–soul analogy does not stop here; it remains to be seen how the definition of *eudaimonia* formulated at 478 C, 5 f. applies to the case of the soul. And one suspects, of course, that this was the intended purpose of that analogy: namely, to show the similarities between something known (body) and something less known or at best ignored (soul), yet with the ultimate aim of establishing the superiority of the latter over the former – as Socrates on many occasions tries to do (cf. 465 C, 8–D, 1; 479 B, 3–C, 4; 493 A, 2 f.; 512 A, 5–B, 2) – and thereby the necessity of the latter's being cared for. Accordingly, at 478 C, 3 Socrates spoke of περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος, whereas at 478 D, 7 f. he simply says εὐδαιμονέστατος, thus seeming to be suggesting that the only *eudaimonia* that really matters is the one related to the human soul. Therefore, when it comes to applying the definition of *eudaimonia* to the soul, or, much better, when it comes to true *eudaimonia*, the following classification emerges:

(1) *eudaimonestatos* is the one who has no vice in his soul, namely, the one who abstains from injustice, intemperance, and vice of the soul as a whole, and thereby has not acquired the greatest evil-harm;

(2) second (δεύτερος) and less wretched (yet not *eudaimon*, as the text clearly implies, cf. 478 C, 5; 478 E, 1–4) is the man who gets rid of the greatest evil by being correctly-justly punished;

(3) the worst life (κάκιστα ζῇ) is led by him who has vice in his soul (the greatest evil) and does not get rid of it; this renders him the most wretched of all men (cf. 478 D, 1–3). Socrates' reference to "the worst life" bids us further reflect upon the interplay between virtue and *eudaimonia* in the *Gorgias*. Let us therefore try to reconstruct the above classification in view of that interaction:

(1) the one who has no vice in his soul (the greatest evil) leads the best life and therefore is *eudaimonestatos*;

(2) the man who has vice in his soul but gets rid of it leads a less bad life, and therefore is less wretched (note that βελτίων at 477 A, 5 f., or even δικαιοτέρους at 478 D, 6 are determined on the basis of the relief from their opposites);

(3) the man who has vice in his soul and does not get rid of it (cf. 479 D, 3) leads the worst life, and therefore is the most wretched of all men (cf. 479 E, 3 f.).

From the above one can clearly see that there is a cause-and-effect relationship holding between κάκιστα ζῇ and ἀθλιώτατος, or, in other words, between κακία and wretchedness: keeping the worst and most shameful of all vices (the worst life) brings one the greatest wretchedness. On the other hand, leading a life where one refrains from the worst and most shameful of all vices is tantamount, as implied in the text, to leading the best life, bringing one the greatest *eudaimonia*. To be sure, a closer examination of the text not only corroborates these claims, but also brings out the following striking conclusions:

(1) being relieved of the greatest evil, vice of soul, constitutes the greatest benefit;

(2) refraining from vice of soul represents the health, virtue, and well-being of the soul;

(3) not possessing vice of soul, owing to one's abstinence from it, is equivalent to *eudaimonia*.

It seems right therefore to infer that throughout his conversation with Polus, Socrates takes pains to define such terms as 'benefit', 'virtue of soul', and *eudaimonia* through their opposites; thus, 'benefit' turns out to denote non-harm, 'virtue' non-vice, and *eudaimonia* non-wretchedness.

(d) Applying the above conclusions to the case of Archelaus

All things considered, Archelaus and the other tyrants, orators, and potentates fall into that category where men have vice in their souls and do not get rid of it; they rather gather all their efforts to evade punishment, driven by the desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain. It is precisely this very application of the conclusions reached above that furnishes Socrates with an occasion to complete the body–soul (and thereby medicine–justice) analogy: all the aforementioned tyrants, orators, and potentates actually behave in roughly the same way as those who, though they are afflicted with the greatest diseases, strive to avoid treatment lest it be painful and therefore deprive them of pleasure. Yet the primary cause of such behaviour, namely, of cowardice (φοβούμενος, 479 A, 8 f.) related to choosing what truly benefits one's body is neither more nor less than their ignorance concerning bodily health and virtue. Indeed, ignorance forms the basis for the body–soul (and medicine–justice) analogy: being ignorant of what truly benefits one's body has its counterpart in being ignorant of what truly benefits one's soul; yet, when compared to each other, the latter is definitely what matters most (cf. 479 B, 7 f.). Accordingly, those fleeing just punishment (οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, 479 B, 5) strain to increase or at best ensure pleasure and avoid pain, thus displaying cowardice (cf. above, pp. 32 f., 34 f.) with respect to opting for what is best–most beneficial to their souls; but the reason for this is that they are blind, ignorant of the true benefit of their souls, cowardice being thus regarded as a manifestation of ignorance (cf. *Lach*. 194 E; 196 D; 199 A–D). Although Socrates does not ponder on the unity of the virtues in the *Gorgias* (cf. *Lach*. 198 D–199 E; *Prt*. 329 C–D; 349 A ff. ; 359 A–360 E), he nonetheless leaves us in no doubt as to how we should interpret their interaction: injustice, intemperance, cowardice (cf. above, pp. 32 f., 34 f., 37), and impiety (cf. 479 C, 1) are clear manifestations of ignorance concerning what benefits the soul. While injustice seems to enjoy pride of place owing to the fact that it is the matter at hand, Socrates hastens to remind us of its indissoluble connection with ignorance (cf. above, pp. 32–35, 38) by highlighting the superiority of the soul over the body to a large extent in terms of ignorance, and thereby shedding full light upon the destructive effects of perpetuating the vice one has in one's soul. It has now become abundantly clear that the reason Socrates emphasises the notion of pleasure (cf. above, pp. 26–29, 33,

36 f.) throughout his conversation with Polus is that he wants to castigate *the majority of people* for their propensity to imitate the practices of tyrants and orators who, being fully ignorant of the true benefit, treat pleasure as the only good thing.

C. General conclusions – verification of the truth of Socrates' words

Socrates' summing up of the conclusions at which they have arrived (479 C, 8–E, 9) takes place primarily in terms of wretchedness, aiming to complete his reprimand against the majority: not being punished when one has done injustice, as Archelaus did and most people do crave to mimic him, has turned out to be by nature (πέφυκεν, 479 D, 6) the greatest of all evils, unavoidably rendering one the most wretched of all people. Eventually, through the proof of the truth of Socrates' views (cf. 479 E, 8), as well as through the predominance of his elenchus over that of Polus (cf. above, p. 21), Plato manages to show that injustice, and its perpetuation, is a far cry from *eudaimonia*.

CONCLUSIONS

Any attempts to reconstruct Socrates' theory of evil-doing causing psychic disorder (disease/vice of soul as a whole, namely ignorance, injustice, intemperance, impiety, and cowardice) and then transpiring from it on the basis of the exchange with Polus, should always take into account that doing (ποιεῖν) evil (a) necessarily implies suffering (πάσχειν) evil; (b) takes place at three levels: the level before disease is manifested in the soul, the level at which it is manifested, and the level of its perpetuation (this part of the dialogue focuses on the last two levels). Let us therefore conclude this paper with what forms evil-doing (and suffering) take in view of these considerations, and how this helps us to understand for ourselves in what doing good and *eudaimonia* actually consist:

1st level: evil done in ignorance concerning what benefits the soul.	
2nd level: disease in the soul (vice of soul acquired through evil done in ignorance).	*2nd level*: gaining relief from vice of soul.
This level comprises two stages, the first being the cause of the second.	This level comprises two stages, the first being the cause of the second.
1st stage: *doing evil* means not making use of the (Socratic) elenchus to refute myself first, and then others, with respect to what benefits the human soul. Since *doing evil* implies *suffering evil*, myself suffers first (greater evil), and then someone else's (lesser evil) (cf. above, p. 8 f.).	*1st stage*: *doing good* means employing the Socratic elenchus to refute myself first, and then others, with respect to what benefits the human soul. Since *doing good* implies *suffering good*, myself suffers first (greater good), and then someone else's (lesser good).

2nd stage: *doing evil* means not subjecting myself, and others, whether friends or foes, to just punishment (cf. 480 A, 6 ff.; 480 E, 5 ff.).	*2nd stage*: *doing good* means subjecting myself, and others, whether friends or foes, to just punishment.
3rd level: progression and perpetuation of the disease/vice of soul.	*3rd level*: preservation-perpetuation of the health/virtue of soul.
Doing evil means keeping the vice (cf. 479 D, 3) first in my soul, and then in the souls of others, in the belief that this ensures me pleasure. Guided by ignorance concerning what benefits the human soul, I keep depriving both myself and other wrongdoers (namely, the sufferers of that evil-doing) of the knowledge of the true benefit, thus contributing to the multiplication of evil-doing. *Doing evil* means, by extension, continuing doing injustice and letting other offenders do so too. Yet among the victims who suffer wrongdoing one might count those having acquired the knowledge of good and evil (cf. 480 E, 6 f.). To sum up, therefore, *doing evil*, at this level, means being guided by ignorance concerning what benefits the human soul, and thereby keeping depriving both myself and other offenders of the knowledge of the true benefit (and therefore of the possibility to restore the health of our souls), as well as other non-offenders of their acquired knowledge (thus affecting the health of their souls).	*Doing good* means preserving the health/virtue of my soul, as well as that of the souls of others, through abstaining from injustice and vice of soul in general. Guided by knowledge of good and evil (cf. κάλλιστον, 472 C, 7 f.), I keep on refraining from injustice, thus benefiting myself and others. Yet this is not the only benefit conferred upon others; the text implicitly but clearly favours the transmissibility of such knowledge. What seemed difficult, not to say impossible, at level 1, since one had primarily to rid of vice in his own soul, now binds those whose soul remains healthy and virtuous, owing to the guidance of the knowledge of good and evil. They have first to guard against being wronged (cf. 480 E, 6 f.) and then, following Socrates' lead, to use his elenchus to test the ideas and beliefs of others, and, if needed, to subject them to just punishment, thus transmitting their knowledge to them.

The above division into three levels is far from absolute; on another reading, one might say that either levels 2 and 3, or stages 1 and 2 (of level 2) must be conflated. Be that as it may, one cannot fail to see that there is a deep connection between the elenchus and just punishment (cf. above, pp. 32 f.), and that rhetoric, if properly used, can serve Socrates' dialectic in the best way possible (cf. above, pp. 21 f.). While the elenchus, admittedly, precedes just punishment, they are similar in that they both get rid, each in its time, of the greatest evils; the former of false beliefs about "the greatest things", and the latter of vice of soul as a whole. Rhetoric, therefore, may prove very useful for facilitating justice. Yet

what value is to be put upon it after it completes its task? At 481 B, 1–5 Socrates doubts whether rhetoric could have much use for the person who does not intend to do injustice; he even doubts whether it has any use at all (481 B, 4). Should we take his words at face value? And if so, why not say also that the elenchus has no value for the person who has been delivered first from ignorance and then from vice of soul as a whole?

This requires further elaboration on the nature of the elenchus. Is it a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad? Is it of any use to the person preserving the health/virtue of his or her soul? Based on Socrates' line of reasoning unfolding at 467 C, 5 onwards (cf. above, pp. 9 ff.), one can see that the elenchus resembles the medicines taken for the sake of health, or the sea-voyages made for the sake of wealth; to put it another way, it is neither good nor bad, a probably painful thing, done for the sake of good (remember that "humans wish the good things"), that is, wisdom. Yet how this is consistent with Socrates' statement (at 458 A, 5–B, 1, cf. above, pp. 8 f.) that "being refuted is a greater good"? Take a look again at the statement: "For I count being refuted a greater good, insofar as it is a greater good for oneself to be delivered from the worst thing there is than to deliver someone else from it. I don't suppose there's anything quite so bad for a person as having false belief about the things we're discussing right now" (transl. by D. Zeyl). We might paraphrase the text as follows: "I count the elenchus a good thing insofar as it delivers someone from the greatest evil"; yet, this is not always the case. The elenchus is the greatest good for humans insofar as it partakes, as neither good nor bad, of the greatest good for humans: through the elenchus, one gets rid of the greatest evil, false beliefs about *ta megista*; there are times, however, when it partakes of evil. This explains why Socrates launched into juxtaposing (cf. above, pp. 18 f.) his type of elenchus, which is directed towards truth, with that of Polus, which seeks to distort and conceal it. Yet one can go even further than this. Upon closer examination, one can see yet another juxtaposition permeating the discussion with Polus; that between the rhetoric employed by Polus (and the many), which is of no value at all, and the one Socrates proposes, which, being at the service of dialectic, is an extremely useful means of disseminating the truth about the real good to those having false opinions about it, and thereby of facilitating justice (cf. above, pp. 21 f.; *Ap*. 18 A, 5 f.)[36]. It would be no exaggeration to suggest that it is precisely in this underlying juxtaposition that the definition of rhetoric as "a way of guiding souls

[36] Cf. Plochmann, Robinson 1988: 79, 99; Stauffer 2006: 80 f. On the idea that Socrates in the *Gorgias* is pointing to a kind of "noble" rhetoric, see, for example, Stauffer 2006: 123–140, 177–182. Cf. Black 1958; Lewis 1986; Weiss 2003. On the relationship between Plato's dialogues (most notably, *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*) and Aristotle's rhetorical theories, see Hellwig 1973; Ryan 1979. Moreover, Benardete (1991: 2) attempts to establish a linkage between the *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* in order to suggest that these dialogues construct a complete psychology, a psychology in which "the locus of moral indignation and the love of the beautiful in the human soul are properly understood".

through words" (*Phdr.* 261 A–B) can be traced in germinal form (cf. also *Grg.* 503 D–505 B).

There remains the question of whether Socrates' elenchus and elenctic rhetoric have any use for the person who has been delivered from vice of soul as a whole, and how they are related to his or her *eudaimonia*. It seems to me that in the exchange with Polus there are strong hints that the elenchus, which was used as a painful means of delivering one from ignorance, and subsequently from vice of soul as a whole, now becomes a tool in the hands of the former sufferer, a tool that he pleasantly employs (cf. 458 A, 2–5) to deliver others from ignorance, thus transmitting his newly acquired knowledge to them. In other words, by its nature, the elenchus, after being painfully suffered for the sake of knowledge of *ta megista*, makes one realise the benefits that that knowledge provides, and thereby pleasantly eager to transmit it to others.

In view of such considerations, how can people lead *eudaimones* lives? In what does *eudaimonia* actually consist? At 478 C, 5 f., Socrates defines *eudaimonia* not as "relief from evil", but as "non-acquisition/possession of evil to begin with" (cf. above, pp. 36 f.). My belief is that achieving *eudaimonia* as defined above is in some sense impossible for human beings. There are many cases where things are beyond human control, and even the person preserving the health/virtue of his soul is forced to suffer either injustice or some accident (this is dealt with in *Prt.* 345 B, 2–5[37]), thus becoming deprived of his knowledge and affected in respect to his soul's health. This being the case, and given the variability of human affairs, one can hardly avoid acquiring evil; thus, *eudaimonia* seems impossible. Yet, as far as human control is concerned, one can attain a state of non-, or, much better, less wretchedness by directing all his efforts towards (1) guarding against being wronged, (2) keeping on refraining from injustice and vice of soul as a whole, and (3) propagating the significance of both being refuted and refuting others, with the ultimate aim of disseminating the truth-knowledge of good and evil.

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[37] οὕτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε καὶ κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος – αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ πρᾶξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι ("So too the good man could on occasion also become bad, due to time or toil or disease or some other accident – for the only bad practice is to be deprived of knowledge", transl. by R.E. ALLEN, 345 B, 2–5 BURNET).

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DICEARCHUS (FR. 41 MIRHADY) ON PYTHAGORAS' DEATH*

by

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ABSTRACT: This study proposes a close reading of Dicearchus of Messana's account of the circumstances surrounding Pythagoras's death (fr. 41 Mirhady). As the analysis shows, the purpose of Dicearchus' account was to demonstrate that at the moment of the anti-Pythagorean revolt the philosopher was not welcomed in any Italian cities because he was perceived as a danger to social and political stability. Such an interpretation of authorial intention stems from a new reading of the scene of Pythagoras' death in the temple of the Muses. Considering Dicearchus' narrative as a whole, it can be assumed that Pythagoras as a supplicant sought the protection of the gods, and his death should be interpreted as the effect of the philosopher's isolation in the temple by the inhabitants of Metapontum. Moreover, the author of this study considers the presence of the Muses in the story and the significance of this fact in the hypothesis concerning the essential role of the goddesses in the Pythagorean movement.

The circumstances surrounding the assault on the Pythagoreans' and Pythagoras' death are among the most challenging issues in Classical Studies[1]. The challenge stems from the sudden occurrence of the events themselves as well as from the uncertain status and late dating of the majority of the historical and biographical tradition. Most critical studies favour the opinion that the original sources confuse and mistakenly link two events that accompanied the anti-Pythagorean riots[2]. Hypothetically, one of them, dated from the end of the 6th century to the 490s BC, may have been related to Pythagoras' death; the second, estimated to have happened in the mid-5th century, was allegedly organised directly against the Pythagoreans in Italian *poleis*. The scope of the events is equally doubtful: it is not certain whether the former was merely local – i.e. occurred in Kroton (and Metapontum?) – or whether the latter affected the whole of southern Italy. It needs to be stressed that, contrary to popular conviction, the

* I would like to thank Gertjan Verhasselt for allowing me to use fragments of his edition of Dicearchus, and Radosław Poniat and Bogdan Burliga, who read and commented on my text at different stages of its composition.

1 On available sources concerning Pythagoras' death, see Burkert 1972: 97–120 (esp. 116–119), as well as Verhasselt 2014: 424–428.

2 See e.g. Zhmud 2012: 97–102; Verhasselt 2014: 424–448.

Pythagorean lifestyle was not rejected in all cities, as it is evidenced by the case of Tarentum.

This study offers a close reading of Dicearchus of Messana's account of the fall of the Pythagoreans (fr. 41 Mirhady). However, it is not intended to be a reconstruction of the real circumstances surrounding Pythagoras' death. Its primary goals are to assess the historicity of selected elements of Dicearchus' narrative and locate them in their proper cultural contexts. This will enable a global assessment of Pythagoras' representation in Dicearchus's writing, and a verification of some deeply rooted convictions concerning the philosopher.

The following analysis has been inspired by Carl A. Huffman's text dedicated to the depiction of the Pythagoreans in the works of *peripatetikoi*[3]. The American scholar points to the necessity of a comprehensive analysis of all the testimonies of the given ancient author. Taking Dicearchus as an example, he demonstrates how particular testimonies complement each other to create a general picture (e.g. of the Pythagoreans), and how a general picture can support analyses of the particular testimonies. This is particularly useful when the given testimony is shown in cover-texts in a neutral manner, or when for some reasons a neutral reading prevails in its examination. It can be assumed that in such a situation the author's attitude that is detectable in all the testimonies considered together can tell us more about the lost original narrative context than the information transmitted in cover-texts. The greatest interpretive obstacle with testimonies such as Dicearchus' lies in their being severed from the initial context of the authorial narrative[4]. Thus, considering the significance of Huffman's remarks, the present text could be treated as an appendix to his analysis. In the following close reading of fr. 41, I list a set of additional arguments that support his proposals. In particular, I focus on the information concerning Pythagoras's death in the temple of the Muses.

DICEARCHUS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS

Dicearchus belongs to the group of the earliest authors whose texts provide a basis for reconstructing the ways the Pythagoreans functioned as a movement. He is by no means equal to Aristotle or Aristoxenus of Tarentum – the authors of separate works on the Pythagoreans – but the testimonies of his that we know confirm that the biography and the opinions of Pythagoras are an important part of his legacy[5].

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[3] Huffman 2014c.

[4] See Schepens 1997 and Mojsik 2016.

[5] On Dicearchus as author, see Fortenbaugh, Schütrumpf 2001.

Taking into consideration the current knowledge of the titles of his works and their contents, the passages on Pythagoras may come either from *Life of Greece* (Βίος Ἑλλάδος), or from the work (mentioned only once in our sources) *On Lives* (Περὶ βίων)[6]. The former may have presented the beginnings and the development of Greek culture, and that is probably why it included biographical notes on thinkers and philosophers. Nevertheless, it was not a biographical work *per se*, as the surviving fragments are dedicated to types of life and models of (philosophical) life; apparently, the biographical details mentioned in it served as mere examples. As for the latter, rather than being instances of biographical studies, the biographical facts about thinkers/philosophers may have been elements of a discussion on the relation between *bios theoretikos* and *bios praktikos*. Admittedly, there is only one known surviving fragment of *On Lives*, and it is difficult to speculate on the precise content of the whole or on the ways in which biographical data was used in it. That is why all the fragments containing biographical information and an analysis of the selection and connotative meaning thereof become of paramount importance[7].

Although the assignment of the particular fragments on Pythagoras to the particular titles of the works is not the primary element of the present analysis, it has some influence on their interpretation. The work's context and its structure must have conditioned the narrative frameworks and the connotative meaning of the given passages. However, in the case of Dicearchus such a strategy cannot take us too far because of the scarcity of detailed information. To be precise, it has to be noted that one of the fragments (42)[8] may have been part of *On the Soul*, and yet another (45) – of political writings (e.g. *Tripolitikos* or *Spartan Constitution*).

Generally speaking, throughout the 20th century the scholarly assessment of Dicearchus' attitude to the Pythagoreans was subject to change. Erwin Rohde and Werner Jaeger saw his opinions as distinctly positive – both scholars assumed that Pythagoras had been represented as a paragon of practical life in the way preferred by Dicearchus himself[9]. Their interpretation of testimonies became prevalent in Classical Studies and can still be observed in Ch.H. Kahn's biography of Pythagoras, where he asserts that the Samian philosopher was perceived by Dicearchus as a moral guide and a social reformer. At the same time, Kahn

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[6] See Huffman 2014c: 281: "None of his references to Pythagoras is ascribed to a specific work, and they probably come from *On Lives*". See also Verhasselt 2014: 414 with n. 1650.

[7] See White 2001.

[8] The page numbers of Dicearchus' fragments follow Mirhady's edition (2001). A new edition by G. Verhasselt – a follow-up to his PhD dissertation – is due shortly and will appear in section IVB of *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker Continued* (published by Brill).

[9] Rohde 1901: 110; Jaeger 1948: 452–461.

emphasises Dicearchus' and other Peripatetics' accurate and balanced judgement of the Pythagorean tradition[10].

Such an evaluation is shared by S.A. White, who, in his article on the development of the concept of wisdom in Dicearchus' works, claims: "What is clear is that Dicearchus assigned Pythagoras a decisive role in the development of moral education. Wisdom henceforth was something for adults to pursue as a way of life, and the Pythagorean life of teaching and study long remained a model of the philosophical life"[11]. In the context of the evolving pattern of philosophical reasoning, the fact of identifying the changes that Pythagoras introduced to it may have led to such an assessment. White maintains that Pythagoras differed from the so-called "wise men" because he preferred to address large audiences and developed a rhetorical strategy consisting in adjusting both the content and the form of the speech to the expectations of the given group of listeners. Thus, according to Dicearchus, while the Samian philosopher was an orator and teacher, the "wise men" were mostly lawgivers. Still, such an opinion does not exclude the possibility of a critical view of Pythagoras' outlook on life, his decisions and his conduct.

Despite the generally positive validation of Dicearchus' account, its particular fragments have sometimes been perceived as ambiguous. Fr. 42, including the information about Pythagoras' reincarnation in the body of the hetaera Alco, is one example of such ambiguity. It was in this context that Fritz Wehrli wrote about the mockery of the ancient understanding of what soul and metempsychosis were ("die Wiedergeburt als Hetäre sieht aus wie Hohn"), and Burkert was sure that the information was a "sarcastic addition by Dicearchus"[12]. Derision concerning the transmigration of the soul was, by the way, likely to be expected from Dicearchus; as other sources indicate, he displayed a negative attitude towards the concept of the immortal soul[13].

But it is Carl Huffman's recent analysis that enables a comprehensive critical perspective on the existing testimonies. According to Huffman, if considered together, the message conveyed in the fragments is, to a lesser or greater extent, negative, and some of Dicearchus' comments are distinctly ironic, if not spiteful. So, let us examine the content of the surviving fragments along with Huffman's interpretation.

Among all the testimonies that are available to us, two long fragments that are attributed to Dicearchus come from Porphyry's *Life of Pythagoras*, one from Aulus Gellius' *Noctes Atticae*, and one from Plutarch's *Quaestiones convivales*. In the following part of my paper I first introduce and briefly review fragments

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[10] Kahn 2001: 68.

[11] White 2001: 213 f.

[12] See Wehrli 1967: 53; Burkert 1972: 139.

[13] Fr. 13–32 Mirhady; see also Sharples 2001.

40, 42, 45, and I then focus on fragment 41, which requires separate, extensive analysis.

Dicaearch. fr. 40 (Porph. *VP* 18–19[14]): The description of Pythagoras' arrival in Kroton and the information about the speeches he delivered to various local groups appear in the biographical tradition of numerous authors[15]. The earliest confirmation of these can probably be found in Antisthenes' (fr. 187 SSR), and the most detailed report in Iamblichus (*VP* 9, 45), who also relays the alleged content of the speeches. Dicearchus' reserved account, which survived in Porphyry's work, shows (as it is believed) Pythagoras in an unbiased manner. For different reasons, this account is considered to be the most reliable document about the philosopher's arrival in Kroton. It was Huffman who managed to demonstrate that – taking into account certain items of the vocabulary used in the text – Dicearchus tried to show Pythagoras as a skillful rhetorician and a charismatic charlatan, who mesmerised and deceived the inhabitants of Kroton[16]. A decisive argument supporting this claim is the use of the verb ψυχαγωγέω, which conveys the way of influencing the listeners, and which justifies such an understanding of the whole scene described in the account. It needs to be noted, however, that the word seems to have been used by Dicearchus himself – the hypothesis that it was added either by Porphyry or by some neo-Pythagoreans is rather improbable.

The above-mentioned claim is further strengthened by a close reading of the death scene (shown in fr. 41), which is to be analysed in the following part of my paper.

Dicaearch. fr. 42 (Gell. *NA* IV 11, 14)[17]: Aulus Gellius' passage contains a list of famous past incarnations of Pythagoras. Interestingly, the version quoted here was included both by Dicearchus and yet another Peripatetic, Clearchus of Soli (fr. 10 Wehrli). The larger part of the list overlaps with the tradition known from the version that can be found, for example, in Diogenes Laertios (VIII 4). However, it concludes with an element, which – as has been mentioned earlier – drew the attention of Wehrli and Burkert. According to Huffman, this apparently ironic reference to the hetaera Alco as an incarnation of the philosopher is directly related to Dicearchus' representation of Pythagoras as one who

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[14] In Wehrli's edition, Dicearchus' account is limited to *VP* 18, but Mirhady includes, probably rightly, paragraph 19 as well. See Huffman 2014c: 282, n 8.

[15] Iustin. XX 4; Diod. X 3, 2; Ov. *Met*. XV 65–477; cf. Val. Max. VIII 15 *ext*. 1; Verhasselt 2014: 415 f.

[16] Huffman 2014c: 284: "He emphasizes Pythagoras' incredible charisma but the use of ψυχαγωγέω portrays him as employing illegitimate appeals to the emotions to 'beguile' and 'bewitch' his audience".

[17] "Pythagoram vero ipsum sicuti celebre est Euphorbum primo fuisse dictasse, ita haec remotiora sunt his, quae Clearchus et Dicaearchus memoriae tradiderunt, fuisse eum postea Pyrrum, deinde Aethaliden, deinde feminam pulcra facie meretricem, cui nomen fuerat Alco".

mesmerises and deceives the people of Kroton. It was therefore not merely malicious joke, but part of a well-conceived general judgment. Whoever invented the hetaera – whether our author was the first to do so is not important here – her presence in Dicearchus' narrative was meant to strengthen the critical edge detectable in other fragments.

Dicaearch. fr. 45 (Plut. *QC* VIII 2 [*Mor*. 719 A–B])[18]: Plutarch's information (not directly related to Pythagoras' biography) is by no means a significant contribution to our analysis. In one of his writings Dicearchus is believed to have said that Plato's oeuvre featured a mixture of opinions by Lycurgus, Socrates and Pythagoras. The alleged context of that claim and the reasons for such a juxtaposition of the inspirational figures for the founder of Academy have been discussed by White (2001: 205). Huffman (2014c: 285) guesses that if the fragment was somehow related to other testimonies, then – perhaps – Dicearchus wanted to imply that through his *Dialogues* Plato also endeavoured to mesmerise and deceive his readers so as to make them renounce their traditional customs and embrace radical innovations in the sphere of social and political life. The validity of such a presupposition, however, is linked (*inter alia*) to the question of whether the above-mentioned fragment came from the same work by Dicearchus as the other pieces. If this was so, Huffman's explication is convincing; if not – we should not venture upon any definite judgment.

In the light of the above explanation, the real connotative meaning of the three fragments (with an emphasis on the first two) seems ironic and implies a rather negative attitude towards Pythagoras. The mention of the hetaera, which draws the citizens' attention away from the socially and traditionally established behaviour, could have metaphorically expressed a critical evaluation of the apparently alluring appearance and rhetorical skills of Pythagoras, thanks to which the philosopher cast a spell on the inhabitants of Italian towns (ἐψυχαγώγησεν) and convinced them to make revolutionary changes in their lifestyles. The potentially rebellious force of the philosopher's teaching can be seen in the influence it had on the so-called "liminal" groups: youth, children, women or barbarians (fr. 40). All these elements of Pythagoras' picture are distinctly seen in the description of the philosopher's death, which I am going to focus on now. On the one hand, the connotative meaning of this testimony strengthens Huffman's assertion; on

[18] οὐ γάρ τί που καὶ θεὸς δεῖται μαθήματος οἷον ὀργάνου στρέφοντος ἀπὸ τῶν γενητῶν καὶ περιάγοντος ἐπὶ τὰ ὄντα τὴν διάνοιαν· ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκείνῳ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ αὐτόν. ἀλλ' ὅρα μή τι σοι προσῆκον ὁ Πλάτων καὶ οἰκεῖον αἰνιττόμενος λέληθεν, ἅτε δὴ τῷ Σωκράτει τὸν Λυκοῦργον ἀναμιγνὺς οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τὸν Πυθαγόραν, <ὡς> ᾤετο Δικαίαρχος. ὁ γὰρ Λυκοῦργος οἶσθα δήπουθεν ὅτι τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν, ὡς δημοκρατικὴν καὶ ὀχλικὴν οὖσαν, ἐξέβαλεν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος, ἐπεισήγαγεν δὲ τὴν γεωμετρικήν, ὀλιγαρχίᾳ σώφρονι καὶ βασιλείᾳ νομίμῃ πρέπουσαν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τὸ ἴσον ἡ δὲ λόγῳ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονέμει.

the other hand, the fragment itself becomes more comprehensible if we take into consideration the valuations of Dicearchus' other fragments.

DICEARCH. FR. 41

Dicearchus' account of Pythagoras' escape from Kroton and his death has survived in an extensive version in Porphyry's writing, and a short excerpt on the philosopher's death in the temple of the Muses is testified by Diogenes Laertios[19] and Themistios. The latter is unfairly omitted in all the editions since he does not refer to Dicearchus as the author of the information. Yet, his testimony is worth considering because it includes a description of Pythagoras' journey, of an episode in Locri, and of the stopovers in Tarentum and Metapontum[20]; first and foremost, however, it is significant because Themistios quotes almost the whole last sentence about the philosopher's death in the temple. Considering the itinerary of the escape, it is often assumed that Themistios quotes from Porphyry's work[21]. Even if this is true, his version was subject to significant re-composition.

The starting point for the following analysis, and its reference frame, is, of course, the longest testimony by Porphyry (*VP* 56–57):

> Δικαίαρχος δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι καὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν φασὶν παρεῖναι τῇ ἐπιβουλῇ. Φερεκύδην γὰρ πρὸ τῆς ἐκ Σάμου ἀπάρσεως τελευτῆσαι. τῶν δ' ἑταίρων ἀθρόους μὲν τετταράκοντα ἐν οἰκίᾳ τινὸς συνεδρεύοντας ληφθῆναι, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς σποράδην κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἔτυχον ἕκαστοι διαφθαρῆναι. Πυθαγόραν δὲ κρατουμένων τῶν φίλων τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς Καυλωνίαν τὸν ὅρμον σωθῆναι, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ πάλιν ἐς Λοκρούς. πυθομένους δὲ τοὺς Λοκροὺς τῶν γερόντων τινὰς ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς χώρας ὅρια ἀποστεῖλαι. τούτους δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπαντήσαντας εἰπεῖν 'ἡμεῖς, ὦ Πυθαγόρα, σοφὸν μὲν ἄνδρα σε καὶ δεινὸν ἀκούομεν· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις νόμοις οὐθὲν ἔχομεν ἐγκαλεῖν, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων πειρασόμεθα μένειν· σὺ δ' ἑτέρωθί που βάδιζε λαβὼν παρ' ἡμῶν εἴ του κεχρημένος τῶν ἀναγκαίων τυγχάνεις.' ἐπεὶ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Λοκρῶν πόλεως τὸν εἰρημένον ἀπηλλάγη τρόπον, εἰς Τάραντα πλεῦσαι· πάλιν δὲ κἀκεῖ παραπλήσια παθόντα τοῖς περὶ Κρότωνα εἰς Μεταπόντιον ἐλθεῖν. πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἐγένοντο μεγάλαι στάσεις, ἃς ἔτι καὶ νῦν οἱ περὶ τοὺς τόπους μνημονεύουσί τε καὶ διηγοῦνται, τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων καλοῦντες. [Πυθαγόρειοι δ' ἐκλήθησαν ἡ σύστασις ἅπασα ἡ συνακολουθήσασα αὐτῷ.][22] ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ Μεταπόντιον καὶ Πυθαγόραν αὐτὸν λέγουσι τελευτῆσαι καταφυγόντα ἐπὶ τὸ μουσῶν ἱερόν, σπάνει τῶν ἀναγκαίων τεσσαράκοντα ἡμέρας διαμείναντα.

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[19] On Diogenes Laertios as the author of Pythagoras' biography, and about his attitude to sources, see Laks 2014.

[20] Such a version of Pythagoras' journey before his death can be read in, for example, Firm. Mat. I 7, 12: "Sed nec ibi illum diutius fortuna detinuit; nam nunc per Locros, nunc per Tarentum et per omnes paene Italiae oras fugitivus erravit".

[21] On his knowledge of Porphyry's works, see Vanderpoel 1995: 25–27. It would be equally justified to assume that both authors used the same or a similar source.

[22] Nauck considered it to be a late explanatory note to the text of Porphyry.

Dikaiarchos and the more accurate authors, however, claim that Pythagoras too was present at the assault. For (they say) Pherekydes had died before his departure from Samos. Forty of his companions were caught together, while meeting in somebody's house, but most perished scattered across the city, wherever each happened to be. While his friends were being overwhelmed, Pythagoras first escaped to the refuge Kaulonia and then from there to Lokroi. When the Locrians heard this, they sent some of the elders to the borders of their land. These men approached him and said: "Pythagoras, we hear that you are a wise and clever man. But since we have nothing to reproach to our own laws, we ourselves will try to stick with the present laws. You, go somewhere else and should you need anything of the necessities of life, take it from us". After leaving the city of Lokroi in the aforementioned way, he sailed to Tarentum. When there too he again suffered similar things as around Kroton, he went to Metapontion. For everywhere great revolts broke out, which even now the locals recall and relate, calling them the revolts in the times of the Pythagoreans. [Pythagoreans was the name of the entire party that had followed him.] It is also said that Pythagoras himself died in the area around Metapontion[23], after he had fled to the temple of the Muses and had stayed there for forty days, due to lack of the necessities of life.

(transl. by G. Verhasselt)

Diog. Laert. VIII 40:

φησὶ δὲ Δικαίαρχος τὸν Πυθαγόραν ἀποθανεῖν καταφυγόντα εἰς τὸ ἐν Μεταποντίῳ ἱερὸν τῶν Μουσῶν, τετταράκοντα ἡμέρας ἀσιτήσαντα.

Dicaearchus, however, says that Pythagoras died a fugitive in the temple of the Muses at Metapontum after forty days' starvation.

(transl. by R.D. Hicks)

Them. *Or*. 23, 285 B:

αὐτός τε γὰρ ὁ Μνησάρχου τοσόνδε ἄρα ἀπέλαυσε τῆς πολυυμνήτου σοφίας ὥστε μετανάστης ἀεὶ διεβίω διὰ τοὺς βασκαίνοντας καὶ κολούοντας, ἐκ Σάμου μὲν εἰς Κρότωνα διὰ Πολυκράτην, ἐκ Κρότωνος δὲ εἰς Λοκροὺς διὰ Κύλωνα· Λοκρῶν δὲ οὐχ εἷς ἤδη, ἀλλὰ πάντες Λοκροὶ οὐχ ὑπέμειναν Πυθαγόρου τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ μετεστήσαντο εἰς Τάραντα καὶ παρέπεμψαν· Ταραντῖνοι δὲ αὖθις, ὥσπερ φορτίον, εἰς Μεταπόντιον· οὗ δὴ καὶ ἐτελεύτησεν ἐν τῷ τεμένει τῶν Μουσῶν, τετταράκοντα, ὡς φασιν, ἡμέρας φεισάμενος σίτου.

As for the son of Mnesarchus himself [i.e., Pythagoras], he, of course, was so possessed of that much famed wisdom that he spent his whole life on the move because of those who envied and discredited him. He went from Samos to Croton because of Polycrates, and from Croton to Locri because of Cylon. At Locri, it was not one person but the whole citizen body who could not abide Pythagoras's virtue and consequently made him leave and sent him to Tarentum. The Tarentines again sent him off, this time to Metapontum, like an item of cargo; and there he died in the precinct of the Muses, having taken no food, as they tell it, for forty days.

(transl. by R.J. Penella)

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[23] About ἐν δὲ τῇ as referring to the stasis at Metapontum rather than to the country of Metapontum, see below, pp. 60 and 67.

There are some perceptible discrepancies between the surviving versions. First, I need to point to the disproportion in the amount of relayed information – only Porphyry relates the whole scene of the escape. Surprisingly, details of Dicearchus' account cannot be found among the numerous versions of the circumstances surrounding the philosopher's death as presented by Diogenes Laertios (VIII 39–40). Themistios, in turn, summarises the description of the journey in such a manner that it looks like an enforced or unintentional one ("sent him off [...] like an item of cargo"). Only the last sentence of the account appears in the writings of all three authors in a similar form:

1. (Porph.) λέγουσι τελευτῆσαι καταφυγόντα ἐπὶ τὸ μουσῶν ἱερόν, σπάνει τῶν ἀναγκαίων τεσσαράκοντα ἡμέρας διαμείναντα;

2. (Diog. Laert.) φησὶ δὲ Δικαίαρχος τὸν Πυθαγόραν ἀποθανεῖν καταφυγόντα εἰς τὸ ἐν Μεταποντίῳ ἱερὸν τῶν Μουσῶν, τετταράκοντα ἡμέρας ἀσιτήσαντα.

3. (Them.) οὗ δὴ καὶ ἐτελεύτησεν ἐν τῷ τεμένει τῶν Μουσῶν, τετταράκοντα, ὥς φασιν, ἡμέρας φεισάμενος σίτου.

What arrests our attention is similar syntax, the same number of days, and the use of the phrase ἱερὸν τῶν Μουσῶν / τὸ μουσῶν ἱερόν / τῷ τεμένει τῶν Μουσῶν in each case. What differentiates them is the way they describe the lack of means to live: σπάνει τῶν ἀναγκαίων (Porph.), ἀσιτήσαντα (Diog. Laert.). The phrase φεισάμενος σίτου, used in Themistios' version, should rather be understood as the philosopher's own decision to abstain from eating. In the very same version there is no information about the philosopher's escape to the temple (καταφυγόντα in Porphyry and Diogenes Laertios). This probably stems from the choice of a different interpretation (and different narrative frames) of the whole story, which he locates in a much broader context of the enforced (by Polykrates and Kylon) peregrinations of Pythagoras. That is why the philosopher comes to be perceived as "an item of cargo" which "Tarentines sent off to Metapontum". Themistios' version is to a certain degree a re-interpretation and re-composition of the information from an earlier source. Thus in this form it is rather significant to the assessment of the development of the Pythagorean tradition; it is, however, of little value in the reconstruction of Dicearchus' account. For this reason, I focus mostly on the versions of Porphyry and Diogenes Laertios in the following analysis.

Let us briefly consider the interpretations of Dicearchus' fr. 41 up to the present. Even a superficial reading of the secondary literature brings somewhat selective analyses and arbitrary juxtapositions of various testimonies in order to achieve narrative unity. Both approaches are complementary because the interest in the cult of the Muses, the role of *mousike* in the Pythagorean tradition, or Pythagoras' migration to Metapontum required the combining of the testimonies of different provenance. However, the main problem lies in the liberty with which scholars tend to combine the documents, irrespective of their origin, contexts and

chronology of particular motifs or versions that can be found in the biographical tradition[24]. But polynarrativity is the constitutional trait of the Pythagorean tradition, and such a juggling of the testimonies without prior analysis based on our knowledge about the author, the cultural context within which he wrote, and without taking into account all the obstacles resulting from the process of text transmission in the ancient world cannot lead to any convincing conclusions[25].

Below I recall a few selected examples. Perhaps the best known are the hypotheses by I. Lévy and P. Boyancé. The former, almost a century ago, tried to reconcile Dicearchus' testimony with the other tradition concerning the philosopher's death, and, drawing on Satyros' fragment (fr. 11 Schorn), came to the conclusion that Dicearchus' description presented Pythagoras' suicide[26]. He also suggested identifying the temple of the Muses in Metapontum with the *mouseion* in front of Pythagoras' house as we know it from Timaeus' testimony. Boyancé, in turn, slightly developed Lévy's proposal and tried to prove that the *mouseion* should be identified as the philosopher's grave, around which there must have arisen a hero cult (see Iustin. XX 4; Cic. *Fin.* V 2, 4)[27]. This led other scholars to the conclusion that Pythagoras must have been responsible for setting up the temple in Metapontum, or must have at least inspired it[28]. As a consequence, the information about the goddesses' cult in the city and about the philosopher's death in the temple, as well as about the cult in Kroton, became the evidence for the popularity of the so-called "Pythagorean mouseion"[29]. This last inference allowed for a demonstration of the continuity between the religious dimension of the Pythagorean society and the way Plato's Academy, in which the cult of the Muses played a key role, was organised[30].

Yet another aspect of Dicearchus' testimony which drew scholars' attention is connected with the hypothesis that assumes the existence of the philosopher's house in Metapontum. A large part of the tradition, beginning with Aristotle and Aristoxenus, suggests that the philosopher moved to this city before his death[31]. This has led certain scholars to the conclusion that if Pythagoras died in Metapontum, that was because – as some testimonies imply – his house was there[32].

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[24] See e.g. Boyancé 1937; Hardie 2004; Provenza 2013 and 2014.

[25] See Huffman 2014b: 2: "...there are many Pythagorases and many Pythagoreanisms in this book. No one Pythagoras or Pythagoreanism emerges because there is not one Pythagoras in the ancient sources and different modern interpreters derive a different picture even from the same sources".

[26] Lévy 1927: 67 f.

[27] Boyancé 1937: 233–247, esp. 235, n. 2.

[28] See e.g. Giannelli 1963: 79; Carter 2006: 173.

[29] Hardie 2004; cf. Boyancé 1937: 233–247.

[30] See Riedweg 2002: 14.

[31] Arist. fr. 191; Aristox. fr. 18. See Burkert 1972: 116–119.

[32] See Boyancé 1937: 233–247; Giannelli 1963: 79 with n. 4.

S.A. White, in turn, in his otherwise brilliant reconstruction of the development of philosophy as shown by Dicearchus, attempts to demonstrate that Pythagoras' fasting and his death in the temple testify to his exceptional religiousness[33]. In the context of our general knowledge of the Pythagorean society and the role religious rules played in it, such an assertion is possibly acceptable. Still, it remains in stark contrast with the picture that emerges from Dicearchus' account.

An analogical doubt accompanies Antonietta Provenza's explanations. She claims that the information about the death in the temple of the goddesses of *mousike* should be understood in the much wider context of the role of music in the Pythagoreans' lives: "La versione secondo cui Pitagora sarebbe morto a Metaponto nel santuario delle Muse lascia emergere la stessa considerazione del sapiente come individuo sacro alle Muse: la sua morte non profana il luogo di culto, ma segna un ritorno a quell'armonia che egli ha costantemente perseguito"[34]. However, this beautiful, poetic representation of Pythagoras's death as a return to harmony has nothing to do either with Pythagoras or Dicearchus.

The only comprehensive analysis of the testimony under consideration can be found in the edition of Dicearchus' fragments by G. Verhasselt (2014). (Werhli's few sentences can hardly be treated as a satisfactory assessment of the rather long text[35].) Verhasselt summarises the current state of research (which is a great asset of his work) and points to the fact that Dicearchus' version of Pythagoras' death was already known in ancient times, and the traces of this knowledge are seen in the writings of Firmicus Maternus, Arnobius or Tzetzes[36]. Despite the unquestionable quality of the commentary, some parts of Dicearchus' account require further, meticulous interpretation. This is particularly important when the explanations are not sought in other testimonies within the biographical tradition, but in a close reading of the whole text as well as in the social and cultural contexts that can illuminate the information included in the source.

Dicearchus' account defies a widespread 4th-century tale, according to which Pythagoras was absent during the uprising in Kroton[37]. Describing the uprising itself, the author informs us that 40 companions of the philosopher were captured (ληφθῆναι) in the besieged house and that the remaining scattered majority were killed in other parts of the city (διαφθαρῆναι). Seeing that his companions were defeated (κρατουμένων τῶν φίλων), Pythagoras escaped to Kaulonia to save his own life (σωθῆναι).

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[33] White 2001: 211, n. 36.

[34] Provenza 2014: 80.

[35] Wehrli 1967: 53.

[36] Verhasselt 2014: 419–432.

[37] Verhasselt 2014: 425–427.

Here arises the first interpretive problem: taking into consideration the commonly accepted biography of the philosopher, we should expect his "return" to Metapontum, the city in which Pythagoras is believed to have spent the remaining years of his life[38]. However, if we accept the opinion that Timaeus was wrong when he claimed that the house was in Kroton (or that it was the mistake of Porphyry, who quoted Timaeus), then it would be reasonable to assume that the philosopher lived in Metapontum for a period of time that would be sufficient for his daughter to become a leader of juvenile and later adult groups in religious celebrations[39]. Nevertheless, in Dicearchus' account, for a certain reason, Pythagoras begins his escape by going to Kaulonia's port first[40]. This means that the philosopher is heading west, not east, in the direction of Metapontum. But the whole narration implies that this city will be his final destination.

Lokroi are to the east of Kaulonia. Here Pythagoras is not even able to enter the territory of the *polis*, as he is confronted with the elders or members of the council [of elders] (πυθομένους δὲ τοὺς Λοκροὺς τῶν γερόντων τινὰς ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς χώρας ὅρια ἀποστεῖλαι), sent by the inhabitants. The "dangerous charismatic charlatan", as Huffman has it, is politely yet firmly asked not to cross the borders of the *polis*[41]. The picture that emerges from the first part of the Locrians' speech (σοφὸν μὲν ἄνδρα σε καὶ δεινὸν ἀκούομεν) is consistent with the representation of Pythagoras in fr. 40 (according to Huffman's aforementioned interpretation). The Locrians seem to be aware that, using a few words only, Pythagoras is capable of making them change their lifestyle, and therefore they declare straight away: ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις νόμοις οὐθὲν ἔχομεν ἐγκαλεῖν, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων πειρασόμεθα μένειν.

Sent away by the Locrians, Pythagoras sails to Tarentum (εἰς Τάραντα πλεῦσαι). Here, as Dicearchus notes, the situation is similar to that in Kroton, which means that there are riots or at least anti-Pythagorean attitudes. That is why Pythagoras moves on to Metapontum. Here the author of the account adds a remark that at the time μεγάλαι στάσεις (anti-Pythagorean attitudes) were omnipresent, by which he must have meant the Greek cities in Italy. Moreover, he declares that the memory of them lives on in the oral tradition (μνημονεύουσί τε καὶ διηγοῦνται) of the cities' inhabitants, which in itself is a very interesting clue as to possible sources that may contain information about the events.

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[38] See Burkert 1972: 112.

[39] *FGrH* 566 F 131; see Burkert 1972: 112, n. 18; Vallet 1974; Lippolis, Garaffo, Nafissi 1995: 206; Giacometti 2005: 91–93. The fragment by Timaeus (an object of numerous misunderstandings) as well as the dilemma "Kroton or Metapontum" deserve a separate study, and I hope to present my reflections upon these issues in a separate article.

[40] The information concerning the port of Kaulonia (which is a colony of Kroton) may imply that Dicearchus meant a boat trip from Kroton – similar to the route between Lokroi and Tarentum.

[41] Huffman 2014c: 284. For other explanations of the meeting with the Locrians, see Verhasselt 2014: 429. About the Locrians' traditionalism, see Dem. *Or.* 24, 139–141.

Here the trasmitted text contains a sentence that is commonly believed to have been added by a copyist (Πυθαγόρειοι δ' ἐκλήθησαν ἡ σύστασις ἅπασα ἡ συνακολουθήσασα αὐτῷ) and everything confirms that such an assumption is correct[42]. The information about μεγάλαι στάσεις in Greek cities in Italy was immediately followed by a sentence containing the information about Pythagoras' death in Metapontum. I have already indicated that this last sentence is usually considered out of the context of the whole account of Pythagoras' death and interpreted as, for example, proof of the philosopher's religiousness, or of the significance of the Muses for the Pythagoreans. Sometimes it is arbitrarily juxtaposed with the testimonies of Timaeus (*FGrH* 566 F 131), or Trogus/Iustinus (XX 4), which leads scholars to construct far-fetched interpretive proposals. However, considering the whole context of Dicearchus' account, we may look at the fragment from a completely new angle. In the narrative about the Pythagorean revolt, the emphasis is put on Pythagoras' escape and his subsequent wanderings that led to his death, and not on the philosopher's relations with the Muses and "un ritorno a quell'armonia, che egli ha costantemente perseguito"[43].

Also, the choice of Metapontum as the last shelter in the context of Pythagoras' wanderings across southern Italy does not imply his deliberate return to the city in which he normally lived. In Dicearchus' account, the sequence of the cities which Pythagoras visits on his escape route seems rather accidental and is probably the result of the opportunities that unexpectedly crop up during the journey. The sentence about his death in Metapontum only gives information about the escape to the temple of the Muses and forty days of fasting. This version of Dicearchus' account, based on the oral tradition prevailing in southern Italy, does not seem to link the philosopher with the city.

The key question in the present analysis is how to understand the information about the philosopher's death in the temple? Considering the aversion to Pythagoras in other cities, his taking refuge in the temple cannot, as it seems, be perceived as merely factual, i.e. without deeper significance. Both Porphyry and Diogenes Laertios call it an "escape to the temple" and not a deliberate decision to go to a place chosen earlier. In such a case, the search for an explanation in other testimonies concerning Pythagoras' life (and his links to the Muses) will not lead to any reasonable conclusion. A much better strategy is to interpret the events described here first in relation to the whole of Dicearchus' account and then to verify them by referring to the cultural context of the archaic and classical epochs. The conclusions thus drawn may be examined against the knowledge originating from the other authors' testimonies.

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[42] The explanation, included in the narrative, of who the Pythagoreans are was certainly not written by Dicearchus. In all probability, this is the effect of relocating the marginal gloss to the text itself.

[43] Provenza 2014: 80 (see above for a fuller quotation).

If we do not analyse the sentence in isolation but take into consideration the whole of Dicearchus' account, the death in the temple is merely the last phase of Pythagoras' escape. Additionally, other narrative details distinctly point to the aversion that the inhabitants of southern Italian cities displayed towards the philosopher. It is worth noting that the Locrians were willing to give him a supply of provisions if he gave up the idea of entering the *polis* (βάδιζε λαβὼν παρ' ἡμῶν εἴ του κεχρημένος [τῶν ἀναγκαίων] τυγχάνεις). This piece of information is particularly interesting in the context of the explanation that concludes the account – during the escape to the temple in Metapontum, Pythagoras had no food (σπάνει τῶν ἀναγκαίων [Porph.], ἀσιτήσαντα [Diog. Laert.]). Taking into consideration the whole narrative, the instances of particular cities offer a spectrum of Italian Greeks' attitudes towards the Pythagoreans. In some of the cities (Kroton or Tarentum) revolts broke out, putting the Pythagoreans' lives at risk. The attitude of others may be illustrated by the opposition of Lokroi–Metapontum. The first one does not allow the philosopher to enter the *polis*, but offers him means for a further journey. The second one apparently lets him in, but refuses to supply him with food. This may be the result of entering the *polis* without the inhabitants' consent or the effect of a course of subsequent events. The second possibility becomes more probable if we interpret ἐν δὲ τῇ (περὶ Μεταπόντιον) as referring to the στάσις (uprising) which breaks out in the city, and not as the usually supposed χώρα. In such a situation, the escape to the temple (καταφυγόντα) would be an effect of the course of events.

Irrespective of the aforementioned way of interpreting Dicearchus' account in detail, the connotative meaning of the last sentence seems clear: Pythagoras escapes to the temple as a result of the danger and, deprived of food, dies there. Such a reading of the sentence can be supported by a reference to the Greek patterns of social and religious life. First of all, from the religious standpoint, death in the temple was pollution (*miasma*) for the *polis* – thus it cannot be perceived as a visit paid to the friendly gods. Secondly, shelter in the temple, especially when sought by a stranger, ought to be perceived as a reference to the rights of a supplicant – a person who, facing perils, seeks the protection of the gods[44]. In most cases such gestures and actions were the results of being exposed to an ultimate danger. Ancient sources give numerous examples of situations in which people at risk of losing their lives ask the gods for guardianship and, consequently, become imprisoned in a *temenos* or temple. The best-known example of the kind, which is not very distant chronologically from the events under consideration here, is the story of the death of the Spartan regent and general Pausanias (Thuc. I 133–134). Iustinus (XX 2) informs us about the murder committed by the inhabitants of Metapontum, of fifty youths and a priest, who found refuge

[44] On the phenomena of *asylia* and *hiketeia*, see Schlesinger 1933; Gould 1973; Chaniotis 1996; Rigsby 1996; Dreher 2003; on *miasma*, see Parker 1983.

in the altars of Athena in Syris, and about the religious troubles the act brought upon the perpetrators. In many cases the information about asylia is recalled in the sources just because instances of breaking it were rife[45]. Most often we hear of the attempts to starve supplicants to death and of the removals of the bodies so as to avoid pollution. Therefore, it can be assumed as obvious that, in the archaic and classical epochs, individuals seeking refuge in temples do not do so voluntarily, but in cases of absolute necessity. Moreover, as a space dedicated to gods and to communication with gods, the temple is not a good place for dying, neither for the dying themselves nor for the community which takes care of the sanctuary[46].

It should also be noted that the phenomenon of *hiketeia* appears several times in Pythagorean *akousmata* as an exceptionally important institution[47]. Generally, *akousmata* and *symbola* indicate the importance of an appropriate attitude to religion in the lives of the Pythagoreans. The model of life that they followed was based on the recommendation to avoid pollution at all cost and to retain chastity in their relation to the gods. If the Pythagoreans, for fear of desecrating the sacred, introduced a ban on urinating sunwards (Diog. Laert. VIII 17), how would they have reacted to the pollution resulting from the occurrence of death in the temple?

All this suggests that the interpretation according to which the stay and the death in the temple were Pythagoras' voluntary and deliberate decisions is rather unconvincing. Firstly, this is not evident in Dicearchus' account (or at least not in Porphyry's and Diogenes Laertios' versions). Secondly, if the philosopher had simply wanted to die, for example, out of nostalgia for his dead friends (as some of the sources maintain), he would not have had to go to the temple (or even he should not have done so). This is more than obvious in view of our knowledge about Pythagoras' attitude to the sacred and the well-known reluctance of the Pythagoreans to cause death (and their attitude to suicide, for that matter). Both arguments are related to the Pythagorean belief in the transmigration of souls[48]. But if Pythagoras had been living in Metapontum for a certain period of time, both his avoidance of the city and his escape to the temple would have required a further explanation.

To sum up, the information about the escape and the fact of taking shelter in the temple must be understood as signifying a state of danger. This is clear in Dicearchus' account, according to which Pythagoras moves on to save his life (σωθῆναι). Information about the lack of means to live for forty days can,

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[45] See Gould 1973 (esp. pp. 82–85).

[46] Parker 1983: 32–48.

[47] E.g. Iambl. *VP* 84: "It is not right for a man to pursue his own wife; for she is a suppliant"; see Gemelli Marciano 2014.

[48] See e.g. Palmer 2014: 218–220.

considering the context of life in ancient Greece, be interpreted as the effect of the philosopher's isolation in the temple.

One detail of Dicearchus' account, i.e. the choice of the goddesses in whose sanctuary Pythagoras took refuge while in Metapontum, requires further consideration. The question is connected, as we saw earlier, with a more general hypothesis concerning the (significant) role of the Muses in the functioning of the Pythagorean school. The problem can be seen in Antonietta Provenza's article mentioned earlier (see n. 34 above). But one of the first scholars that referred to the fragment from Dicearchus' account in this particular context was Pierre Boyancé, the author of the work about the cult of the Muses among Greek philosophers[49]. Since the time of his publication the thesis about the role of the Muses in the functioning of the school has been repeated in an almost unaltered form (with few minor exceptions)[50]. As it seems, Boyancé's arguments have a rather fragile basis in the sources, and most of the (late) testimonies were, on the one hand, inspired by the model of a philosophical school that was fashioned after Plato's Academy, and, on the other hand, were the result of the clash between the neo-Pythagoreans and the Platonic tradition, and of the attempts to re-write the history of Pythagoreanism[51]. As this problem reaches far beyond the scope of the present article, I will limit myself to listing the most important objections against the hypotheses prevailing in the scholarly research so far[52].

Firstly, the reasoning is built upon the assumption that the versions of the speeches given by Pythagoras to the inhabitants of Kroton, which can be found in Iamblichus' book (*VP* 9, 45), are reliable[53]. They mention the proposals to introduce the cult of the Muses perceived as the goddesses taking care of social order and harmony[54]. At present, their authenticity is not only questioned, but totally rejected[55]. In their surviving form, they must be a fabrication by Iamblichus or his neo-Pythagorean source.

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[49] Boyancé 1937.

[50] See e.g. Linfert-Reich 1971; Vallet 1974; Hardie 2004; Carter 2006: 173; Wittenburg 1990: 121 (about Boyancé's books as "un'esauriente analisi della tradizione dei Mouseia").

[51] See Dillon 2014a; Flinterman 2014.

[52] See Mojsik 2011. My thorough examination of all the testimonies will be presented in a separate paper.

[53] The passage by Iamblichus (*VP* 35, 264) about the return to the cult of the Muses in Kroton after the fall of the school and the realisation of the wrongdoings committed against the Pythagoreans is, in my opinion, connected with the speeches and thus fictional as well.

[54] By the way, such a function of the Muses as taking care of social order and harmony is very poorly documented; the earliest and circumstantial evidence appeared in the Hellenistic epoch. See Mojsik 2011: 155–156; also Dillon 2014a: 11: "...an interesting projection back of the Platonist doctrine of the Muses as principles of order onto Pythagoreanism by Iamblichus in his Pythagoric Life".

[55] See e.g. Rowett 2014: 116: "The earliest sources, relayed in Diogenes and Porphyry, record none of the content of these speeches. Yet Iamblichus, somewhat implausibly, recounts each one in

Secondly, the testimony concerning the speeches has been juxtaposed with the information (preserved only by Iamblichus) about offerings to the Muses in Milon's house just before the attack[56]. This testimony, too, has a rather fragile basis – and I will point to only two problematic aspects of it.

First, we need to note that the phrase μουσεῖα θυόντων that Iamblichus used in his description of the scene was confirmed as late as the 4th century. Similarly, the term *mouseion* acquired its religious connotation relatively late, and the earliest confirmations from the 5th century are in stark contrast to the meanings that can be found in Iamblichus' account[57]. Besides, it is clear that Iamblichus quotes after Apollonios, about whom he writes much earlier that the author enriched the accounts of predecessors with previously unknown details[58]. Considering the fact that the predecessors are Aristoxenus and Nicomachus, and remembering the neo-Pythagoreans' attitude to the history of the society, we should question the credibility of the information. As this version of the events was unknown in the 4th century, it is unlikely that the version from Roman times was more accurate than, for instance, that by Aristoxenus. Besides, the addition of the information about the Muses to the story of Pythagoras – whether by Apollonios or Iamblichus – is clearly justified both on the narrative level of the biography[59] and on the level of the cultural reality of the 2nd and the 3rd centuries AD[60]. Even more so if we remember the neo-Pythagoreans' endeavours to demonstrate the Academy's derivative status when compared with the Pythagorean society.

Thirdly, the information (attributed to Timaeus [*FGrH* 566 F 131]) that the street where Pythagoras' house stood was named *mouseion* is also recalled in the given context. However, this testimony is interpreted superficially, without delving into an analysis of the grammatical form of the verb used in the passage or the narrative context of the source information[61]. Still, it is enough to point

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detail, but without naming any authority. Perhaps he is using the opportunity to elaborate his own Pythagorean moral teaching, or that of his source (conceivably Apollonius)"; Huffman 2014c: 283: "Iamblichus, writing over 600 years later, provides the text of the four speeches given at Kroton, but these are a fabrication of the later tradition".

[56] Iambl. *VP* 35, 261: ὥστε μετ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας, μουσεῖα θυόντων αὐτῶν ἐν οἰκίᾳ παρὰ τὸ Πύθιον, ἀθρόοι συνδραμόντες οἵοί τ' ἦσαν τὴν ἐπίθεσιν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ποιήσασθαι.

[57] Ar. *Ran*. 93; Eur. *Hel*. 174; fr. 88.

[58] Iambl. *VP* 35, 254: ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ Ἀπολλώνιος περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔστιν ὅπου διαφωνεῖ, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ *προστίθησι* τῶν μὴ εἰρημένων παρὰ τούτοις (my emphasis, TM). On the Pythagoreans preparing new, genuine version of the history of the society, see Dillon 2014b; Flinterman 2014.

[59] Mojsik 2011: 61 f.: at the moment of the attack, the Pythagoreans make offerings to the Muses that, according to Iamblichus, take care of social order and *homonoia*. On the late (and borrowed from Plato) idea of the Muses and *mousike* as principles of order, cf. e.g. Dillon 2014a: *passim*.

[60] On another wave of interest in the Muses in this period, see e.g. Sahin 1999 (esp. pp. 212–219).

[61] Mojsik 2016.

to the fact that, according to most of the authors quoting Timaeus, the naming of the street was an act of the inhabitants of Kroton or Metapontum, which took place after Pythagoras' death[62]. The act could not have occurred in the 5th century as the term *mouseion* originates from a later period of history – a circumstance which has not been noted so far.

Thus, out of the whole Pythagorean tradition, the fragment by Dicearchus remains the only solid basis for speculation on the links between the Muses, Pythagoras and the Pythagorean lifestyle[63]. Yet, upon closer examination, we can see that Dicearchus' testimony does not suggest any relation between Pythagoras and the Muses. What can be drawn from this author's text as a most rudimentary conclusion is the suggestion that this is a poliadic cult of the Muses (and not a cult of any Pythagorean goddesses)[64]. Besides, in the scene of the philosopher's death, the emphasis is put on the escape to the temple and the search for asylum by assuming the role of supplicant. The whole corresponds both to Dicearchus' narrative about Pythagoras' wanderings and the aversion towards him in Italian cities, as well as to the social and religious realities of the epoch.

The hypothesis that the cult of the Muses in Metapontum – like the one in Kroton, known from the speeches included by Iamblichus – must have been inspired by Pythagoras seems improbable too. Considering the currently available testimonies, this is pure fiction, stemming from an excessively frivolous use of the testimonies of incomparable value, prepared by different authors and reporting on events from different settings.

A justification for the above interpretation can be found in the general knowledge about the development of the cult of the Muses in the archaic and classical epochs. There is no doubt whatsoever that, even if we reject the weak hypothesis about the links between the Pythagoreans and the Muses, the information about the existence of the cult in Metapontum at the beginning of the 5th century remains valid. The general analysis of literary, epigraphic, iconographic and archaeological testimonies confirms that the cult did not start earlier than in the

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[62] See Iustin. XX 4; Iambl. *VP* 30, 170–171; Val. Max. VIII 15 *ext*. 1.

[63] I put aside the (occasionally used) information, coming from the collection of *akousmata*, that the Pythagoreans called the Pleiades the Muses' lyre (Arist. fr. 159), or the comparison between the pleasure that one can derive from goodness and justice to the harmony of the Muses (Porph. *VP* 39). See e.g. Linfert-Reich 1971: 16; and Riedweg's remark (2002: 28): "Verschiedene Zeugnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die Musen im religiösen und kosmologischen Denken der Pythagoreer in der Tat eine nicht unwichtige Rolle spielten". Considering the fact that the Pleiades were also called Rheia's hands, and the sea was called Kronos' tears, these gods should also be included in the Pythagoreans' cosmological system (and their cult practices). On the context of the proper understanding of *akousmata*/*symbola*, see Gemelli Marciano 2014 (esp. p. 135, n. 18).

[64] See: Giacometti 2005: 92: "...il filosofo peripatetico non parla di uno 'stenopos' denominato Mouseion all'indomani della morte di Pitagora, ma di un Mouseion preesistente alla sua venuta a Metaponto".

5th century[65]. The earliest reliable sources come from the second half of this century[66]. However, we need to remember that what we are considering here is not the instance of an insignificant homage but a whole, separate temple dedicated to the goddesses, a phenomenon which was rare and confirmed in testimonies much later – in most known cases the Muses appear surrounded by other gods, without a separate *temenos*. Such is the situation in Epidauros or in Dion, to give just a few examples[67]. Thus the cult in Metapontum at the turn of the 6th and the 5th centuries appears to be an exception, different from a – hypothetical but still convincing – reconstruction of the cult's evolution.

Such a late dating of the cult's beginnings stems from the assumption that the Muses, originally functioning as the guardians of poets, could not have appeared in the sphere of cult as, in this very function, they were not an important socio-religious phenomenon. The change that occurred in the 5th century was an effect (one of many) of the spread of schools and the fact that the goddesses were associated with the educational process as well as intellectual development. Originally, this phenomenon can only be observed in vase iconography, where over the span of the 5th century the Muses are gradually and more often represented with a papyrus scroll, a stylus, and in an educational context[68]. But it was the introduction of the cult of the Muses to Plato's Academy that, from our perspective, should be thought of as a watershed event[69]. And it seems that when it comes to this and some other issues, later sources on Pythagoras were influenced by the way the functioning of Plato's school was represented[70].

For the sake of the present analysis, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the cult of the Muses in the form it is known from Dicearchus' account started no earlier than in the 4th century, and that the information about the circumstances of Pythagoras' death cannot be taken as an argument that would confirm the Pythagoreans' links to the Muses.

SUMMING-UP

Probably all scholars agree that, in terms of a storyline and hard facts, the accounts of Pythagoras' life and death are not consistent with each other, and that

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[65] Mojsik 2011.

[66] E.g. *SEG* LI 2001, 713 (Larisa); see A. Tziafalias, AD LII 1997 [2003], p. 523, no. 19; *IG* I^3 369, 66 and 86 (Athens).

[67] Epidauros: Lamprinoudakis 1986; Dion: Diod. Sic. XVII 16, 3–4; see Mari 2002.

[68] See Queyrel 1988; Glazebrook 2005; Small 2005: 68: "A history of the appearance of the Muses in the visual arts clearly marks the increasing association between the Muses and learning".

[69] Murray 2004: 374: "...it was Plato's appropriation of the Muses for the newly emerging discipline of philosophy that ensured their survival into the age of prose".

[70] The best known example of attributing a(n) (allegedly) Platonic innovation to Pythagoras is linked with the concept of *philosophia*. See Burkert 1960.

they provide material for at least several different biographies. The descriptions of the circumstances surrounding the philosopher's death are the best examples of the problem. Taking out one of the testimonies from the historiographic context, and the analysis of the information included in it, irrespective of its origin, of authorial intention, of the place of the motif in the (original) narrative structure, and of the meanings generated by primary and secondary cultural contexts, will not facilitate our reaching legitimate conclusions. Even more so because we are not analysing a diachronic picture of the Pythagoreanism as such, but we want either to establish how probable certain events at the time of Pythagoras in the 6th and 5th centuries were, or to assess the state of research on the Pythagoreans in, for example, the 4th century.

The most important aim of the present analysis was a thorough examination of various aspects and meanings of Dicearchus' account, and *not* a reconstruction of the real circumstances of the philosopher's death or of the valid picture of him and his society. Because of the late dating of the testimonies, we still do not know how faithful Porphyry and Diogenes Laertios were in passing on the account of this author. As it seems, there is at least one element of his tale that belongs to a later period and *not* to the late archaic epoch – the information about the cult of the Muses. Still, in its most substantial part, the tale of the circumstances surrounding the fall of the Pythagoreans and Pythagoras' death should be treated as corresponding to Dicearchus' original account, and, in such a form, it needs to be considered as a relatively reliable testimony to the state of research in the late 4th century. Such a claim is justified by the representation of the philosopher's escape (in a form which is not typical for the later, apologetic, biographical tradition) and by the information about the local tradition. The latter definitely seems more reasonable in the context of the late 4th century, especially if we take into account Dicearchus' background. Besides, later authors, while looking for ways of verifying fictional data, resort to other sources than an anonymous oral tradition[71].

When analysed globally, Dicearchus' testimony seems to carry slightly different overtones than ones suggested by selective readings of the crucial fragment. Only when we remember the whole route and circumstances accompanying the escape can we see that the death in Metapontum was not shown as a pure, "neutral" fact. The logic of the events presented by Dicearchus implies that it was not a casual visit to the temple of Pythagoras' favourite goddesses. If the whole account is, basically, a description of the escape and the negative attitudes that the inhabitants of numerous *poleis* displayed towards the philosopher, whose community, in their opinion, was responsible for μεγάλαι στάσεις, then the last stage of the event, leading to Pythagoras' death, should not be different in its overtones from the rest of the narrative. But if we assume that the reception Pythagoras met with in Metapontum ought to have been more cordial (as

[71] See Ulacco (forthcoming).

according to the majority of the traditional accounts, he had been living there for some time), we need to explain why he reached the place at the very end of his wanderings. This is particularly the case in view of the fact that the escape route takes him west of Kroton, that is in the opposite direction to Metapontum. Obviously, here we can sidestep the whole problem, pointing to our superficial knowledge of the assault on the Pythagoreans in Kroton, and of the escape, and even suggest that the choice of direction was accidental. Nevertheless, it is intriguing to note that his death in Metapontum is the last stage of his escape, and that even in this city he is met with hostility. Within the whole narrative frame, the escape to the temple may be comprehended only in the context of *asylia* – i.e. the description of the incident was meant to present Pythagoras as a helpless supplicant. Therefore, the information about the lack of means to live suggests the philosophers' isolation and starvation, leading to his death. Such an interpretation of the story is further strengthened by the connection of ἐν δὲ τῇ (περὶ Μεταπόντιον) with στάσις (uprising) which breaks out in the city, and not with supposed χώρα. In such a situation, the escape to the temple (καταφυγόντα) would be an effect of the course of events.

If we accept the above version of what happened, this means that the purpose of Dicearchus' account was to demonstrate that at the moment of the anti-Pythagorean revolt the philosopher was not welcomed in any of the Italian cities because he was perceived as a danger to social and political stability. On the one hand, such a reading strays from the current interpretations which assume that Dicearchus presented the philosopher as a moral guide, a social reformer, or as an example of *praktikos bios*. On the other hand, the picture that emerges from the above interpretation should be seen as corresponding to the meaning of other fragments by the same author, notably fr. 40 and 42, as proposed in the interpretation by Huffman. There is an observable logical relation between the picture of a hetaera, who drew the inhabitants' attention away from socially sanctioned and traditional behaviour, the picture of a skillful rhetorician, who cast a spell on the inhabitants of Italian cities and persuaded them to radically different lifestyles, and the representation of the circumstances surrounding the fall of a charismatic who wandered along the south Italian coast and starved in the temple. The picture can be read as ironic, or even negative, but for want of a broader narrative context in which Dicearchus included these pieces of information, I abide by my assertion that this is by no means a favourable representation of the philosopher of Samos.

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HONORIFIC INSCRIPTIONS AND THEIR PONTIC RECIPIENTS*

by

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ABSTRACT: This article discusses the phenomenon of public munificence as seen in the Greek cities on the western/northern Black Sea coast between the fifth c. BC and the third c. AD. The analysis of over three hundred local honorific inscriptions demonstrated that certain trends, such as the growing popularity of euergetism in the second c. AD, closely resembled those seen in other communities of the Eastern Mediterranean. Nonetheless, the occurrence of particular deeds in the material that was analysed deviates from the contemporaneous standards of the Eastern Mediterranean. More expensive contributions, such as building funds or large direct donations, were relatively rare in western and northern Pontic Greek cities, possibly due to their precarious political and financial position. The material that was analysed showcases that the Greek *poleis* from the northwest Pontic region initially experienced constant pressure from the hinterland tribes. Records of envoys to natives decline in number between the Hellenistic and Roman periods, proving that, thanks to the *pax Romana,* the barbarian threat was substantially reduced.

Public munificence in antiquity has its roots in liturgies carried out by citizens to their cities during the classical period. The idea of euergetism (a term used by modern scholars) was to contribute goods or services to the community and to receive a public award in return. The ancient Greeks used the word *euergesia* in reference to a deed committed by a *euergetes*, a benefactor. Being a benefactor often equalled having wealth and influence, also connoting the need to flaunt one's high social status. The majority of acts of euergetism benefitted the *euergetes*' city; in other cases, services were offered to groups of people (councillors) or unions of cities. The salient feature of public munificence was a drive to distinguish oneself by making an extraordinary and previously unheard-of contribution to one's community. Significantly, economic and social aspects of *euergesia* are often highlighted in many works concerning public munificence[1].

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[1] To read more about euergetism, see: Gauthier 1985; Veyne 1990; Sartre 1991; Migeotte 1997; Zuiderhoek 2009.

The main aim of this paper is to shed some light on the activities of benefactors from Greek cities on the western and northern Black Sea coast[2]: I chose to limit myself to acts of *euergesia* profiting the entire *polis*, as the comprehensive and detailed study of benefactors of private associations lies beyond the scope of this paper.

The foundation of Greek cities in the western and northern Black Sea coastal region was spearheaded chiefly by Milesian settlers. Settlers from this Asia Minor *polis* established several colonies in the region, such as Odessos, Istros, Tomis, Apollonia, Olbia, Tyras and Dionysopolis. Other Greek *poleis* also sent settlers: the foundation of Mesambria is attributed to the city of Megara, whereas Kallatis and Chersonesos are linked to Heraklea Pontica. Chronologically, Olbia and Apollonia comprised the very first colonies, dated to the second half of the seventh c. BC; Odessos and Chersonesos followed in the first half of the sixth c. BC, then Mesambria at the end of the sixth c. BC, Dionysopolis at the end of the fifth c. BC and Tomis in the fourth c. BC[3].

Situated on the edges of the Graeco-Roman *oikumene*, the Black Sea Greek cities rarely featured in the written accounts of contemporary historians and other authors. Enigmatic and incomplete, literary sources referring to this region have to be supplemented with other types of data. Accordingly, the histories of these communities are chiefly studied through analysing approximately three thousand four hundred inscriptions found in their vicinity[4].

Honorific decrees and *tituli honorarii* bestowed in western and northern Pontic cities provide us with the names of about 230 people important enough to be commemorated in an inscription. Damaged through the ravages of time, they often record only parts of the honorands' names, their filiations or places of origin. Among 313 honorific inscription stelas, many damaged ones lack information about the recipient, showcasing the scarcity of available evidence; nevertheless, the honorific character of these stelae remains indubitable. Although they do not reveal much about particular honorands and their benefactions, these stelas can nevertheless shed some light on chronological tendencies concerning the honorific practices in the north-western Black Sea region; however, the poor condition of the bulk of our evidence may make the numbers in this paper less exact.

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[2] To read more about euergetism in the Black Sea region, see: Nawotka 1995 and 1997a; Vinogradov 1997; Anghel 1999–2000.

[3] Nawotka 1997b: 23–26; Musielak 2003: 13–15; Hansen, Nielsen 2004: 932–952.

[4] The epigraphic evidence discussed in this paper was published in several *corpora: IOSPE* I^2; *NEPKh*; *I.Olbia*; *IGB* I^2; *ISM* I–III; *IGDOlbia*; and several volumes of *SEG*. (See the end of this paper for the list of abbreviations.)




Fig. 1. Chronology of 313 honorific inscriptions from the northwest Pontic region[5]

Approximately 55% of the pieces of evidence studied predate the Roman period. The bulk of the body of evidence dates from the Hellenistic period, with several stones from Olbia dated to the fifth and the fourth c. BC[6]. The remainder of the evidence comes from the Roman period, with the majority (65%) issued in the second and early third c. AD. Recorded acts of public munificence rise sharply in number in the second c. AD in the Black Sea communities and beyond: in Roman Asia Minor, the average number of benefactions commemorated per annum in the second c. AD rose fivefold in comparison to the preceding century[7]. Nevertheless, the data mentioned above shows the general tendency in the region, not always accounting for local trends and divergences. For example, the city of Tomis, established after other colonies, never equalled them in importance in the Hellenistic period, a disparity reflected in the relatively small number of inscriptions dated to that period[8]. In the late Hellenistic and Roman periods, Tomis entered a period of growth and prosperity, developed into being a prominent member of the Pontic League and proceeded to issue what would become the majority of its surviving honorific inscriptions[9].

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[5] The bulk of the inscriptions is dated on palaeographical grounds, which can make the time frame vague. This paper uses the dates established by the editors.

[6] *IOSPE* I² 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 188, 325, 345; *I.Olbia* 1, 2, 3 + *SEG* XXXIII 617; 4–9, 11 + *SEG* XXXIV 764; 13 + *SEG* XXXIV 761; 14 + *SEG* XXXVII 669; 15; *IGDOlbia* 5 + *SEG* XLVII 1180; 13; *SEG* XXXII 795; LIII 785.

[7] Zuiderhoek 2009: 18.

[8] Nawotka 1997b: 18–20.

[9] Nawotka 2014: 52.




Fig. 2. Number of honorific inscriptions issued in every *polis* between the second half of the fifth c. BC and the third c. AD

From their very beginnings, the western and northern Pontic Greek depended on larger states. According to the epigraphic evidence from the Hellenistic period, the colonies in question were under constant pressure from hinterland tribes[10]. Two inscriptions from Chersonesos mention the barbarian threat in the third c. BC, with another inscription from the first half of the second c. BC implying that the locals still harboured ill will towards the colonists[11]. A Scythian kingdom established by Scilurus in the Crimea posed the gravest threat to the exposed city: at the end of the second century, the pressure must have become too much to withstand, with Chersonesos coming under Mithridates Eupator's protection[12].

Other areas of the northern and western Euxine coast also had to cope with unrelenting pressure from the hinterland dwellers[13]. The Olbian inscriptions for the famed Protogenes and Niceratos depict Olbia as an impoverished, poorly defended and famished colony eternally grateful to its benefactors for providing it with corn, funds and fortifications[14]. Many barbarian kings exploited the colonies' weaknesses: Saitaphernes extorted money from Olbia for providing

[10] *IOSPE* I² 32, 34, 343, 401, 402; *IGB* I² 307; Strabo VII 4, 3.

[11] *IOSPE* I² 343, 401, 402.

[12] *IOSPE* I² 352 + *SEG* XLII 695.

[13] To read more about Greek cities on the western shores of the Black Sea, see: Pippidi 1975; Nawotka 1997b; Musielak 2003.

[14] *IOSPE* I² 32, 34.

protection to the city[15], whereas Sadalas demanded a tribute from Mesambria[16]. Efforts to placate local rulers did not always succeed: king Burebista sacked several cities and temporarily gained control over a swath of the coast, the last serious barbarian excursion in the western Pontus[17].




Fig. 3. Chronological distribution of honorific inscriptions from the northern and western Pontic Greek cities in the Roman period

As stated before, the relatively small number of honorific inscriptions in the late Hellenistic and the early Roman period was followed by a rapid increase in the first and second half of the second c. AD, an increase representative for the majority of the Eastern Mediterranean communities. Growing numbers of surviving epigraphic data have been connected to economic growth in this period, a hypothesis supported by concurrent increases in other significant trends, such as the number of ancient Mediterranean shipwrecks (a roaring maritime trade), the size of animal bone deposits (regular consumption of costly meat) and the construction of public buildings (conspicuous euergetism)[18]; one may also mention the increase in lead and copper pollution in the Greenland ice cap, peaking in the second c. AD and definitely connected to a parallel increase in Roman mining/smelting activity[19]. If we showcase epigraphic trends in the Pontic region in the light of other types of data, then it becomes evident that, thanks to the enduring *pax Romana*, Greek cities in that region had a chance to recover from the economic and demographic decline brought about by the lingering barbarian threat. Accordingly, the decline of the public munificence in the Pontic area

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[15] *IOSPE* I² 32.

[16] *IGB* I² 307. However some scholars argue that this was not a tribute: Balabanov (1995) claims that this contract was sealed with economic rather than political aims in mind; Veligianni-Terzi (2004: 21–36) argues that the decree depicts real honours, typical for this region.

[17] *IGB* I² 13; Crişan 1978: 128 f.

[18] Callataÿ 2005: 369–372; Zuiderhoek 2009: 20 f.

[19] Callataÿ 2005: 361–369; Zuiderhoek 2009: 21.

from the third c. AD onwards coincides with trends observed in other regions of the Eastern Mediterranean: the economic decline of the Empire and the resultant impoverishment of the local civic elites was reflected by declines in the epigraphical phenomenon[20].

The Greek *poleis* from the northwest Pontic region had many intra- and inter-regional connections through proxeny, with approximately 35% of all inscriptions categorised as such[21]. Ascertaining whether the honorand was granted the title of *euergetes* or how exactly he benefited the *polis* often remains difficult at best, with the majority of proxenic inscriptions only partially preserved or including only a list of typical proxenic privileges. We can presume that all recipients of proxenic decrees were (at least in principle) *euergetai* and indeed many of them were referred to in that manner, but certainly not all *euergetai* were *proxenoi*[22]. Of particular interest is the phenomenon of using proxenic decrees in an idiosyncratic manner. Many formulas cite plausible and very detailed reasons for commemorating particular individuals[23]. Nonetheless, other inscriptions mention honorands who were probably not true benefactors, but rather asylum seekers[24] – and, crucially, political extortionists: a Mesambrian commemoratory inscription for Sadalas represents a thinly veiled record of an extraction of a fifty-stater tribute to a local barbarian king[25]. In such a way, a proxenic decree commemorating an individual may also shame the city-state, being an eternal record of its subjugation.

Indeed, granting honorific decrees to foreigners was ubiquitous in the Graeco-Roman world, with the Pontic cities being no exception in this case. Out of 140 inscriptions recording honours granted to foreigners, the majority included elaborate commercial privileges. In addition to *proedria*, *politeia* and privileges like *ateleia* (or *isoteleia*), harbour privileges and land purchase permissions are almost always granted, with the harbour privilege extended to the honorand's brothers and slaves in certain cases[26]. Interestingly, Chersonesos often granted foreigners the privilege of involvement in its internal civic life (μετοχάν τε πάντων ὧν καὶ Χερσονασείταις)[27]. Admittedly, not all who received these

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[20] Nawotka 1995: 131; Zuiderhoek 2009: 155.

[21] For example: *IGB* I² 13 *bis*, 41, 307 *bis*, 309; *I.Olbia* 27; *IOSPE* I² 357.

[22] Mack 2015: 40.

[23] For example: *ISM* I 36 + *SEG* LI 936; *IGB* I² 37 *bis*, 41, 307 *bis*; *IOSPE* I² 27; *SEG* XLV 985 + LIX 813.

[24] Vinogradov (1981: 23–26) argues that a honorific decree (*SEG* XXXI 701 + *IGDOlbia* 5) was granted to Timesileos, the expelled tyrant of Sinope and that granting this inscription was a form of confirmation of asylum. However, in his review of this book, Graham (1983) points out that evidence supporting this hypothesis remains insufficient.

[25] *IGB* I² 307, see n. 16 above.

[26] Only in the case of Olbia, for example: *IOSPE* I² 20, 21; *I.Olbia* 15.

[27] Examples: *IOSPE* I² 358, 376, 377, 378.

privileges were involved in trade, yet the bestowal of these special rights would probably mean much more to merchants than to other social groups. The intentions behind issuing a proxenic decree almost always remain obscure, though in all cases its bestowal was officially described as a prize publicly granted by a *polis* to a benefactor.




Fig. 4. Honours granted in all honorific inscriptions. Typical proxenic honours are excluded[28]

In the body of the inscriptions that were examined, 166 (53%) speak of granted privileges. In 96 cases the honours bestowed are proxenic; for the 70 remaining inscriptions, the honorands were citizens of the *polis* which commissioned the inscription, since there is no *proxenia* on record. The stelas that were examined record the bestowal of 56 wreaths and the erection of 41 statues. Privileges of this type were certainly the most sought after, although benefactors of the Pontic cities could also expect other kinds of rewards for their civic-minded efforts, such as invitations to the *prytaneion* or the temple for a meal, issuing private inscriptions from the public funds or the covering of funeral expenses[29]. 39 inscriptions explicitly grant the title of *euergetes*, bestow the title upon an individual or refer to his activity as euergetic[30]. Roughly two-thirds of these inscriptions (ca.

[28] There are 39 inscriptions granting the title of *euergetes*, defining the honorands' attitude towards the city as euergetic or naming deeds as *euergesia*. They were issued for at least 42 people. See also n. 29 below. – Miscellaneous honours comprise bestowing the honour of hereditary priesthood of the Muses, hereditary priesthood of the Gods of Samothrace, painting of honorands' images, the reimbursement of expenses, carving inscriptions and fashioning statues paid from public funds, honorands' funerals paid from public funds, meals in the temple or invitation to the *prytaneion*.

[29] Examples: *I.Olbia* 36; *ISM* III 7 + *SEG* LIII 719; *IGB* I² 315; *IOSPE* I² 34.

[30] These inscriptions are: *IGB* I² 13, 15–17, 307, 307 *quater*, 314, 320, 395; *IOSPE* I² 32, 34, 40, 61, 188, 352, 357, 362; *ISM* I 1, 8, 12, 19, 31, 54, 61, 70, 71; II 77; III 2–4, 7, 57, 107, 115; *SEG*

26) commemorate citizens and one-third (at least 13) commemorates foreigners. The city of Istros produced the greatest number of honorific decrees and *tituli honorarii* containing the words *euergetes* or *euergesia*; strikingly, not even one was inscribed for a foreigner[31].

Benefactors from western and northern Pontic Greek cities, exactly like their counterparts in different parts of the Mediterranean, contributed to the life of a *polis* in diverse ways, with proportions of types of benefactions often differing from those in the Eastern Mediterranean *sensu lato*. Unfortunately, due to the scarcity of evidence, only ca. 45% of inscriptions analysed record legible information on the benefactions that took place. As figure no. 5 demonstrates, one of the commonest civic services was to be appointed to the magistracy: being a gymnasiarch, *agoronomos* or priest cost time and, most significantly, money. In the majority of cases, the magistracy was simultaneously held with other offices; inscriptions commemorating individual solely for being a magistrate exist as well, but all of them belong to *tituli honorarii*[32].

Significantly, public munificence evolved as a concept, with certain acts classified as euergetism, even though they would not have been categorised so in the past. As was stated before, holding the magistracy demanded a lot of money and time, with those who performed more than the bare minimum certainly expecting public praise for their efforts. Having examined all the examples concerning the honouring of citizen-magistrates, we have observed a striking increase in this trend during the Roman period. Approximately 72% of all magistracies commemorated by honorific inscriptions from the northwest Pontic region date from the Principate, whereas only 28% of magistrate inscriptions were dated to the early (16%) and late (12%) Hellenistic period. As Nawotka noticed, Istros and other north-western Pontic Greek cities established democracies only in the second half of the fourth century or even later; accordingly, the sole fact of holding an office of magistrate was enough of a novelty or public recognition, with other prizes possibly not deemed necessary[33]. From the late Hellenistic times onwards, notables realised that their expenditures of time and funds could be rebranded as an act of munificence. Notably, this scenario differs slightly from the pattern proposed by Gauthier, who has shown that, from the second c. BC onwards, *euergetai* were very often indiscriminately distributing their benefactions to local citizens, no matter if they were magistrates or not[34].

XLVII 1196; L 683; LII 724; LIX 740; LX 683.

[31] *ISM* I 1, 8, 12, 19, 31, 54, 61, 70, 71; *SEG* L 683; LII 724.

[32] *IGB* I² 65, 322; *IOSPE* I² 43, 55, 424.

[33] Nawotka 1995: 131.

[34] Gauthier 1985: 67–74.




Fig. 5. Types of benefactions recorded from 140 inscriptions from the northwest Pontic region[35]

Two common categories of benefactions depend upon each other and comment upon the geopolitical situation in Pontic Greek cities. Embassies and military efforts often went hand in hand in the pre-Roman period, with these two types of munificence amounting to ca. 32% of all registered examples. As mentioned previously, the hold of the Greek Black Sea colonies on the neighbouring lands was often tenouous. The examples of Protagenes and Nikeratos from Olbia, the defenders of Mesambria, Akornion from Dionysopolis or Diogenes and Agathokles from Istros reveal that neighbouring barbarian rulers attacked Pontic Greek *poleis*, negotiated with Greek envoys about the ransom of hostages and, finally, demanded tribute from defeated city-states[36]. This kind of public munificence grew in significance in Hellenistic times, as a successful diplomatic mission could save a city from destruction, an example in point being the case of Dionysopolis during Burebista's invasion.

A benefactor serving as an envoy or fighting in defence of the city could expect lavish praise in the commemoratory inscription; however, one has to keep in mind that elaborate motivation formulas found in these decrees do not necessarily aim to accurately describe the unique political and military context of the deed, but rather exalt the honorands' deeds as more "*euergetic*" by highlighting the critical situation in which the *polis* found itself[37]. In the Roman period, sending or covering the expenses of envoys remained a popular and highly regarded, yet unidirectional public service, with envoys sent to the Emperor or to one of his

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[35] Miscellaneous deeds comprise (*inter alia*) organising a garrison, bringing a poet to the city, reading the gods' will, adorning an agora or a temple, financing a play in the theatre, financing of procession, serving as a judge, organising gladiatorial fights, or financing a feast.

[36] *IOSPE* I² 32, 34; *IGB* I² 13, 323–326; *ISM* I 8, 15.

[37] Anghel 1999–2000: 90.

officials, but not the other way round. Accordingly, its importance diminished: envoys were no longer sent to save the city from an oncoming barbarian onslaught, but to secure the city's good standing with the Emperor, a visible result of the *pax Romana.*

Approximately 10% of all deeds were concerned with the distribution of goods. This type of munificence, rare in the north-western Black Sea region, mattered much more in other parts of the Graeco-Roman world and served to ease mounting economic and social tensions. Distributing grain in times of shortages or selling it at a lower price pacified disadvantaged social groups and suppressed possible rebellions. Interestingly, such deeds were not focused on the lower social strata. The organisation of gladiatorial games, processions and feasts did cater to the poor, but the evidence does not point to any preference in social status, instead stressing the universal redistribution of goods and services. Professional groups, such as teachers or members of the *boule*, were occasionally distinguished through acts of distribution dedicated specifically to them[38].

Some inscriptions record extraordinary, if unique, acts of generosity, such as those of Protogenes from Olbia, Akornion from Dionysopolis or Diogenes the son of Diogenes and Dionysios the son of Strouthion from Istros[39]. Many of these so-called donations were in fact loans to the *polis*, with the honorand expecting their return[40]. The relatively small number of public donations can be explained by there being simply not enough rich (and generous) citizens; furthermore, magistrates would rather spend public money than make private donations while not in office. A case in point is the practice of donating consumables: all *poleis* continuously had to ensure that their supply chains for grain and oil would remain unbroken: donations of those goods could help a *polis* in a moment of crisis, but in all probability they were not essential for the economic survival of the cities.

The most expensive form of munificence, the funding of public buildings, also happens to be the least numerous. Nine inscriptions mentioning the procuring of funds for a new building or for the restoration of an old one come from Istros[41]. Another six inscriptions concern the construction of city walls and the restoration of towers and gates[42]. Eight examples come from Hellenistic times and another seven from the Roman period; no patterns can be found by analysing the surviving evidence. Nearly half of all building benefactions are attested for Istros, just as in the case of the distribution of goods. Accordingly, this trend demonstrates

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[38] *IGB* I² 15 *bis*, 63 *bis*.

[39] *IOSPE* I² 32; *IGB* I² 13; *ISM* I 1–3, 19.

[40] *IOSPE* I² 32 – more than half of Protogenes' money was given to the city as a loan (see also Gauthier 1985: 71); *SEG* LII 724 – Meniskos from Istros received 300 staters to compensate his expenditures; *ISM* I 1 – Diogenes from Istros lent 500 staters to the city.

[41] *ISM* I 1, 3, 22, 54, 145, 146, 168, 178, 179, 181.

[42] *IOSPE* I² 32, 40, 418; *IGB* I² 15 *bis*, 57; *IGDOlbia* 13 + *SEG* XXXII 795.

that Istros was the best developed of all Pontic cities throughout the centuries and its citizens could afford to donate to costly building and goods distribution programmes; furthermore, it also highlights by contrast the economic fragility of other regional *poleis* and underlines the demographic and economic problems they had to deal with.

The evidence analysed so far showcases the importance of euergetism in the region being analysed, but it does not suggest that the treasuries of the north-western Pontic cities would collapse without the steady influx of donations. In his seminal work, Zuiderhoek claims that the elite in Asia Minor during the Roman period spent no more than 5% of their annual income on acts of public munificence[43]. In the north-western Pontic region, the dearth of evidence would make such appraisals unreliable; however, the exact percentage is likely to not exceed the value given by Zuiderhoek, especially in the light of the economic and political problems the local *poleis* had to face. As such, euergetism emerges as a civic-minded act of wealth sharing, performed to defuse social tensions. Members of the highest social echelons coveted golden wreaths and statues on the agora; by engaging in acts of public service, dignitaries also endeavoured to underline and justify their position in society, especially in the late Hellenistic/Roman times, when the so-called "euergetism *ob honorem*" became widespread and *poleis* became more oligarchic in nature[44]. Regardless of the inherent value of gifts, the evidence shows that public munificence in the Greek cities of the northern and western Pontic area was a regularly occurring phenomenon and remained an important factor until the third c. AD.

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ABBREVIATIONS

IGB I²: G. Mihailov (ed.), *Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae*, vol. I: *Inscriptiones orae Ponti Euxini*, 2nd edn., Sofia 1970.

IGDOlbia: L. Dubois, *Inscriptions grecques dialectales d'Olbia du Pont*, Genève 1996 (Hautes Études du monde gréco-romain).

I.Olbia: T.N. Knipovich, E.I. Levi, *Inscriptiones Olbiae*, Leningrad 1968.

IOSPE I²: B. Latyshev (ed.), *Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae* (vols. I–III, St. Petersburg 1885–1901), vol. I: *Inscriptiones Tyriae, Olbiae, Chersonesi Tauricae*, 2nd edn., St. Petersburg 1916.

ISM I/II/III: *Inscriptiones Daciae et Scythiae Minoris antiquae*, Series altera: *Inscriptiones Scythiae Minoris Graecae et Latinae*, vol. I: D.M. Pippidi, *Histria et vicinia*, Bucharest 1983; vol. II: I. Stoian, *Tomis et territorium*, Bucharest 1987; vol. III: A. Avram, *Callatis et territorium*, Bucharest 2000.

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43 Zuiderhoek 2009: 28.

44 Veyne 1990: 140; Nawotka 1997a: 69; Zuiderhoek 2009: 151.

NEPKh: E.I. Solomonik, *Novye epigraficheskie pamiatniki Khersonesa*, vols. I–II, Kiev 1964.
SEG: *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.*

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DID C. CAECINA TUSCUS BECOME A PRAETORIAN PREFECT?

by

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ABSTRACT: This study is aimed at answering the title question of whether C. Caecina Tuscus became a praetorian prefect, or was at least considered as a candidate for this office. Doubts are raised due to the report by Tacitus (*Ann*. XIV 19 f.) regarding the plot against Nero in AD 55. Tacitus mentions that according to Fabius Rusticus (the author of a historical work used by Tacitus), the prefect of the Praetorian Guard, Sex. Afranius Burrus, was also among those suspected of being involved in the plot. As a result, Caecina Tuscus was appointed as his successor and had it not been for the intervention of Seneca, Burrus would have been dismissed. Tacitus questions this side of the story and eventually declares himself in favour of the views put forward by Cluvius Rufus and Pliny the Elder, who claimed that the fidelity of Burrus had never been doubted. Nevertheless, a structural analysis of Tacitus' passage, knowledge about the sources he used, as well as certain details in his narrative, incline us to suppose that the information provided by Fabius Rusticus is highly likely to be true.

THE BEGINNING OF NERO'S REIGN

Tacitus' twelfth book of the *Annals* is crowned by the description of emperor Claudius' death and the elevation of the nearly seventeen-year-old Nero to the throne. The next book, starting with a depiction of the new reign, leaves the reader with no doubts whatsoever. Already the first sentence shows the features of the forthcoming years: death sentences and rivalry as regards the influence of Agrippina the Younger (the imperial mother) and other advisers of the young emperor (XIII 1, 1). The death of Claudius initiated the first such period in the history of the Roman Empire when a young ruler was a figurehead for many years whilst the real power was in somebody else's hands. Many people aspired to dominate in the state, but the final struggle was between Agrippina on the one hand and the pair of imperial advisers: Seneca, the former teacher of Nero, and Sextus Afranius Burrus, who held the crucial office of the prefect of the Praetorian Guard, on the other (XIII 2; cf. 6, 3; 11, 2). Although the rivalry was eventually won by the two advisers, and Agrippina herself fell victim, five years later, to matricide, the position of Burrus and Seneca was all the time endangered – their activity reminded one of the dangerous manoeuvring among the intrigues of various court coteries. At the very beginning, however, it was Agrippina who

seemed to dominate. This was proven most clearly by her being allowed to attend the sittings of the Senate, even if she merely listened to the sessions from behind a curtain (XIII 5). The weakening of her impact was to come along with the love affair between Nero and a freedwoman, Claudia Acte. Seneca and Burrus turned a blind eye to this affection, while Agrippina, said to have been jealous of her influence, tried to stand gainst it (XIII 12 f.). When the dismissal of Pallas (the influential freedman and political ally of Agrippina during the reign of Claudius) followed, Nero's mother emphasised that Britannicus, Claudius' biological son, was still alive, and this was not an idle threat. For Agrippina it must have been simply a war of nerves with the son whom she had elevated to the throne earlier on (XIII 14). However, at the beginning of AD 55, it resulted in Nero's order to poison Britannicus (XIII 15–17). He also banned his mother from her right to the military escort that she had hitherto benefited from. He had her moved to another apartment, where he visited her rarely and was always accompanied by soldiers (XIII 18, 2 f.). Such obvious signals of disfavour were soon noticed and Agrippina found herself abandoned by her previously numerous supporters and friends (XIII 19, 1)[1].

THE PLOT

It was in such circumstances that one of the first crises in the political fight happened, the course of which is narrated only in the *Annals* by Tacitus (XIII 19 f.). The causes of this incident were trivial – a grudge against Agrippina felt by her former friend Junia Silana. Their friendship was replaced by hatred after Agrippina had not given her consent to the marriage of Silana to a young aristocrat, Sextius Africanus. The moment came for Silana to use the disgrace experienced by Agrippina and to worsen the latter's situation even more. Using her clients, Iturius and Calvisius, she decided to accuse Agrippina of planning to overthrow Nero and replace him with C. Rubellius Plautus, who took pride in his descent from the emperor Augustus on his mother's side. Agrippina was to marry him afterwards and thus regain her influence upon the supreme authority. The aforementioned accusers gave away this information to Atimetus, a freedman of Domitia Lepida, who was Nero's aunt on his father's side and who competed with Agrippina as well. Paris, an actor and a freedman of Domitia, but also, most

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[1] Cf. Cass. Dio LXI 2–8; Suet. *Nero* 9; 28, 1; 33, 2 f.; 34, 1; Ios. *Ant. Iud.* XX 151–153; *Bell. Iud.* II 250. See generally W.C. McDermott, *Sex. Afranius Burrus*, Latomus VIII 1949, pp. 235–237; B. Baldwin, *Executions, Trials, and Punishment in the Reign of Nero*, PP XXII 1967, pp. 425–430; M.T. Griffin, *Nero. The End of a Dynasty*, New York [3]2001, pp. 37–40, 67–75; eadem, *Seneca. A Philosopher in Politics*, Oxford [3]2003, pp. 67–103; A.A. Barrett, *Agrippina. Sex, Power, and Politics in the Early Empire*, London 2001, pp. 150–174; J. Ginsburg, *Representing Agrippina. Constructions of Female Power in the Early Roman Empire*, Oxford 2006, p. 35–44.

importantly, a playmate of Nero in feasts and games, was chosen as an executor of this plan (XIII 19, 2–4)[2].

The culmination occurred on a tragic night in AD 55. Following the accepted plan, Paris came to Nero late in the evening, as he used to do, but instead of taking part in the party he passed the message to Nero about the plot against the emperor's life. The latter, alarmed, was going to slay his mother and Rubellius Plautus at once and might have been also considering the dismissal of Burrus because of his earlier political connections with Agrippina (XIII 20, 1). Further on, Tacitus recalls the testimony of Fabius Rusticus, who wrote in his historical work not only that C. Caecina Tuscus was to become a new prefect, but even about the letter (*codicillus*) which was already written and which entrusted him the command over the Praetorians. It was only thanks to Seneca's intervention that Nero calmed down and Burrus kept his position (XIII 20, 2). Tacitus, however, recalls Rusticus' opinion only to reject it, pointing out that his testimony is unreliable as Rusticus was Seneca's friend and because of that he overstated the significance of the latter in his history. At the same time, Tacitus agrees with the opinions of other historians, Pliny the Elder and Cluvius Rufus, who asserted that Burrus' loyalty was beyond doubt (*ibidem*). According to this side of the story, it was Burrus himself, not Seneca, who settled the terrified emperor. He declared that if the imperial mother was guilty, she would not escape death. At the same time he convinced Nero to give Agrippina a chance to defend herself, even more so because all this happened at night, after a drinking binge, and the accusation was based merely on rumour (XIII 20, 3)[3].

Tacitus had no doubts about the course of events of the next day. Burrus and Seneca in the presence of imperial freedmen charged Agrippina and listened to her explanations. She succeeded in countering the allegations and turned the whole matter into a political victory afterwards. The slanderers were punished with exile or sentenced to death, but also a few vital offices were assumed by people related to the imperial mother (XIII 21 f.)[4].

THE MATTER

Tacitus, willing to describe the course of the tragic night, encountered irreconcilable differences in the reports written by his predecessors. Atypically to

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[2] McDermott, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 237; Baldwin, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 430; Barrett, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 174 f.; Ginsburg, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 44.

[3] Cf. Baldwin, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 430 f.; T.K. Roper, *Nero, Seneca and Tigellinus*, Historia XXVIII 1979, pp. 350, 354 f.; Barrett, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 175 f.; Ginsburg, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 44.

[4] See McDermott, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 237 f.; Baldwin, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 431 f.; M. Absil, *Les préfets du prétoire d'Auguste à Commode. 2 avant Jésus-Christ – 192 après Jésus-Christ*, Paris 1997, p. 70; Barrett, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 176 f.; Ginsburg, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 45; cf. S. Ruciński, *Arruntius Stella, l'organisateur des jeux de Néron*, Eos XCIX 2012, pp. 279–281.

the ancient historians he quoted the most important elements of both sides of the events, and pointed out the names of the authors or their most significant representatives[5]. He finished not only by coming down on one side of the fence, but also by justifying his standpoint. Not being bound to Tacitus' opinion, however, we may ask the question raised once his work has been read: which version of events presented is the most probable one and thus what was the role of C. Caecina Tuscus in the whole story, including the most important matter: was he appointed a praetorian prefect?

It is worth adding that in the literature this issue is far from being settled, and researchers' views offer a vast array of possibilities. There is a kind of general agreement, although not a single author claims that Caecina Tuscus performed the duties of the praetorian prefect as such. Many researchers avoid unambiguously declaring themselves in favour of or against this issue; although they weigh up various options more than once, generally they are content with quoting Tacitus' report[6]. According to Michel Absil, Tuscus was not a praetorian prefect, and the story behind his appointment may have been made up. The researcher takes into consideration the version that Tuscus' appointment might have been considered (although there are doubts)[7]. A similar opinion, although not expressed outright, can be found in a classic work by Alfredo Passerini. Both Tuscus and the story connected with him were totally ignored and missed even in the index of proper names[8]. Some researchers are satisfied with the statement that Tuscus was not given an appointment to the office but that his nomination had been considered and was almost carried out[9]. A. Héron de Villefosse went furthest in his additions to the unfinished list created by Bartolomeo Borghesi, and later D.J. De Laet, who supplemented A. Passerini's book, did something similar. Both advanced the thesis that Tuscus had been appointed, which was confirmed by the document having been issued, but in consequence of Seneca's intervention, the

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[5] E. Mensching, *Zu den namentlichen Zitaten in Tacitus' Historien und Annalen*, Hermes XCV 1967, pp. 457–469; D. Flach, *Die taciteische Quellenbehandlung in Annalenbüchern XI–XVI*, MH XXX 1973, pp. 93 f.; O. Devillers, *Tacite et le sources des Annales. Enquêtes sur la méthode historique*, Louvain 2003, pp. 157–205; cf. D. Sailor, *Writing and Empire in Tacitus*, Cambridge 2008, p. 163.

[6] See e.g. O. Hirschfeld, *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diocletian*, vol. I: *Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete der roemischen Verwaltungsgeschichte*, Berlin 1877, pp. 220 f.; *PIR*[2] C 109 (A. Stein); Baldwin, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 431; Roper, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 350.

[7] Absil, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 205, no. *6*.

[8] A. Passerini, *Le coorti pretorie*, Roma 1939.

[9] See e.g. McDermott, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 239 f., 250 f.; S. Demougin, *Prosopographie des chevaliers romain julio-claudiens (43 av. J.-C.–70 ap. J.-C.)*, Roma 1992, p. 564, no. 671; Barrett, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 175; I. Łuć, *The Praefecti Praetorio of the Julio-Claudian Dynasty*, Res Historica XXIX 2010, p. 104.

nomination was withdrawn and the candidate did not manage to assume actual command over the Praetorians[10].

THE STRUCTURE OF TACITUS' PASSAGE

Let us begin with the structure of Tacitus' passage. His report was compiled from numerous facts, some of which caused him to have no doubts, while he considered the other part controversial. He starts with the facts which must have been reported by most of the authors dealing with these particular events and which rather did not stir up controversies – that is why Tacitus does not mention his sources here. This category includes the information that (1) Nero got to know about the alleged plot from Paris, the actor, (2) he panicked and (3) on the spur of the moment he planned to murder Agrippina and Rubellius Plautus. Tacitus, having made no differentiation between these pieces of information and the subsequent ones, continues his account with (4) Nero's doubts about Afranius Burrus' fidelity and his willingness to dismiss the prefect, and explains to readers that (5) they stemmed from his earlier political connections with Agrippina. Not until the next sentence does Tacitus recall the testimony of Fabius Rusticus and expand upon the previously outlined course of events with new facts: that is (6) a letter to Caecina Tuscus, entrusting him with the command over the Praetorians and (7) Seneca's intervention in Burrus' favour. Writing so, Tacitus suggests that the first five pieces of information adduced above appeared in various works, including obviously Fabius Rusticus, too. The latter, as the only one (or at least the most important) among the writers referring to these events, enclosed two additional facts. Thus, the conclusion might be drawn that this side of the story had many more supporters and that the name of Rusticus was quoted on account of the greatest number of details in his version, as he was the one to mention the act of writing the codicil and the extraordinary role of Seneca[11].

In the next sentence Tacitus decides on a fundamental change of direction, possibly in order to take his reader by surprise. He objects to the aforementioned version of events and quotes Pliny the Elder and Cluvius Rufus, who claimed that no one had been in doubt of Burrus' loyalty ("nihil dubitatum de fide praefecti referunt"). To explain his view, Tacitus suggests that Fabius Rusticus was biased due to his friendship with Seneca. Some fundamental uncertainty appears at this point over what Pliny and Cluvius had in mind when they wrote that nobody

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[10] A. Héron de Villefosse, ad B. Borghesi, *Œuvres complètes*, Paris 1897, vol. X, p. 14, no. XIII; D.J. De Laet, *Cohortes prétoriennes et préfets du prétoire au Haut-Empire*, RBPh XXIII 1944, p. 505; cf. S. Ruciński, *Praefecti Praetorio. Dowódcy gwardii pretoriańskiej od 2 roku przed Chr. do 282 roku po Chr.* ["*Praefecti praetorio.* Commanders of the Praetorian Guard from 2 BC to AD 282"], Bydgoszcz 2013, pp. 181 f.

[11] See Mensching, *op. cit.* (n. 5), pp. 467 f.; Flach, *op. cit.* (n. 5), pp. 93–98; Devillers, *op. cit.* (n. 5), pp. 177 f., no. 33.

had doubted the fidelity of the prefect. Otherwise Tacitus is lacking consistency here, as by discrediting Rusticus' credibility he questions information that he has given earlier without referring to Rusticus' testimony. Yet the difference in opinions between the ancient writers would concern not only the role of Seneca, but first of all the matter of the trust the emperor had in Burrus. The friendship between Rusticus and Seneca could therefore be helpful in explaining why the vital role in solving the crisis was ascribed to the latter, but offers no answer to the question why Fabius Rusticus would fabricate the story about an attempt at dismissing the influential advisor and praetorian prefect. So Tacitus would not have been objective and his standpoint on this specific matter would have been the aftermath of the general evaluation of Burrus, on whom a positive spin is put in the *Annals*[12]. It is best seen in overestimating the military experience of the prefect (XII 42, 1; cf. XIII 2, 1–2; 6, 3), which in the light of epigraphic sources appears moderate at best. Before assuming the post of praetorian prefect, Burrus was active mainly in the civil sphere[13]. Such could have been the reasons why Tacitus would not have responded to the argument indicating the political connections of Agrippina and Burrus. Yet these are undeniable. It was her wish to elevate him to the post of praetorian prefect at the end of Claudius' reign and

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[12] Baldwin, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 430–433.

[13] The epigraphic sources mention just one of Burrus' strictly military functions, before the assumption of the praetorian prefecture, and that is the military tribunate. Additionally, the inscription from Vasio Vocontiorum mentions three procuratorial functions, the first of which was performed in the property owned by Livia Augusta, and the next two under the rules of Tiberius and Claudius – *CIL* XII 1360 + adn. p. 825 = 5842 = *ILS* 1321 (Vasio Vocontiorum): "Vasiens(es) Voc(ontiorum) | patrono | Sex(to) Afranio Sex(ti) f(ilio) | Volt(inia) Burro |[5] trib(uno) mil(itum) proc(uratori) Augus|tae proc(uratori) Ti(beri) Caesar(is) | proc(uratori) divi Claudi | praef(ecto) pra[e]tori(o) orna|m[ent]is consular(ibus)". The *cursus honorum* from the inscription from Perge, which unfortunately did not maintain the name of Burrus, might be ascribed to him thanks to the mention that he performed the praetorian prefecture during the reigns of Claudius and Nero. This inscription states precisely that the latter of the procuratures was performed in the provinces of Galatia and Pamphylia – *AE* 2008, 1427 = F. Onur, *Two Procuratorian Inscriptions from Perge*, Gephyra V 2008, p. 53–57 (Perge): "[Sex(to) Afranio] Sex(ti) f(ilio) Vol(tinia) | [Burro tr(ibuno) mil(itum) proc]urat(ori) | [Augustae procurat(ori) | Ti(beri) Caesaris procurat(ori)] |[5] divi Claudi pro[vin]|ciae Galaticae [et] | Pamphyliae et pr[ae]|fecto praetori(i) di[vi] | Claudi et Neronis |[10] Claudi Caesaris | Aug(usti) Germanici | Ti(berius) Claudius divi Clau|di l(ibertus) et sacerdos | Plocamus amico | suo h(onoris) c(ausa)". See Passerini, *op. cit.* (n. 8), p. 281, no. XII; McDermott, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 230–233, 254; R. Syme, *Tacitus*, Oxford 1958, vol. II, p. 591; H.-G. Pflaum, *Les carrières procuratoriennes équestres sous le Haut-Empire romain*, vol. I, Paris 1960, pp. 30–32, no. 13; idem, *Les fastes de la province de Narbonnaise*, Paris 1978, pp. 198 f., no. 6; Demougin, *op. cit.* (n. 9), p. 461, no. 552; B. Levick, *Claudius*, London 1990, p. 74; Absil, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 34; R. Sablayrolles, *Fastigium equestre. Les grandes préfectures équestres*, in S. Demougin *et al*. (eds), *L'ordre équestre. Histoire d'une aristocratie (I^er^ siècle av. J.-C.–III^e^ siècle ap. J.-C.). Actes du colloque international Bruxelles–Leuven (5–7 octobre 1995)*, Rome 1999, p. 366; Barrett, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 122; Y. Burnand, *Primores Galliarum. Sénateurs et chevaliers romains originaires de Gaule de la fin de la République au III^e^ siècle*, vol. II: *Prosopographie*, Bruxelles 2006, vol. II, p. 146, no. 58; Onur, *op. cit.* (n. 13), pp. 58–60; Łuć, *op. cit.* (n. 9), pp. 103 f.; Ruciński, *Praefecti...* (n. 10), pp. 175 f.

then both of them must have been cooperating when Nero was taking over as ruler[14]. It should also be added that Burrus contributed remarkably to the fact that Agrippina could rate the outcome of the matter described among her political successes. Instead, Tacitus would have appealed to the argument *ex communi opinione*[15]. Such arguments are always precarious, particularly in this case, as the work by Cluvius Rufus constituted a source of information for many subsequent historical writers (see below). Therefore, they might have reproduced his opinion uncritically, and thus a pretence of the majority's opinion was made. Only during its further course would Tacitus' report have become consistent – it is Burrus who plays the leading role in calming down the emperor and the next day it is Burrus again who is to interrogate the accused Agrippina.

Another explanation assumes that Pliny and Cluvius did not negate that Nero had feared Burrus' betrayal, but they just stated that some persons from the imperial circle had been convinced of his fidelity and it had been them, not Seneca, who convinced the emperor not to dismiss Burrus. Such a reading of Tacitus' passage may stem from his use of the passive voice. The historian frequently uses the passive in his writings to refer to events which were taking place around the emperor but that were not initiated by the ruler but by someone else, e.g. an anonymous adviser or a group of advisers[16]. In such a case, Pliny's and Cluvius' reports placed by Tacitus in juxtaposition with the one by Fabius Rusticus would make more sense, but would refer only to the question of Seneca's participation in the event described[17]. Nevertheless, irrespective of the accepted version, we are given no answer to the following questions: did Nero's fears result in the dismissal of Burrus and the nomination of Caecina Tuscus, was the suitable document issued as, according to Tacitus, Fabius Rusticus testified, and was such an appointment at least considered within the emperor's circle?

TACITUS' SOURCES

It is worth considering whether the question of the probability of the two versions should not be decided on the basis of what we know about the authors used

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[14] Tac. *Ann.* XII 42, 1; 69, 1 f.; Ios. *Ant. Iud.* XX 151–153. Cf. *PIR*² A 441 (A. Stein); Passerini, *op. cit.* (n. 8), p. 281, no. XII; McDermott, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 234 f.; Baldwin, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 430 f.; Demougin, *op. cit.* (n. 9), p. 461, no. 552; Absil, *op. cit.* (n. 4), pp. 70, 84 f., (cf. pp. 135–137, no. 12); Griffin, *Nero...* (n. 1), pp. 30–33; Barrett, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 122 f., 143 f.; Burnand, *op. cit.* (n. 13), pp. 146 f., no. 58; Ginsburg, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 28, 32; Onur, *op. cit.* (n. 13), pp. 58–60; Ruciński, *Praefecti...* (n. 10), pp. 174–177.

[15] Cf. Griffin, *Nero...* (n. 1), pp. 236 f.; Flach, *op. cit.* (n. 5), pp. 95–98.

[16] Cf. J. Pigoń, *The Passive Voice of the Hero: Some Peculiarities of Tacitus' Portrayal of Germanicus in Annals 1.31–49*, in: idem (ed.), *The Children of Herodotus: Greek and Roman Historiography and Related Genres*, Newcastle upon Tyne 2008, pp. 297–299.

[17] I am grateful to Professor J. Pigoń for drawing my attention to this issue.

by Tacitus in his account[18]. They have two aspects in common: all of them lived and worked during the reign of Nero, but they wrote their works in the time of the Flavians. None of these works have survived till today.

Information about Fabius Rusticus can be derived from a few references by Tacitus[19]. He recollects him as an eloquent writer of his times, who described the shape of Britain (*Agr.* 10, 3). Three times he quotes him on the pages of the *Annals*. Apart from the case which is the subject of this paper, his name occurs in the context of the alleged incestuous relations between Nero and his mother (XIV 2, 2) and later in the description of Seneca's death (XV 61, 3). While evaluating the worth of Rusticus' work, the reference about his friendship with Seneca is of the greatest importance. Tacitus estimates that this friendship resulted in the partiality of the historian, and here he may be right. On the other hand, if Fabius Rusticus gained information (even some of it) from Seneca, he would be the only known writer who had access to a direct participant and eyewitness of the events. The circumstance which makes Tacitus doubt is at the same time the best quality of Rusticus' testimony.

The same cannot be said about Pliny the Elder and Cluvius Rufus. The work by Pliny, the source of Tacitus' information of our interest, must have been the missing *A fine Aufidii Bassi libri XXXI*. In his works, Tacitus refers to it twice more (*Ann*. XV 53, 3; *Hist*. III 28). Furthermore, he quotes Pliny's work devoted to the wars with the Germanic peoples (*Bellorum Germaniae libri XX – Ann*. I 69, 3). We are quite familiar with the personality of Pliny himself and there is no indication that he boasted of his access to the entourage of the emperor Nero, even more so because most probably in AD 55 he spent his time by the river Rhine[20].

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[18] See generally Syme, *Tacitus*... (n. 13), vol. II, pp. 178–181, 289–294; Griffin, *Nero*... (n. 1), pp. 40, 148, 235–237; eadem, *Seneca*... (n. 1), pp. 70 f.; Devillers, *op. cit.* (n. 5), pp. 17–22 (no. 3: Pliny the Elder), 22–24 (no. 4: Fabius Rusticus), 24–27 (no. 5: Cluvius Rufus); E. Champlin, *Nero*, Cambridge, MA–London 2003, pp. 40–44; A.M. Gowing, *From the Annalists to the Annales: Latin Historiography before Tacitus*, in: A.J. Woodman (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Tacitus*, Cambridge 2009, pp. 27 f.; B.M. Levick, in: T.J. Cornell (ed.), *The Fragments of the Roman Historians*, Oxford 2013, vol. I, pp. 525–534 (no. 80: *C. Plinius Secundus*), 549–560 (no. 84: *Cluvius Rufus*), 568–572 (no. 87: *Fabius Rusticus*).

[19] He must have come from Spain, which is indicated not only by his acquaintance with Seneca (who came from Cordoba), but also by inscriptions with his name on found in the region of Baetica: *CIL* II 1070; II²/5 783 = II 2015 = *ILS* 1354a.

[20] Pliny the Elder served as a cavalry officer in Germania in the 50s – see generally, R. Syme, *Consular Friends of the Elder Pliny*, in: idem, *Roman Papers*, vol. VII, ed. by A.R. Birley, Oxford 1991, pp. 496–501, esp. 499; P.G. Maxwell-Stuart, *Studies in the Career of Pliny the Elder and the Composition of his "Naturalis Historia"*, Diss. Univ. St. Andrews 1995, pp. 20–66, 88–103; cf. F. Münzer, *Die Quellen des Tacitus für die Germanenkriege*, BJ CIV 1899, pp. 67–111, esp. 82 f., 106 f.; Pflaum, *Les carrières*... (n. 13), pp. 108–111, esp. 109, no. 45; A.N. Sherwin-White, *The Letters of Pliny. A Historical and Social Commentary*, Oxford 1966, pp. 217–221; R. Syme, *Pliny the Procurator*, HSCPh LXXIII 1969, pp. 204–208 = idem, *Roman Papers*, vol. II, ed. by E. Badian,

More is known about Cluvius Rufus than about Fabius Rusticus. Tacitus underlines the oratory skill of the former, his wealth and the fact that the influence he had thanks to Nero was never used against others (*Hist*. IV 43, 1). Thus, the fact that he belonged, at least towards the end of Nero's reign[21], to the close imperial retinue can be in favour of his account. It is unclear, however, whether this familiarity may already be dated to AD 55. Tacitus cites Cluvius once again in the *Annals*, stressing his difference in views from Fabius Rusticus (XIV 2, 1), but there is large evidence that his work was used by other writers including Josephus, Suetonius, Plutarch, and Cassius Dio.

Why did Pliny, Cluvius and Tacitus question the version of the events by Fabius Rusticus? As their works have not survived, one has to be very cautious while arriving at any conclusions. Nevertheless, in my opinion, it must have been difficult for them to comprehend the situation when Burrus, almost deprived of power at night, would act the next morning as a major adviser, entrusted by the emperor with the interrogation of his own mother who was accused of treachery. One should bear in mind, however, that in AD 55 Nero was only seventeen years old and he would not have seized power had it not been for Agrippina and her supporters. He was informed about the imminent danger of a plot by people he trusted, so he could have been making various conjectures and having suspicions. His decisions could hardly have been thought-out and coordinated and once taken might have been withdrawn in a moment. The situation must have been pretty dynamic, but only a participant in these events would know anything about it. Supposedly, such people were few and, what is more, it is dubious that they were willing to say later on how Burrus almost lost his office. Contrary to the night's events, Burrus' activities the next morning were in front of witnesses, hence visible to impartial observers, and hence raised no doubts.

CAECINA TUSCUS

Is there a possibility that what is known about Caecina Tuscus will enable us to point out the more probable version of the truth? He was a son of Nero's nurse (supposedly of Greek descent) and that is why he is called a milk brother of the emperor by Suetonius (*Nero* 35, 5, cf. 50, 2). He might have not taken

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Oxford 1979, pp. 745–748; G.W. Houston, *Roman Imperial Administrative Personel during the Principates of Vespasian and Titus (A.D. 69–81)*, Diss. Univ. of North Carolina 1971, pp. 306–301, esp. 307 f., no. 190; H. Devijver, *Prosopographia militiarum equestrium quae fuerunt ab Augusto ad Gallienum*, vol. II: *Litterae L–V*, Louvain 1977, pp. 647, no. P 44; Demougin, *op. cit.* (n. 9), pp. 603–605, esp. 604, no. 706; *PIR*² P 493 (G. Winkler); J. Kolendo, *Wstęp* [*Introduction*], in: P. Cornelius Tacitus, *Germania*, transl. by T. Płóciennik, ed. by J. Kolendo, Poznań 2008, pp. 30 f.; B.M. Levick, in: Cornell (ed.), *op. cit.* (n. 18), vol. I, pp. 526 f., no. 80.

[21] As a senator of consular rank Cluvius accompanied the emperor on his grand tour through Greece – Suet. *Nero* 21, 2; Cass. Dio LXIII 14, 3.

much pride in his descent as nurses were usually recruited from slaves or freedwomen[22]. Certainly, it was not a problem in the context of his other advantages. We may only guess that Tuscus was just a bit older than Nero and that the boys were for some time brought up together[23]. Consequently, they were childhood friends. Such could have been the roots of Nero's confidence, necessary for the nomination for the praetorian prefect, especially in so tragic a moment, when the emperor suspected his nearest and dearest – his mother and the praetorian prefect – of treachery. It is a fundamental argument in favour of the probability of the story about his appointment.

Circumstances can, however, be shown which challenge such a statement. It is easy to charge Tuscus with the same accusations as Burrus. There must have been good relations between Tuscus and the empress Agrippina as well, because she was the one who already initiated the beginning of his career in the twilight of the reign of Claudius (*nota bene* simultaneously with the appointment of Burrus for the praetorian prefecture). The function of *iuridicus Alexandriae et Aegypti*, performed in AD 51/52, was the first stage of this career[24]. Honourable

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[22] There was a lonely attempt to question this thesis by G.V. Sumner (*The Family Connections of L. Aelius Seianus*, Phoenix XIX 1965, pp. 134–145), who formulated the theory that an inscription found at Volsinii (*CIL* XI 7285 = *ILS* 8996), mentioning a prefect of Egypt, related to the aristocratic *gens Cornelia Lentulorum*, should be attributed to Caecina Tuscus. Pierre Gros, an archaeologist carrying out excavations in this town, was the most ardent follower of such a solution; see *Scavi della Scuola francese di Roma a Bolsena (Poggio Moscini)*, vol. I: *Bolsena. Guida agli scavi*, ed. by P. Gros, transl. by L. Mascoli, Rome 1981 (Collection de l'École française de Rome 6/1), p. 28. It is contrary, however, to the whole research tradition which has ascribed this inscription to L. Seius Strabo, the prefect of the Praetorian Guard during the rule of Augustus and Tiberius and the governor of Egypt under Tiberius; see A. Fraschetti, *B. Borghesi, Th. Mommsen e il "metodo combinatorio" (in margine alle parentele di Seiano)*, Helikon XV/XVI 1975/1976, pp. 253–279; idem, *L'"irresistible ascesa" di L. Seius Strabo*, in: A. Chastagnol, S. Demougin, C. Lepelley (eds), *Splendidissima civitas. Études d'histoire romaine en hommage à François Jacques*, Paris 1996 (Histoire Ancienne et Médiévale 40), pp. 101–117; cf. M. Corbier, *La famille de Séjan à Volsinii: la dédicace des Sei, curatores aquae*, MEFRA XCV 1983, pp. 719–756; eadem, *De Volsinii à Sestinum: cura aquae et évergétisme municipal de l'eau en Italie*, REL LXII 1984, pp. 236–274; Ruciński, *Praefecti...* (n. 10), pp. 77–91. Among many minor arguments it is worth pointing out the most important one – we know that Sejanus, son of Strabo, came from Volsinii (Tac. *Ann*. IV 1, 2; VI 8, 3; cf. IV 3, 4), while nothing is known about any connections of Caecina Tuscus with this town whatsoever. *Gens Caecina* originated from Volterra in Etruria; see M. Torelli, *Ascesa al senato e rapporti con i territori d'origine Italia: Regio VII (Etruria)*, in *Atti del Colloquio Internazionale AIEGL su Epigrafia e ordine senatorio. Roma 14–20 maggio 1981*, Roma 1982, vol. II, p. 290; Demougin, *op. cit.* (n. 9), p. 564, no. 671.

[23] *PIR*^{2} C 109 (A. Stein); Pflaum, *Les carrières...* (n. 13), pp. 45 f., no. 16 bis; R. Syme, *Eight Consuls from Patavium*, PBSR LI 1983, p. 108 = idem, *Roman Papers*, vol. IV, ed. by A.R. Birley, Oxford 1988, p. 377; Barrett, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 175.

[24] *Catalogue of the Greek and Latin Papyri in the John Rylands Library, Manchester*, vol. II: J. de M. Johnson, V. Martin, A.S. Hunt (eds.), *Documents of the Ptolemaic and Roman Periods (Nos. 62–456)*, Manchester 1915, pp. 106–110, no. 119 = A.S. Hunt, C.C. Edgar (eds.), *Select Papyri*, vol. II: *Public Documents*, Cambridge, MA–London 1934, pp. 261–264, no. 279; *PIR*^{2} C 109 (A. Stein); Pflaum, *Les carrières...* (n. 13), p. 45, no. 16 bis; R.E. Bennett, *The Prefects of Roman*

as it was, it definitely did not ensure that the young man was to be promoted quickly to the office of the praetorian prefect after Burrus – an extremely influential and politically experienced commander.

The only explanation of this unfulfilled appointment could be the fact that Nero in the face of threat had no other person at hand to trust absolutely. Unlike the potential older candidates, Tuscus not only had the advantage of knowing Nero personally, but also belonged to the emperor's generation. Hans-Georg Pflaum believed that this case showed that at least during the rule of Nero it was personal confidence and not the hitherto course of one's career that was decisive when appointing to the praetorian prefecture[25]. If other men nominated by Nero were taken into account, however, the above thesis would rather lack confirmation. Let us consider the successors of Afranius Burrus: L. Faenius Rufus had assuredly been the prefect of the *annona* before, while C. Ofonius Tigellinus was the commander of the *Vigiles* at the time. Only C. Nymphidius Sabinus could not boast a rank higher than that of a tribune of the Praetorian Guard. Still, he was appointed in AD 65, when he was fighting against the opposition to Nero and partially in recognition of his achievements in exposing the plot of Piso. So, if any analogies can be found, they would be associated with the last of the aforementioned appointments[26].

The future of Caecina Tuscus shows that later he had to wait for a nomination comparable to that to the praetorian prefecture for as long as eight years, as it was not until AD 63 that he obtained the office of the prefect of Egypt[27]. Nothing can be said about the offices he held in the meantime, so we do not know the course of his career. Nevertheless, it is worth paying attention to the coincidence of dates, which need not be accidental: Tuscus became the prefect of Egypt not until a year

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Egypt: 30 B.C.–69 A.D., Ann Arbor 1970, pp. 127 f.; P.A. Brunt, *The Administrators of Roman Egypt*, JRS LXV 1975, p. 128 = idem, *Roman Imperial Themes*, Oxford 1990, p. 222; G. Bastianini, *Lista dei prefetti d'Egitto dal 30ª al 299ª*, ZPE XVI 1975, p. 274, n. 1; Demougin, *op. cit.* (n. 9), p. 564, no. 671; Barrett, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 175.

[25] Pflaum, *Les carrières...* (n. 13), p. 45, no. 16 bis; cf. Bennett, *op. cit.* (n. 24), pp. 128 f.

[26] Cf. Ruciński, *Praefecti...* (n. 10), pp. 183–196.

[27] See *PIR*² C 109 (A. Stein); O.W. Reinmuth, *The Prefects of Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian*, Leipzig 1935 (Klio, Beiheft 34), p. 132; idem, *A Working List of the Prefects of Egypt: 30 B.C.–299 A.D.*, BASP IV 1967, p. 82; A. Stein, *Die Präfekten von Ägypten in der römischen Kaiserzeit*, Bernae 1950 (Dissertationes Bernenses I 1), pp. 35–39; Pflaum, *Les carrières...* (n. 13), pp. 45 f., no. 16 bis; Bennett, *op. cit.* (n. 24), pp. 127–133; Brunt, *The Administrators...* (n. 24), p. 143, no. 25 = idem, *Roman...* (n. 24), p. 247, no. 25; Bastianini, *Lista...* (n. 24), p. 274; idem, *Lista dei prefetti d'Egitto dal 30ª al 299ª. Aggiunte e correzioni*, ZPE XXXVIII 1980, p. 77; idem, *Il prefetto d'Egitto* (*30 a. C.–297 d. C.*)*: Addenda* (*1973–1985*), *ANRW* II 10, 1 (1988), p. 505; J.E.G. Whitehorne, *Tuscus and the Temples again* (*SB VI 9066*), CE LIV 1979, pp. 143–148; Demougin, *op. cit.* (n. 9), p. 564, no. 671; A. Jördens, *Statthalterliche Verwaltung in der römischen Kaiserzeit. Studien zum praefectus Aegypti*, Stuttgart 2009 (Historia Einzelschriften 175), p. 527.

after Burrus had died and Seneca was deprived of his influence[28]. The following questions might be asked: did not Burrus, having in mind the events of the year AD 55, slow down Tuscus' career? Was not Nero's trusted friend elevated to high office only when the emperor emancipated himself from the influence of his advisors and took up the reins?

CODICILLUS

The side of the story presented by Fabius Rusticus was meant to increase in probability thanks to the reference to the document enclosing the appointment of Tuscus. Perhaps such a procedure of nomination should be regarded as non-standard, because under everyday circumstances the appointment ought not to have been announced in writing, but orally. Pliny the Younger, followed by later authors, tells the anecdote about the emperor Trajan who, appointing a new prefect (only Aurelius Victor states precisely that he was Sextus Attius Suburanus Aemilianus), handed him a sword or dagger and encouraged him to use it to defend the emperor if the latter acted properly, or against him should he behave in an undignified manner (Plin. *Paneg.* 67, 8; Cass. Dio LXVIII 16, 1[2]; Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 13, 9). So the appointment was public, in front of the assembled army, by handing the imperial sword to the appointed person[29]. The sword as a symbol of the office of the praetorian prefect occurs in the sources repeatedly – already in regard to the prefects at the time of Nero: Tigellinus (Philostr. *VA* IV 42) and Nymphidius Sabinus (Plut. *Galb*. 8, 2), later to Casperius Aelianus during the rule of Domitian (Philostr. *VA* VII 16), M. Bassaeus Rufus under Marcus Aurelius (Philostr. *V. Soph.* II 1, 11) and eventually to the extremely influential prefect Plautianus during the reign of Septimius Severus (Hdn. III 11, 2; Cass. Dio LXXVII [LXXVI] 4, 3 f.)[30].

Still, the information provided by Fabius Rusticus fits the tradition of appointing prefects of the guard in writing. A practice like this was reported for the first time by Cassius Dio in the lengthy depiction of the fall of Sejanus (LVIII 9, 2–6). Behind the veil of secrecy, a new prefect, Macro, was already appointed

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[28] Demougin (*op. cit.* [n. 9], p. 564, no. 671) links the Egyptian appointment for Tuscus to the disgrace of Seneca.

[29] Passerini, *op. cit.* (n. 8), p. 295, no. XXX; Syme, *Tacitus*... (n. 13), vol. I, p. 56; idem, *Guard Prefects of Trajan and Hadrian*, JRS LXX 1980, p. 64 = idem, *Roman Papers*, vol. III, ed. by A.R. Birley, Oxford 1984, p. 1277; Pflaum, *Les carrières*... (n. 13), pp. 134 f., no. 56; Sherwin-White, *op. cit.* (n. 20), pp. 410 f.; Burnand, *op. cit.* (n. 13), pp. 360 f., no. 148; M. Molin, *Préfets et préfecture du prétoire dans l'Histoire Romaine de Dion Cassius*, CCG XVIII 2007, pp. 202 f.; K. Krenn, *Cleanders Stellung am Hof des Commodus. Zur Deutung des Titels a pugione*, Tyche XXVI 2011, pp. 180 f.; Ruciński, *Praefecti*... (n. 10), pp. 295 f.

[30] W. Ensslin, *RE* XXII 2 (1954), col. 2419; Molin, *op. cit.* (n. 29), pp. 202 f.; Krenn, *op. cit.* (n. 29), pp. 180–182; Ruciński, *Praefecti*... (n. 10), p. 296, n. 15.

at Capri by Tiberius – the successor was to bring his hitherto omnipotent predecessor down. Then, he made for Rome not only with the famous long letter which contained the accusations against Sejanus and which was read aloud in the Senate, but also with other written messages which permitted him to take over the Praetorians, along with the promises of money to be paid to the soldiers of the guard. A papyrus dating from the time of Domitian in which the emperor put forth a proposal of assuming the praetorian prefecture to the contemporary prefect of Egypt was of a somewhat different nature[31]. Both cases are joined by a common feature, however – the distance caused by the absence either of the emperor or the appointee from Rome. Was it also so in AD 55? There is no indication whatsoever. Nero was definitely in Rome and so must have been the case for Tuscus, although the latter was not necessarily taking part in the night's feast. However, the appointment of Tuscus would have been of no sense had he not been present in the place, at hand so to speak, especially in that Burrus was in Rome then. Hence, what was the role of the codicil? One only – it was drawn up for a new prefect appointed orally, who had supposedly managed to accept the nomination already. As may be suspected, the document was meant to serve merely as an instrument for taking over the Praetorians after the new prefect had made for the *castra praetoria*. Surely Nero wished to avoid visiting the guardians' camp himself and preferred to introduce the new commander to them by letter. Small wonder, if we keep in mind that all this was happening in the middle of the night and that Nero was not sure about the reaction of the soldiers. In consequence, the narrative by Fabius Rusticus is clear. Caecina Tuscus was appointed prefect and accepted the office, and the purpose of Seneca's intervention was just to prevent his taking over the command of the Praetorians. According to this version, Tuscus did become praetorian prefect, although just for a while.

SUMMING-UP

Let us make an attempt at recapitulating the deliberations hitherto. The version which rules out the participation of Caecina Tuscus in the events of AD 55 is supported by the authority of Tacitus, who judged that the testimonies of Pliny the Elder and Cluvius Rufus are worth more than the one by the biased Fabius Rusticus. This argument cannot be underestimated and its strength is based on its cohesion with the subsequent events: since Burrus later played a dominant role,

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[31] A. Piganiol, *Le codicille impérial du papyrus de Berlin 8334*, CRAI XCI 1947, pp. 376–387; cf. H. Kortenbeutel, *Ein Kodizill eines römischen Kaisers*, Berlin 1940, pp. 1–15; R. Cavenaile, *Corpus Papyrorum Latinarum*, Wiesbaden 1958, no. 238; A. Bruckner, R. Marichal (eds.), *Chartae Latinae antiquiores. Facsimile-Edition of the Latin Charters prior to the Ninth Century*, vol. X, Dietikon–Zürich 1979, no. 417.

it is hardly possible that some hours earlier Nero had been willing to dismiss him[32].

However, this idea disregards the fact that the emperor was young, inexperienced and panicked in the face of the extraordinary circumstances of the night's banquet. At that moment supposedly neither Seneca nor Burrus were beside Nero, and an attempt to persuade the emperor to dismiss the latter may suggest that the conspirators not only aimed revenge at Agrippina, but also aimed at taking over the crucial offices in Nero's entourage. Thus, the version presented by Rusticus is perfectly easy to defend. A few things can be pointed out in its favour: certain inconsistencies in Tacitus' argumentation, Rusticus' acquaintance with Seneca, the details regarding the appointment of a new praetorian prefect and finally the qualities of Tuscus, which would be irreconcilable with his appointment to this office within ordinary procedure, but perfectly suited in an extraordinary situation. C. Caecina Tuscus could have aspired to the praetorian prefecture; at least he was looked upon as a candidate, and therefore can be considered among the other praetorian prefects[33].

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[32] See, e.g., Griffin, *Nero...* (n. 1), pp. 74 f.; Absil, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 205, no. *6*; cf. Passerini, *op. cit.* (n. 8), pp. 281 f.

[33] E.g., *PIR*² C 109 (A. Stein); De Laet, *op. cit.* (n. 10), p. 505; Roper, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 350; Bennett, *op. cit.* (n. 24), p. 128; Syme, *Eight Consuls...* (n. 23), p. 108 = idem, *Roman...*, vol. IV (n. 23), pp. 377 f.; Demougin, *op. cit.* (n. 9), p. 564, no. 671; Barrett, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 175 f.; Łuć, *op. cit.* (n. 9), p. 104.

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THE PLENITUDE (ΠΛΗΡΩΜΑ) OF HUMAN NATURE ACCORDING TO GREGORY OF NYSSA*

by

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ABSTRACT: The concept of human nature constitutes a basis for Gregory of Nyssa's entire anthropology. He considered human nature to be an indivisible monad created by God in the first act of creation before He created the first human being – Adam. It is human nature as a unity that constitutes the image of God and that image has been perfect from the very beginning. Gregory claims that nothing that was created can be indefinite (ἀόριστον). Hence human nature also has its own plenitude (πλήρωμα) recognised by God at the very moment of its creation. That plenitude will be realised when all human individuals are born. The accomplishment of the plenitude of human nature will determine the end of time, resurrection and apokatastasis, upon which human nature will return to its primordial state. I am convinced that Gregory thought of human nature as of a reality transcendent of individuals and that concept explains how he could speak simultaneously about the apokatastasis and the damnation of the sinners.

Although many scholars have written about the concept of human nature according to Gregory of Nyssa, I have an impression that the relationship between human nature and its plenitude (πλήρωμα) has never been sufficiently worked out. I am convinced that this issue is a point of departure for stating whether human nature transcends individuals or is immanent in them. And this is not a theoretical problem. I will try to show how the interpretation of Gregory's soteriology and eschatology depends on it. In fact, it is a mutual relationship: I will need to analyse some texts about Incarnation in order to better explain how Gregory understood human nature.

THE CREATION OF HUMAN NATURE

Gregory evidently distinguished two acts/stages of man's creation. But there is a huge difference in their interpretations: most scholars think that what God created in the first creation was only something planned, not real. So, we should first examine carefully Gregory's descriptions of the double creation.

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There is no doubt that what distinguishes the reality created in the first act of creation from the one created in the second is gender. In the first one, God created human nature without gender, and only in the second one was an individual human being characterised by a specific gender. Gregory solved the apparently unsolvable aporia: what was the origin of gender since man was created in the image of God and there is no gender in God? Gregory acknowledged that God created an individual human being with gender foreknowing the fall to come. His literal explanation is as follows:

> He Who, as the prophetical writing says, "knows all things before they be", following out, or rather perceiving beforehand by His power of foreknowledge what, in a state of independence and freedom, is the tendency of the motion of man's will, – as He saw, I say, what would be, He devised for His image the distinction of male and female, which has no reference to the Divine Archetype, but, as we have said, is an approximation to the less rational nature. [...] In saying that "God created man" the text indicates, by the indefinite character of the term [τῷ ἀορίστῳ τῆς σημασίας], entire human nature[1] [ἅπαν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον]; for was not Adam here named together with the creation, as the history tells us in what follows; yet the name given to the man created is not the particular, but the general name: thus we are led by the employment of the general name of nature [τῇ καθολικῇ τῆς φύσεως κλήσει] to some such view as this – that thanks to the Divine foreknowledge and power [τῇ θείᾳ προγνώσει τε καὶ δυνάμει] all humanity [πᾶσα ἡ ἀνθρωπότης] is included in the first creation[2].

In order to understand Gregory's concept we should read his description of the double creation extremely carefully, especially because the translation done by Peter Schaff is very inaccurate and sometimes outright wrong. In the above-quoted excerpt Schaff used "mankind" as the equivalent of the Greek noun τὸ ἀνθρώπινον – that translation is wrong and radically changes the sense of Gregory's disquisition. Gregory usually uses that term as a synonym for ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις / human nature. For example, when speaking of the Incarnation he says that God's Son took to himself the entirety of human nature and he uses the term τὸ ἀνθρώπινον and ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις as equivalents[3]. On the other hand the term ἡ ἀνθρωπότης really means here "humanity". The last part of the above-quoted excerpt constitutes the beginning of the text about plenitude that I will quote in total later on. But it is important to note that the next sentence begins as follows:

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[1] In the translation by P. Schaff there is an expression which is wrong in my opinion – "all mankind".

[2] Gregorius Nyssenus, *De opificio hominis* 16, PG XLIV 184 f., transl. by P. Schaff (NPNF II 5, p. 406) with my own alterations.

[3] Gregorius Nyssenus, *Contra Eunomium* III 3, 51; GNO II, p. 126, 5 f.: διὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ᾧ κατεσκήνωσεν ὅλον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀναλαβόντα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν; *Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium*, GNO III/1, p. 151, 17 f.: πᾶσαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν δεξάμενος.

> For it is fitting for God not to regard any of the things made by Him as indeterminate, but that each existing thing should have some limit and measure prescribed by the wisdom of its Maker[4].

In the Greek original we have here the conjunction γάρ that binds both sentences with a causative relation. So I think that the expression "thanks to the Divine foreknowledge and power" (τῇ θείᾳ προγνώσει τε καὶ δυνάμει) does not apply to human nature itself, as Giulio Maspero claims[5], but to the plenitude of human nature, which was of course something foreknown, as I will show in detail later. What I would like to stress at this point is that human nature was not just foreknown or planned, it was actually a real creature created before (in temporal meaning) individuals.

THE TEMPORAL PRIORITY OF HUMAN NATURE

Let us now look more carefully at the reality created in the first creation. Gregory says: Τέλος ἔχει ἡ τοῦ κατ' εἰκόνα γεγενημένου κτίσις[6]. Peter Schaff translated this sentence as follows: "There is an end of the creation of that which was made in the image"[7], but it rather means: "The creation created in the image was perfect". In fact, Johannes Löwenklau translated it into Latin as follows: "Perfectum intelligitur illud creatum, quod ad divinam imaginem conformari oportuit"[8]. Jean Daniélou translated it similarly into French: "La création de celui qui est selon l'image a dès lors atteint sa perfection"[9]. Also Bruno Salmona in the Italian translation used the term *perfezione*, although he was definitely wrong to translate the noun ἡ κτίσις with the pronoun *colui*: "Ha qui la sua perfezione colui che é stato creato secondo l'immagine"[10]. Two things are worth stressing in this sentence. First, Gregory evidently distinguishes two stages of man's creation. Only when the first creation was finished and perfect, did God start the second act. It is also important that there is no mention of a plan or idea. It seems that the first creation constitutes a kind of a real being. Also there is another statement which confirms that the second act of creation was made only when the first stage had been finished:

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[4] Gregorius Nyssenus, *De opificio hominis* 16, PG XLIV 185, transl. by P. Schaff (NPNF II 5, p. 406).

[5] Cf. G. Maspero, *Trinity and Man. Gregory of Nyssa's "Ad Ablabium"*, Leiden–Boston 2007 (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae LXXXVI), p. 7.

[6] Gregorius Nyssenus, *De opificio hominis* 16, PG XLIV 181A.

[7] NPNF II 5, p. 405.

[8] PG XLIV 182A.

[9] Grégoire de Nysse, *La création de l'homme*, transl. by J. Daniélou, Paris–Lyon 1941 (SChr 6), p. 154.

[10] Gregorio di Nisa, *L'uomo*, transl. by B. Salmona, Roma 1982, p. 75.

> The distinction of kind in male and female was added to the formed creation last [ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἄῤῥεν καὶ θῆλυ τοῦ γένους διαφορὰ προσκατεσκευάσθη τελευταῖον τῷ πλάσματι][11].

The adverb τελευταῖον ('last, finally, at the end') points to the temporal distinction between the two stages of creation. But the most important evidence of temporal previousness comes from Chapter 22 of *De opificio hominis*, which I will quote and analyse below.

PLENITUDE AS A PROPERTY OF HUMAN NATURE

Another property of human nature is its plenitude. Gregory stressed that only divine nature is infinite and every created nature is definite. Therefore the most important property of human nature is that it is definite in the sense that at the time of creation it already contained – potentially – the specific number of individual beings that would be born during the entire history of Earth.

> For it is fitting for God not to regard any of the things made by Him as indeterminate, but that each existing thing should have some limit and measure prescribed by the wisdom of its Maker. Now just as any particular man is limited by his bodily dimensions, and the peculiar size which is conjoined with the superficies of his body is the measure of his separate existence, so I think that the entire plenitude of human nature [ὅλον τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος πλήρωμα] was included by the God of all, by His power of foreknowledge, as it were in one body [καθάπερ ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι], and that this is what the text teaches us which says, "God created man, in the image of God created He him". For the image is not in part of our nature, nor is the grace in any one of the things found in that nature, but this power extends equally to all the race[12].

It seems that the second creation was necessary for human nature in order to be able to achieve its plenitude. If there was no sin the preconceived number of human beings would come into being in the angelic way (very mysterious). So sexual reproduction is not so much a punishment for sin (that was to be committed) but rather a way – alternative to the angelic one – in which human nature can achieve the plenitude (πλήρωμα) preconceived by God. We can call plenitude (πλήρωμα) the *extent* of human nature: the number of individuals it contains. That plenitude has not yet been realised, but it is not correct to say it is only a potential if we understand potentiality as the possibility of existence. It is determined precisely and will be realised for sure in the history of the world from the day of creation till the last day.

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[11] Gregorius Nyssenus, *De opificio hominis* 16, PG 44, 185D, transl. by P. Schaff (NPNF II 5, p. 406) with my own alteration.

[12] *Ibidem.*

> He who brought all things into being and fashioned whole man according to His own will to the Divine image [ὅλον ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ θελήματι τὸν ἄνθρωπον πρὸς τὴν θείαν εἰκόνα διαμορφώσας], did not wait to see the number of souls made up to its proper plenitude [ἐπὶ τὸ ἴδιον πλήρωμα] by the gradual additions of those coming after; but while looking upon the nature of man in its entirety and fullness [αὐτῷ πληρώματι πᾶσαν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν] by the exercise of His foreknowledge, and bestowing upon it a lot exalted and equal to the angels, since He saw beforehand by His all-seeing power the failure of their will to keep a direct course to what is good, and its consequent declension from the angelic life, in order that the multitude of human souls might not be cut short [ὡς ἂν μὴ κολοβωθείη τὸ τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πλῆθος] by its fall from that mode by which the angels were increased and multiplied, – for this reason, I say, He formed for our nature that contrivance for increase which befits those who had fallen into sin, implanting in mankind, instead of the angelic majesty of nature, that animal and irrational mode by which they now succeed one another[13].

In this quotation there are three notions that are necessary to understand the idea of human nature and impossible to be considered as equal. The first one is the notion of human nature (ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις); the second one is an individual human being that partakes in human nature but is burdened with gender; the third one is the concept of plenitude (τὸ πλήρωμα). I would like to stress that what was created in the first creation was not plenitude itself but human nature and plenitude is its property. This clarification has very important consequences.

We can be sure that the plenitude of human nature is not only logically but also temporally older than an individual man. Gregory used its earlier creation as a contradiction to the simultaneous beginning of the soul and the body of an individual human being:

> As man is one, the being consisting of soul and body, we are to suppose that the beginning of his existence is one, common to both parts, so that he should not be found to be antecedent and posterior to himself, if the bodily element were first in point of time, and the other were a later addition; but we are to say that in the power of God's foreknowledge (according to the doctrine laid down a little earlier in our discourse), all the fullness of human nature had pre-existence [ἅπαν προϋφεστάναι τὸ ἀνθρώπινον πλήρωμα] (and to this the prophetic writing bears witness, which says that God "knows all things before they be"), and in the creation of individuals not to place the one element before the other, neither the soul before the body, nor the contrary, that man may not be at strife against himself, by being divided by the difference in point of time[14].

The plenitude of human nature came into being before individuals (προϋφεστάναι). The question is whether the prefix προ- means temporal or only logical preceding. According to the Liddel & Scott Dictionary, προϋφιστάμαι means "exist before" and was used with such a meaning in the Septuagint (Wi.

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[13] *Ibidem* 17, PG XLIV 189; transl. by P. Schaff (NPNF II 5, p. 407).

[14] *Ibidem* 29, PG XLIV 233; transl. by P. Schaff (NPNF II 5, pp. 420 f.).

19, 7). A lot of scholars[15] say that human nature created in the first creation was only "an idea or plan in God's mind"[16]. But I think we should not equate human nature with its plenitude. I have no doubts that the plenitude really belongs to, as Jean Daniélou stated, the intentional order ("l'ordre intentionnel")[17], that is something that God planned and that will be realised during the entire history of the world. But Gregory did not state that in the first creation God created plenitude, but human nature, of which plenitude is a property: διπλῆ τίς ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν κατασκευὴ[18], τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ἐποίησεν[19]. In the description of the two stages of creation Gregory does not say anything about creating human nature as a plan or idea. So I think, since we have a clear statement that plenitude existed before individuals, that it should be deduced that human nature existed before individuals, as plenitude did not come to being separately – it is only a property of human nature. If my conclusion is right it means that human nature – created before individuals – is transcendent of individual human beings. Such a concept of human nature is coherent with Gregory's entire soteriology (in the Incarnation God's Son took the entirety of human nature[20]) and eschatology.

HUMAN NATURE AS AN INDIVISIBLE MONAD

As far as I know, Gregory of Nyssa was the first Father of the Church to formulate a definition of human nature. Although the definition was elaborated during his polemic with Eunomius regarding the unity of God's nature, there is no doubt that it applies to human nature as well because Gregory compares God's nature to human nature and he considers the comparison clear to his listeners/readers. The definition of that nature, presented in his small work *To Ablabius*, is as follows:

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[15] Cf. C.N. Tsirpanlis, *The Concept of Universal Salvation in Saint Gregory of Nyssa*, Studia Patristica XVII 1979, p. 1144; M. Ludlow, *Universal Salvation. Eschatology in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa and Karl Rahner*, Oxford 2000, p. 48, Maspero, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 6; W. Szczerba, *Podwójne stworzenie a soteriologia Grzegorza z Nyssy*, Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne XXII 2008, p. 92.

[16] Ludlow, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 49.

[17] Cf. J. Daniélou, *Platonisme et Théologie mystique. Essai sur la doctrine spirituelle de saint Grégoire de Nysse*, Paris 1944, p. 57.

[18] Gregorius Nyssenus, *De opificio hominis* 16, PG XLIV 181B.

[19] *Ibidem*, 184B.

[20] Gregory says that God's Son took the firstlings of human nature (τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἀπαρχή); cf. *De occursu Domini*, PG XLVI 1165B; *Refutatio confessionis Eunomii* 83, GNO II, p. 346, 12–20; *De perfectione christiana*, GNO VIII/1, p. 206, 1–9; *Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium*, GNO III/1, p. 151, 18–20. In all those excerpts human nature must be understood in a collective sense; cf. L. Malevez, *L'Église dans le Christ. Étude de théologie historique et théorique*, Recherches de Science Religieuse XXV 1935, pp. 268 f. Gregory also compares our nature to the lost sheep taken on his shoulders by the divine Shepherd; cf. *Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium*, GNO III/1, p. 152, 2–6; *In Ecclesiasten* 2, GNO V, p. 305.

> Nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit [μονάς], not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appears in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals who participate [τοῖς μετέχουσιν] in it[21].

In his other works Gregory also talks about one body of our nature[22] and calls nature one live being[23]. What is worth stressing in that definition is the verb μετέχω that describes the relationship between nature and individuals. That concept of participation makes us think of the Platonic tradition and transcendent ideas in which individual beings participate.

There are many studies about the concept of participation according to Gregory of Nyssa, though only regarding Creator and creature[24], not nature and individuals. But as Claudio Moreschini stated, for Gregory Platonism represented the privileged *forma mentis*[25]. Why does Gregory say that we speak about many men improperly[26]? I do not think it is because he believed that they are one nature in the Stoic sense, but because he thought that nature is a proper being, like a Platonic idea that is more real than the individuals who participate in it only in an imperfect way. It does not mean that Gregory's concept of human nature is Platonic. I believe, following Christopher Stead's intuition, that Gregory invented his own theory without developing any school or tradition[27]. But in my opinion, based on the textual analysis of Gregory's writings, he thought of human nature as of transcendent reality created before (in a temporal sense) individuals, and he described the relationship between nature and individuals in the category of participation close to the Platonic one.

THE PLENITUDE OF HUMAN NATURE AT THE END OF TIME

Gregory connected the existence of time with the process of realisation of the plenitude of human nature: in the resurrection and the Final Judgement human nature will achieve its fullness (πλήρωμα) preconceived at the moment of its creation:

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[21] Gregorius Nyssenus, *Ad Ablabium, quod non sint tres dei*, GNO III/1, p. 41, 2–7.

[22] Gregorius Nyssenus, *In illud: Tunc et ipse Filius*, GNO III/2, p. 16, 17 f.

[23] Gregorius Nyssenus, *Oratio catechetica magna* 32, GNO III/4, p. 78, 14.

[24] Cf. E. von Ivánka, *Plato Christianus: Übernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die Väter*, Einsiedeln 1964, pp. 175 ff.; D.L. Balás, *Μετουσία θεοῦ. Man's Participation in God's Perfections According to St. Gregory of Nyssa*, Romae 1966.

[25] Cf. C. Moreschini, *Storia della filosofia patristica*, Brescia 2004, p. 571.

[26] Cf. Gregorius Nyssenus, *Ad Ablabium, quod non sint tres dei*, GNO III/1, p. 40, 5–9.

[27] Cf. Ch. Stead, *Individual Personality in Origen and Cappadocian Fathers*, in: U. Bianchi, H. Crouzel (eds.), *Arché e Telos: l'antropologia di Origene e di Gregorio di Nissa: analisi storico-religiosa: atti del colloquio, Milano, 17–19 maggio 1979,* Milano 1981, pp. 190 f.

> Now seeing that the full number of men preconceived by the operation of foreknowledge will come into life by means of this animal generation, God, who governs all things in a certain order and sequence, [...] therefore also foreknew the time coextensive with the creation of men [τὸν σύμμετρον τῇ κατασκευῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων χρόνον προκατενόησεν], so that the extent of time should be adapted for the entrances of the pre-defined souls, and that the flux and motion of time should halt at the moment when human nature [τὸ ἀνθρώπινον] is no longer growing by means of it [δι' αὐτοῦ]; and that when the generation of men is completed, time should cease together with its completion, and then should take place the restitution of all things, and with the World-Reformation human nature [τὸ ἀνθρώπινον] also should be changed from the corruptible and earthly to the impassable and eternal [ἐπὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀΐδιον][28].

Now it is the best moment to ask whether ALL people will be included in the plenitude, in other words whether ALL people will be saved. I am convinced that it was the concept of transcendent human nature that allowed Gregory to speak simultaneously about apokatastasis understood as a return to the beginning and about the eternal damnation of sinners[29]. Apokatastasis concerns human nature as an indivisible monad and it does not mean that all human individuals will be saved. The Last Judgment will make the real plenitude of human nature apparent. Already in this life people who sin separate themselves from human nature and become beasts:

> When he says earthborn and sons of men he distinguishes those who are fleshly and earthly and irrational from those who are being saved and who have an impress of human nature in themselves. Now likeness to the divine is the distinguishing impress of humanity [ἴδιος δὲ χαρακτὴρ ἀνθρώπου ἡ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὁμοίωσις][30].

Gregory says that only one who practises virtue is truly a human being. The sinner becomes an animal:

> It is clear to everyone how we must distinguish the dogs from those who are humans in nature. I do not mean on the basis of the appearance of the form of the body, but on the basis of the difference in life. For the inhabitant of the virtuous city is truly a human being, but if someone is eager for stinking licentiousness, or for excretal covetousness which could properly be called dung, or for the other forms of evil, wandering and walking about outside the circle of that city, he is shouting out against himself that he is a dog, since his nature has been refashioned from likeness to God to dog-likeness[31].

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[28] Gregorius Nyssenus, *De opificio hominis* 22, PG XLIV 205; transl. by P. Schaff (NPNF II 5, p. 411) with my own alterations; cf. *De anima et resurrectione* GNO III/3, p. 96, 16–97, 15.

[29] Gregory did believe in eternal damnation; cf. *Adversus eos qui baptismum differunt*, GNO X/2, p. 363, 14–20; *In inscriptiones Psalmorum* II 11, GNO V, p. 121, 6–12; *De beneficientia* (*De pauperibus amandis* I), GNO IX, p. 100, 2–5.

[30] Gregorius Nyssenus, *In inscriptiones Psalmorum* II 12, GNO V, p. 130, 1–5; transl. by R.E. Heine (Gregory of Nyssa, *Treatise on the Inscriptions of the Psalms*, Oxford–New York 1995, p. 175).

[31] *Ibidem*, p. 173, 22–174, 3; transl. by R.E. Heine (pp. 211 f.).

It is important to note that Gregory does not say "like a dog", but "a dog", meaning that a sinner really stops being human. That state of separation from human nature will last forever in the future life:

> Then he again repeats the same word about those who return at evening, and who are hungry as a dog, and who go around the city in a circle showing, I think, through the repetition of the word, that men, insofar as they are now in either wickedness or in that which is better, will also be in the same afterwards. For the person who now goes about in a circle in disregard for God, and does not live in the city, nor guard the human imprint on his own life, but is changed into a beast by his choice and has become a dog, will also be punished at that time by being cast out of the city above in a famine of good things[32].

So, human nature will be restored, but there are people who will not take part in that restoration because of the original sin in which they were born or because of their own evil choices they do not partake in human nature. However, human nature will not be depleted as it is a reality transcendent to individuals.

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MODERN GREEK TERMS FOR AMPHIBIANS IN CRETE

by

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ABSTRACT: This article is a lexicographical work devoted to the Modern Cretan terminology for amphibians. There are four different species of amphibians on the island of Crete. Dialectal dictionaries and scientific works suggest that the Cretans use as many as 21 different nouns for frogs or toads.

According to Sakoulis (2008: 9), there are only four species of amphibians in Crete:

(1) Green toad, *Bufo viridis*, syn. *Pseudepidalea viridis* Laurenti 1768 (Mod. Gk. πρασινόφρυνος, Pol. *ropucha zielona*). It is completely unclear whether a different species of toad, namely *Bufo bufo* var. *spinosus* (E. common toad, Pol. *ropucha szara*), exists (or existed?) in Crete or not (see Vardinoyanni 1995).

(2) Bullfrog, *Lithobates catesbeianus*, syn. *Rana catesbeiana* Shaw 1802 (Mod. Gk. βουβαλοβάτραχος, Pol. *żaba rycząca, żaba byk*). This species, which originates from North America, has been recently introduced into the island of Crete (1994). It appears exclusively in the Aghia lake (Western Crete) (Sotiropoulos 2010: 164; Pafilis, Valakos 2012: 21).

(3) Cretan tree frog, *Hyla arborea*, ssp. *kretensis* Ahl (Mod. Gk. κρητικός δεντροβάτραχος, Pol. *rzekotka drzewna kreteńska*). This subspecies is an endemic phenomenon (Ahl 1931: 161; Stugren, Lydataki 1986: 57; Lymberakis 2005: 22 f.; *ARG* 2008: 95).

(4) Cretan (marsh) frog, *Pelophylax cretensis*, syn. *Rana cretensis* Beerli, Hotz, Tunner, Heppich, Uzzell (Mod. Gk. κρητικός λιμνοβάτραχος, Pol. *żaba kreteńska*). This is an endemic species (Beerli *et al*. 1994: 2–4; Arnold 2002: 96 f.; Halliday, Adler 2002; Sakoulis 2008: 12; *TAW* 2008: 503; *ARG* 2008: 106 f.; Sotiropoulos 2010: 167 f., Pafilis, Valakos 2012: 71 f.), wrongly given as *Rana ridibunda* Pallas, syn. *Pelophylax ridibundus* Pallas (E. *Eurasian marsh frog*, Pol. *żaba śmieszka*) in some earlier scientific works. This endemic species is patchily distributed in the lowlands throughout the island of Crete generally up to 100 m above sea level. It is classified as an endangered species (Sotiropoulos 2010: 167; Pafilis, Valakos 2012: 72).

According to Ondrias (1968: 113 f.), the Cretans hardly differentiate amphibians and they use generally the term αφορδακός for every species of tailless amphibians. The same statement is tacitly suggested by Platakis (1980: 53). In fact, the Modern Greek term βάτραχος denotes both 'frog' and 'toad' (Pring 1986: 37; Stavropoulos 1988: 160). Babiniotis (2002: 353), definesing it as "αμφίβιο χωρίς ουρά με χαρακτηριστκά του τα διξοτομημένη γλώσσα, τα ισχυρά πίσω πόδια που φέρουν μεμβράνη μεταξύ των δακτύλων και με τη βοήθεια των οποίων πραγματοποιεί άλματα, καθώς και την ιδιαίτερη κραυγή". This description clearly refers to frogs and toads.

In our paper we intend to review and discuss 21 Cretan names for amphibians. The Cretan terminology will be presented here in four different groups in etymological and alphabetical order.

Lexical Evidence:

1.1. West Cretan (attested in some separated places: Theriso, Ano Meros, Apodoulou, Tylisos) αβορθακός [avorθa′kos] m. 'βάτραχος / frog or toad' (Kontosopoulos 1988 [2006]: 164; Geronymakis 1999: 29).

1.2. West Cretan (only in the village of Sises, nom. Rhethymno) αποθακός [apoθa′kos] m. 'frog, toad' (Kontosopoulos 1988 [2006]: 164).

1.3. East Cretan αφορδακός [aforða′kos] m. 'βάτραχος / frog, toad' (*IL* 1942: 489; Lioudaki 1936: 290, 336; Pangalos 1959: 194; 1967: 216; Frangoulis 1961: 17; Frangaki 1978: 252; Platakis 1980: 52 f.; Kontosopoulos 1988 [2006]: 164; Kondylakis 1990: 39; Pitykakis 2001: 183; Tsirigotakis 2001: 58; Rodakis 2005: 44; Apostolakis 2008: 91, 105, 506).

1.3a. East Cretan (Sitia) αφορντακός [aforda´kos] m. 'frog, toad' (*IL* 1942: 489; Platakis 1980: 53).

1.4. West Cretan βαθρακός [varθa´kos] m. 'frog, toad' (attested in some villages in the Chania district, e.g. Kampos, Sasalos, Voutas, Kakodiki, Anydroi, Agia Eirene, Platanias, Anopolis) (Kontosopoulos 1988 [2006]: 164).

1.4a. West Cretan βάθρακος [´vaθrakos] m. 'frog, toad' (*IL* 1942: 489; Platakis 1980: 53). See 1.4. Probably incorrectly written with the wrong accent under the influence of Mod. Gk. βάτραχος.

1.5. West Cretan (in most places in the Kissamos eparchy, also in Sfakia) βαρθακός [varθa´kos] m. 'frog or toad' (Jeannaraki 1876: 325; *IL* 1942: 489; Platakis 1980: 54; Kontosopoulos 1988 [2006]: 164; Peristerakis 1991: 200; Kontosopoulos 2006: 40; Apostolakis 2008: 105).

1.6. Central Cretan dial. (attested near Heraklion) βοθρακός [voθra´kos] m. 'frog, toad' (Kontosopoulos 1988 [2006]: 164).

1.6a. Cretan dial. βόθρακος [´voθrakos] m. 'frog, toad' (*IL* 1942: 489; Platakis 1980: 55). It appears to be a probable variant of 1.6. The initial stress was wrongly introduced under the influence of Mod. Gk. βάτραχος.

1.7. West Cretan (distributed in Akrotiri, Apokoronou, Sfakia and Rhethymno) βορθακός [vorθa´kos] m. 'βάτραχος / frog, toad' (*IL* 1942: 489; Pangalos 1959:

216, 251; Platakis 1980: 55; Kontosopoulos 1988 [2006]: 1964; Geronymakis 1999: 29; Kontosopoulos 2006: 40; Apostolakis 2008: 91, 105).

1.8. Central Crete (only in Nea Halikarnassos) μορθακός [morθa´kos] m. 'frog, toad' (Kontosopoulos 1988 [2006]: 164).

1.9. Cretan (dial.) μπαρδακός [barða´kos] m. 'frog, toad' (*IL* 1942: 489; Platakis 1980: 86).

1.10. Cretan (dial.) μποθρακός [boθra´kos] m. 'frog, toad' (Politis 1964: II 41; Kriaras 1975: 70; Platakis 1980: 88).

1.11. West Cretan (ep. Agios Vasilios, also in the villages of Anogeia and Fodele) and East Cretan (in the village of Ini) φορδακός [forða´kos] m. 'frog, toad' (Kontosopoulos 1988 [2006]: 164; 2006: 40; Apostolakis 2008: 506).

1.11a. Cretan (dial.) φόρδακος [´forðakos] m. 'frog, toad' (*IL* 1942: 489; Platakis 1980: 117). A (wrong) variant form of 1.11 with a barytone stress.

1.12. Cretan (dial.) φορθακός [forθa´kos] m. (*IL* 1942: 489; Platakis 1980: 117).

1.13. αφορδακάκι [aforða´kaki] n. demin. 'small frog or toad' (Oustamanolaki-Doundoulaki, Oustagiannaki-Tahataki 1969: 89; Platakis 1980: 53).

1.14. βάθρακας [´vaθrakas] m. '(big) frog or toad' (IL 1942: 489; Platakis 1980: 53).




Fig. 1: Cretan names for 'frog or toad'. Source: Kontosopoulos (1988: 164)

Comments: According to Kontosopoulos (1988 [2006]: 164, No. 100; 2006: 40), four cognate forms (1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 1.11) seem to dominate on the island of Crete. The remaining items should be treated as archaic or innovative. The oxytone stress is certain, so this feature differentiates the Cretan nouns from the Modern Greek items. It is believed that three ways of writing with a barytone accent (1.4a, 1.6a, 1.11a) were wrongly introduced to the literature under the influence of the standard form βάτραχος. Two similar variants βοθρακός (1.6) and βορθακός (1.7) seem archaic in character. Note, however, that the Modern

Greek dialectal appellative from Plomari (Lesbos) βαθρακός [vaθrakós] ‘frog’ (Katsanis 1991: 127) also has the same oxytone stress.

The form αβορθακός (1.1) was created from βορθακός (1.7) by means of the prothesis α-. The common East Cretan name αφορδακός (1.3), as well as its exceptional variant αφορντακός (1.3a), must be treated as a prothetic version of φορδακός (1.11), too. The last form (1.11) has a secondary voiced spirant [dh] instead of [th] after the voiced liquid [r] and it can easily be traced back to an earlier variant φορθακός (1.12), which may securely derive from βορθακός (1.7) by a sandhi process (the initial voiceless consonant [f] may be introduced instead of the voiced one [v] in some sandhi environments). The forms βαθρακός (1.4) and βαρθακός (1.5) were created from βοθρακός (1.6) and βορθακός (1.7) by an assimilation of the vowels ([a]-[a] < [o]-[a]). Three rare forms 1.8, 1.9, 1.10 had to appear secondarily by a sandhi effect, i.e. μορθακός (1.8) < βορθακός (1.7), μπαρδακός (1.9) < *βαρδακός < βαρθακός (1.5), μποθρακός (1.10) < βοθρακός (1.6). The common Modern Cretan form βορθακός (1.7) seems more archaic than the variant βοθρακός (1.6), which appeared by the metathesis of the cluster -ρθ- (perhaps under the influence of the Latin *botrax* m. ‘lizard’).

Derivatives: The neuter noun αφορδακάκι (1.13) is a diminutive form derived from αφορδακός (1.3) by means of the suffix -άκι. The augmentative masculine suffix -ας is seen in the alternative term βάθρακας (1.14), which is formed from βαθρακός (1.4).

Ancient heritage: It is obvious that the Cretan terms for ‘frog, toad’ represent a Doric ingredient in the vocabulary of the Modern Cretan dialects. It must be related to the Ancient Greek names: Attic βάτραχος, East Ionic βάθρακος, Cypriote βρούχετος. Hippocrates (*apud* Galen) gives a Coan variant βότραχος and Xenophanes introduces a similar version βρόταχος. Other dialectal forms βύρθακος, βλίταχος, and βρύτιχοι (in the plural) ‘small frogs having tails’, are attested only in the Hesychian glossary with no ethnic or dialectal designation. The Coan form βότραχος, given by Hippocrates of Cos (5th–4th c. BC), undoubtedly represents a Doric form. It is highly probable that Xenophanes of Colophon (6th–5th c. BC), who spent many years on Sicily and in South Italy, used a West Doric form βρόταχος. The Italian dialectal forms, including North Calabrese *vròtaku*, *vròtiku*, *vutrakkju*, *vutrákkja*, Lucanian (Maratea, Lauria) *vròtika*, (Castelluccio) *vròtaku*, (S. Chirico Raparo) *vətrákkju* ‘Frosch / frog’, clearly demonstrate that the Ancient Greeks, who settled in South Italy, used the following alternate (presumably Doric) forms βρόταχος/βρόθακος and βότραχος/βόθρακος (Rohlfs 1961: 91, s.v. βρόταχος). The personal name Βρόταχος Γορτύνιος (Brotachos from Gortyn), registered in Simonides’ sepulchral epigram *AP* VII 254b (Benseler 1884: 230; Fraser, Matthews 1987: 105; Vertoudakis 2000: 102), “shows that this form was also Cretan” (Shipp 1979: 141). As it was said earlier, the Modern Cretan variants seem to descend from the archetype *βορθακός (see 1.7) m. ‘frog, toad’, which represents a Doric ingredient. Note

that the Modern Cypriote βόρτακος m. ‘frog, toad’, demin. βορτακού(δ)ιν n. ‘small frog or toad’, derives from the Ancient Greek βόρταχος, according to Yangoullis (2002: 64). However, the Modern Cypriote variants όδρακος and όθρακας m. ‘frog, toad’ seem to represent two different Ancient Greek archetypes: *βόθρακος and *βόθραξ (= Lat. *botrax*).

Etymology: It is relatively certain that the Modern Cretan names for ‘frog, toad’, as well as the Ancient Greek forms registered above, derive from an ancient source. The root vowel variation *-ο-* : *-α-* is hardly explicable from the view-point of the history of the Greek language. Also the alternation of the consonants τ-χ ~ θ-κ (see Attic βάτραχος vs. East Ionic βάθρακος vs. Cypriote βρούχετος vs. Coan βότραχος vs. Cretan βρόταχος vs. Modern Cretan βορθακός and its variants) indicates a foreign origin of this bundle of terms, see e.g. Attic χιτών vs. Ionic κιθών vs. Doric κιτών m. ‘garment worn next to the skin, tunic’, Ionic-Attic φάτνη vs. πάθνη f. ‘manger, crib’ (Beekes 2003: 109–112). Lagarde (1887: 356) derives the Greek term in question from the Hebrew *ṣəpardēʿa* ‘frog’, but his Semitic etymology is correctly rejected by other scholars (Lewy 1895: 14; Rosół 2013: 166).

Linguists connect the Greek terms for ‘frog’ (especially the dialectal form βρόταχος or βρόθακος) with the Calabrese *vrótiku*, *vrótaku* and the Daco-Romanian *broatec*, *brotac*, the Aroumunian and Meglenian *broatic* ‘id.’ (Meyer-Lübke 1935: 119, No. 1331, s.v. ‘brothăcus’; Rohlfs 1930: 355; Rosetti 1964: 66). It is commonly suggested that the Romanian terms, as well as the Albanian *bretër* ‘frog’, were borrowed from a Doric (or West-North) dialect of the Ancient Greek language (Sandfeld 1930: 281; Shipp 1979: 140).

According to Frisk (1960: 226 f.), the Attic Greek name βάτραχος and its cognate forms remain without etymology (“ohne Etymologie”). Chantraine (1968: I 170) tries to seek a connection with the Latin *botrax* m. ‘lizard’, but with no success.

Hamp (1976: 333 f.; 1979: 209–212) stresses that some similar terms appear in the Balkan area, cf. Alb. *bretër* m. ‘toad’, *bretkosë* f. ‘id.’, diminutive *brétëkuth* f. ‘small toad’, Roum. *brotóc*, *brătác*, *broatec* ‘gargaliq’, Aroum. *broátik*^{u} ‘frog, toad’ (Nikolaidis 1909 [1999]: 332). Most etymologists derive the Albano-Roumanian words from the Latin *brotacus* m. ‘frog, toad’ (Nikolaidis 1909 [1999]: 332), which, in fact, is an obvious borrowing from Doric Greek βρόταχος (or βρόθακος) (Meyer 1982: 47).

In a different paper Hamp (1981: 46) refers to the Arm. *gort* (*i*- and *o*-stem) ‘frog’ (gen. sg. *gortoy*, instr. sg. *gortiv*) (Hübschmann 1897: 437), as well as to the Latvian *vaŕde* f. ‘frog’, the East Latv. *vargle* f., and the Lithuanian *varlẽ* f. ‘id.’ (< East Baltic **vardi̯ā*, **vardli̯ā*, also **varli̯ā*). The Armenian-Baltic lexical isogloss seem to represent IE. dial. **u̯ord-* f. ‘frog’ (Trautmann 1923: 342; Meillet 1936: 76). The Ancient Greek forms (e.g. Attic βάτραχος, Coan βότραχος) seem to derive from IE. **u̯ordakos* m. ‘frog’ through the medium of

an unknown Indo-European language, whose phonology was changed by a consonant shift (**d* > *t*, **k* > *kh*), as well as by a metathesis of the cluster *-rt-* (< **-rd-*) to *-tr-*. As the consonant shift (G. *Lautverschiebung*) is said to be a basic feature of an Indo-European Pre-Greek substrate called commonly "Pelasgian", the (Ancient) Greek term for 'frog' can be treated as a "Pelasgian" loan word[1].

Beekes (2010: 206 f.) quotes a number of Ancient Greek forms attested in literary sources, stressing that "[s]everal variants are due to folk etymology or taboo, and also to simple phonetic variation. A priori, a local (i.e. Pre-Greek) form is to be expected for all of these forms". In Beekes's opinion, all the Ancient Greek terms for 'frog, toad' "point to Pre-Greek origin", though he believes that "the forms βλικ/χ- and βάβακοι are etymologically unrelated" (Beekes 2010: 207).

2.1. Cretan Greek (dial.) ζάμπα [ˈzaba] f. 'green toad, *Bufo viridis* Lacep., syn. *Bufo viridis viridis* Laur.' (Raulin 1869: 1024; Ondrias 1968: 113; Platakis 1980: 63; Kaczyńska, Witczak 2008: 136; Charalampakis 2016: 155, 248).

Etymology: This noun was borrowed from a South Slavic source in the medieval period, cf. Byz. Gk. ζάμπα f. 'toad / bufo, rubeta' (Du Cange 1688: 457). The term in question is well attested in most Slavic languages, cf. Maced. *жаба*, Bulg. *жàба* f. 'frog, *Rana* L.', Slovenian *žába* f., Russ. *жáба* f. 'toad, *Bufo*', Pol. *żaba* f. 'frog, *Rana*' (< Common Slavic **žaba* f. 'toad, frog'). It was adopted by some Balkan dialects, cf. the Albanian *zhabë* f. 'bretkosë / frog, toad', Alb. dial. (Calabria) *žába* 'rana / frog', the Aroumanian *jábă* f. 'toad' (Guyon 1909: 36; *BER* 1971: 520; Seliščev 1978: 189; Ndreca 1986: 748; Newmark 1999: 971) and borrowed for the second time by the Greeks, cf. Mod. Gk. (Macedonia) ζιάμπα f. 'frog', (Epir) ζιάβα f. 'toad' (Budziszewska 1991: 21 f.; Kaczyńska, Witczak 2008: 136; Charalampakis 2016: 155). The Slavic name for 'frog, toad' derives from the Indo-European root **g*^{w}*əb-* : **g*^{w}*ēb-* 'frog, toad', cf. the Old Prussian *gabawo* f. 'frog', Old Saxon *quappa* f. 'Aalquappe'. The same root is also attested in the Balkan area, cf. Ancient Greek (Pontic) βάβακος 'frog, toad' derives from IE. **g*^{w}*əb-* : **g*^{w}*ēb-* 'id.' by means of the diminutive suffix *-ακος*. The Pontic term in question is registered only in the so called Hesychian glossary: βάβακοι· ὑπὸ Ἠλείων τέττιγες· ὑπὸ Ποντικῶν δὲ βάτραχοι (Latte 1953: 304b–305; Chantraine 1968: I 169, s.v. βάτραχος). It should be emphasised that the Ancient Greek (Pontic) gloss for 'frog' is perfectly confirmed by Modern Greek data, cf. Mod. Gk. (in Macedonia) βάβακος 'frog / Frosch', also βάβακους in Kozani (Andriotis 1974: 170, No. 1399).

[1] It is highly uncertain if the East Cretan forms (α)βορδακός or (α)φορδακός derive from the Doric Greek form **ϝορδακός* m. 'frog'. Theoretically, this hypothetical archetype can be assumed as native (IE. **o*, **d* and **k* are preserved, as well as the cluster **rd*).

3.1. Cretan μαντού [ma′du] f. ‘frog’, especially ‘Cretan tree frog, *Hyle arborea* ssp. *kretensis*’ (Frangaki 1978: 246, 249; Platakis 1979: 115; 1980: 81; Rodakis 2005: 88).

Etymology: It derives from the Ancient Greek *μαντώ f. ‘she-prophet’, see the feminine personal name Μαντώ, -οῦς (Benseler 1884: 856; Dornseiff, Hansen 1978: 320; Fraser, Matthews 1987: 298). The basic masculine form μάντις m. means not only ‘diviner, seer, prophet’, but also ‘green garden-frog, *Hyle arborea* syn. *Rana arborea* L.’ and ‘a kind of grasshopper, esp. praying mantis, *Mantis religiosa* L.’, see the Hesychian gloss: μάντις · ὁ ἐν τοῖς κήποις βάτραχος. καὶ εἶδος ἀκρίδος (Latte 1966: 628, μ-247) [“*mántis* – the frog in the gardens. Also a kind of grasshopper”]. The green garden-frog was “so called as predicting the weather” (Liddell, Scott 1996: 1080).

4.1. West Cretan (in the village Anogeia) νεροπούλλι [nερɔ′puli] n. ‘βάτραχος / frog or toad’ (Pangalos 1960: III 141), νεροπούλι [nερɔ′puli] n. ‘βάτραχος’ (Platakis 1980: 90).

Etymology: It evidently means ‘watery animal’, deriving from the noun νερό n. ‘water’ and πουλ(λ)ί n. ‘young or small animal, esp. bird, chicken’ (Pangalos 1960: III 141). Outside Crete, Mod. Gk. νεροπούλι denotes ‘a kind of waterbird, esp. water-fowl / υδρόβιο πτηνό’ (Stavropoulos 1988: 585; Babiniotis 2002: 1175).

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Modern Cretan terminology for amphibians contains as many as 21 different appellatives. Most of them (from 1.1 to 1.15) are related to each other, as well as to ancient names (cf. Attic Greek βάτραχος, East Ionic βάθρακος, Coan βότραχος and Doric βρόταχος). Generally, the Cretan lexemes refer to every species of tailless amphibians (i.e. frogs and toads) and especially to the Cretan frog (*Pelophylax cretensis*, syn. *Rana cretensis*).

2. The Cretan lexeme μαντού denoting ‘Cretan tree frog, *Hyle arborea* ssp. *kretensis*’ (3.1) derives from the Ancient Greek *μαντώ f. ‘she-prophet’, cf. Anc. Gk. μάντις m. ‘diviner, seer, prophet’, also ‘green garden-frog, *Hyle arborea* syn. *Rana arborea* L.’.

3. The Cretan term ζάμπα ‘green toad, *Bufo viridis* Lacep., syn. *Bufo viridis viridis* Laur.’ (2.1) represents a loanword of Slavic origin. It was borrowed as early as medieval times, cf. Byz. Gk. ζάμπα f. ‘toad / bufo, rubeta’.

4. The West Cretan noun νεροπούλ(λ)ι (4.1) ‘frog or toad’ (literally ‘water animal’) seems to be a local innovation registered in the Cretan village of Anogeia.

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LE PARODIE DI MELCHIOR LAUBANUS, OSSIA SUL TRATTAMENTO NON CLASSICO DI UN CLASSICO ROMANO ALLA SOGLIA DEL XVII SECOLO

di

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TITLE: Poetical parodies by Melchior Laubanus, or how to treat a Roman classical poet without (due) respect – a case from the 17th century

ABSTRACT: The paper concerns poetical parodies of Horace by a poet from Silesia district, Melchior Laubanus. In 1607 he published an anthology of his Latin lyrics under the title *Musa lyrica sive poeticarum epiphyllidon pars mellica*. In the paper some of Laubanus' poems are presented and then confronted with their Roman poetic models, that is with the odes by Horace; subsequently, Laubanus' method of parodying ancient Roman poet is under examination.

Uno dei primi segni del diffondersi della moda letteraria verso la fine del XVI secolo e sicuramente nel XVII è stata la copiosa produzione delle cosiddette "parodie"[1]. Nel nostro ambito culturale l'attenzione degli studiosi si è concentrata soprattutto sugli autori delle parodie oraziane dato che il poeta romano era considerato come depositario di un ideale non contestato, e i suoi canti e i suoi epodi sono quelli che probabilmente più spesso si trovavano nei lavori degli autori neolatini di parodie[2]. Vi ricorrevano sia autori protestanti, come ad esempio Joachim Bielski (circa 1550–1599)[3] o Ulryk Schober (1559–1598), sia quelli cattolici, come

[1] Sulla parodia in teoria poetica v. J. Robert, *Nachschrift und Gegengesang. Parodie und parodia in der Poetik der Frühen Neuzeit*, in: R.F. Glei, R. Seidel (a cura di), *"Parodia" und Parodie: Aspekte intertextuellen Schreibens in der lateinischen Literatur der Frühen Neuzeit*, Berlin–New York 2006, pp. 47 e sgg. Cfr. una definizione della parodia di Hanna Dziechcińska (*Parodia. Nazwa i pojęcie*, in: T. Michałowska [a cura di], *Słownik literatury staropolskiej*, Wrocław ²1998, p. 623). Gabriela Pianko nell'articolo *Co to jest parodia?* (Meander II 1947, p. 322) partendo dall'etimologia della parola chiama la parodia "imitazione del canto" o "il canto imitato". Cfr. anche H. Dziechcińska, *Parodia, kierunki jej rozwoju i kształtowanie się pojęcia* in: J. Pelc [a cura di], *Problemy literatury staropolskiej*, serie III, Wrocław 1978, p. 278.

[2] Rüdiger Niehl enumera molte raccolte di parodie oraziane scritte nel XVII secolo (*"Parodia Horatiana". Parodiebegriff und Parodiedichtung im Deutschland des 17. Jahrhunderts*, in: Glei, Seidel, *op. cit*. [n. 1], p. 13).

[3] Bielski solo alla fine della vita è diventato cattolico. V. H. Barycz, *Bielski Joachim,* in: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. II, Kraków 1936, pp. 61–64.

il gesuita Maciej Kazimierz Sarbiewski[4] (1595–1640), considerato un'eminenza del barocco polacco. Anche se l'attività poetica di quell'ultimo viene definita di solito come un "parodiare" Orazio[5], vale la pena ricordare che il poeta stesso intitola parodia solo una delle sue odi (II 18: *In D. Virginem Matrem carmen saeculare. Parodia ex Q. Horatio Flacco*)[6] e soltanto in un epodo si ispira al modello classico, definendo i propri versi come la palinodia di un'opera di Orazio (*Ep*. 3: *Laus otii religiosi. Palinodia ad secundam libri Epodon Odam Q. Horatii Flacci: "Beatus ille qui procul negotiis"*)[7]. Per questo motivo e a causa della mancanza di chiarezza su dove debba essere posto il confine fra la parodia e l'originale, ovviamente secondo le concezioni che avevano a quei tempi i poeti del rinascimento e del barocco, si può giustificare la scelta di provare ad includere appieno nel gruppo degli autori oraziani nostrani le parodie di Melchior Laubanus (1567–1633), poeta proveniente dalla città slesiana di Szprotawa, vicerettore e professore di filologia nel Ginnasio Accademico di Danzica ed in seguito rettore del Ginnasio Ducale di Brzeg[8].

Nella raccolta di poesie di Laubanus pubblicata nel 1607 a Danzica, *Musa lyrica sive poeticarum epiphyllidon pars mellica*[9] accanto a quattro libri di canti con tematiche e verseggiature molto diverse, sono state ritrovate tre raccolte di parodie per un insieme di 77 brani di cui 71 sono "parodie oraziane". Il pri-

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[4] J. Budzyński parla della loro creazione parodistica nel libro *Horacjanizm w liryce polsko-łacińskiej renesansu i baroku*, Wrocław 1985, pp. 119–196, però alle parodie di Laubanus dedica soltanto qualche frase (pp. 143 e sg.). V. anche I. Bogumił, *Inspiracje antyczne w twórczości poetów Gdańskiego Gimnazjum Akademickiego*, in: M. Otto, J. Pokrzywnicki (a cura di), *W gdańskim ogrodzie Muz. Gimnazjum Akademickie w Gdańsku wobec kultury starożytnych Greków i Rzymian. Idee – Teksty – Artefakty*, Pelplin 2016, pp. 29 e sg.

[5] Per definire le parodie di Sarbiewski Dziechcińska usa il termine "parafrasi" (*Parodia, kierunki jej rozwoju...*, [n. 1], p. 283).

[6] J. Budzyński cerca di mostrare la tecnica parodistica di Sarbiewski prendendo come esempio l'ode II 18 nell'articolo *"Parodia" i "palinodia" Horacjańska w liryce M.K. Sarbiewskiego. Studium z techniki poezji barokowej*, Meander XXX 1975, pp. 94–98. Cfr. anche M. Bieniek, *Pieśń I 19 M.K. Sarbiewskiego jako przykład barokowej parodii*, Terminus VI 2004, pp. 55–73.

[7] Cfr. Prefazione all'edizione: *Mathiae Casimiri Sarbievii Lyrica [...]*, trad. di T. Karyłowski SI, a cura di M. Korolko, con la collaborazione di J. Okoń, Warszawa 1980, pp. XLI e sgg. V. anche E. Buszewicz, *Sarmacki Horacy i jego liryka. Imitacja – gatunek – styl. Rzecz o poezji Macieja Kazimierza Sarbiewskiego*, Kraków 2006, pp. 108–110.

[8] Sul poeta v. ad es. E. Praetorius, *Athenae Gedanenses sive commentarius historico-chronologicus succinctus originem et constitutionem Gymnasii Dantiscani illustris itemque recensionem superiorum eius antistitum seu proto-scholarcharum nec non vitas et scripta rectorum ac professorum eiusdem continens*, Lipsiae 1713, pp. 52–54; Ch.G. Iöcher, *Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon*, pt. 2, Leipzig 1750, col. 2297; B. Nadolski (a cura di), *Poezja renesansowa na Pomorzu*, Gdańsk 1976, pp. 36–38. Cfr. anche H. Barycz, *Śląsk w polskiej kulturze umysłowej*, Katowice 1979, pp. 182 e sg.

[9] *M. Laubani Musa lyrica sive poeticarum epiphyllidon pars melica in quâ libri odarum IV, parodiarum III, phaleucorum I, adoptivorum I*, Dantisci Boruss[iae], typis viduae Guilhelmi Guilmothani [Guilmontani – K. Estreicher, *Bibliografia Polska*, vol. XXI, Kraków 1906, p. 118] [...], anno 1607.

mo libro contiene le parodie dei canti del primo libro oraziano (*E primo carminum Horatii*), il secondo presenta le parodie dei canti del secondo libro del poeta romano (*E secundo carminum Horatii*), il terzo (*E variis*) è la "parodia" del III e IV libro di Orazio e di qualche opera di Catullo, Virgilio e Marziale. Diversamente da Bielski e anche dal di poco posteriore Sarbiewski, Laubanus cerca insistentemente di suggerire al lettore il modello letterario su cui si basa, contrassegnando ogni parodia con la nota indicante l'ode oraziana da cui essa proviene, inserendone il suo numero ed incipit. Alcuni canti del poeta romano vengono rielaborati più volte dal poeta slesiano: sulla base dell'ode II 13 (*Ille et nefasto te posuit die*) Laubanus crea due parodie, dalla II 15 (*Iam pauca aratro iugera regiae*) tre, dalla II 17 (*Cur me querelis exanimas tuis?*) ancora due, e dall'ultimo canto nel secondo libro II 20 (*Non usitata nec tenui ferar*) costruisce ben cinque opere[10]. Le più grandi ispirazioni però vengono fornite all'autore neolatino dal canto IV 3 (*Quem tu, Melpomene, semel*), sulla cui base ha creato ben undici parodie, un vero record[11].

Sia nell'epoca rinascimentale che barocca esisteva la tendenza di cristianizzare la letteratura pagana, la quale, visto che spesso riguardava situazioni immorali, erotiche oppure rievocava storie mitiche, immaginarie e non vere, richiedeva opportuni interventi adattivi per poter essere riutilizzata in ambito cristiano[12]. Sembra che la creazione delle parodie su temi religiosi (*parodiae sacrae*, *parodiae Christianae*), che nei tre libri di Laubanus sono molte, fosse qualcosa di assolutamente naturale nel XVI e XVII secolo. A volte nascevano nel modo più semplice e naturale, come quando lo slesiano al posto di una divinità antica, dunque pagana, mette il Cristo. L'ode I 31 oraziana, che il poeta romano inizia con la domanda "che cosa il poeta chiede ad Apollo" in occasione della dedica del nuovo tempio a questo dio (vv. 1–2: "Quid dedicatum poscit Apollinem / vates?")[13] nella versione di Laubanus diventa un'opera dedicata a Gesù Bambino e l'arrivo dell'Anno Nuovo costituisce l'occasione per fargli auguri (lib. I, parodia 21: *Ad Iesum Infantem votum ianuarium,* p. 250)[14]:

> Quid liberalem poscit Iesulum
> Vates? quid orat de veteri novum
> Migrans in annum?

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[10] La situazione simile sarà da Sarbiewski, v. Budzyński, *"Parodia" i "palinodia"...* (n. 6), p. 99.

[11] Cfr. Buszewicz, *op. cit.* (n. 7), p. 106. Cfr. anche elenco delle parodie basate sull'ode IV 3 nell'articolo di Niehl, *op. cit.* (n. 2), pp. 35 e sg.

[12] Cfr. J. Budzyński, *Horacjanizm...* (n. 4), p. 136.

[13] V. R.G.M. Nisbet, M. Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes, Book I*, Oxford 1970, p. 347 e sgg.

[14] È utilizzata l'edizione indicata nella nota 9 con l'ortografia ed interpunzione classica.

Un analogo metodo di lavoro dell'autore neolatino si ritrova anche nella parodia 23 del libro II (*Ad Natalem Dominicum*), dove Laubanus trasforma la confessione di Orazio, che "nell'ispirazione creativa" vide Bacco insegnare alle ninfe e ai satiri l'arte poetica (II 19, 1–2: "Bacchum in remotis carmina rupibus / vidi docentem") nella dichiarazione che sul freddo fieno di Betlemme vide Gesù (p. 285: "Iesum in rigenti stramine Bethlidos / vidi iacentem"). Non ci sono dubbi che per i protestanti il Natale che simbolizza un nuovo inizio nella storia del mondo, ma anche l'inizio della nuova religione riformata, fosse molto importante[15], il che viene confermato da un'altra parodia a Gesù Bambino (*Ad puerulum Iesum*)[16]. Vale la pena riportare l'intero testo di Laubanus per poter osservare in quale modo inserisce i contenuti religiosi nello schema lessicale e di verseggiatura dato dal poeta romano (p. 250):

O, Puer, tutela soli polique,
Sperne Bethlemae stipulam et vocantis
Voce te crebrâ in famulima cordis
Scrinia transfer.

Spiritus tecum Sacer et benigno
Gratia incessu veniet Fidesque,
Filiâ nunquam sine Caritate et
Vita Salusque.

L'autore slesiano trasforma il tema pagano dell'ode oraziana I 30 (*O Venus regina Cnidi Paphique*), che costituisce una specie d'invito indirizzato da una ragazza, probabilmente una giovane etera (come potrebbe suggerire il suo nome greco Glicera "Dolce")[17] a Venere, regina di Knidos e Pafos. La dea, come la definisce con l'aiuto di un ossimoro il poeta romano, respinge il Cipro così amato ("sperne dilectam Cypron") e si trasferisce ("te [...] transfer") nella casa o nel tempietto privato della ragazza che l'invoca. Nella parodia di Laubanus invece di Venere viene chiamato il piccolo Gesù, che deve disprezzare il fieno di Betlemme ("Sperne Bethlemae stipulam") e trasferirsi ("te [...] transfer") nel cuore del suo adoratore. Per ragioni evidenti anche il corteo celeste presentato nella seconda strofa delle due opere subisce una metamorfosi. In Orazio il seguito di Venere è costituito da Amore, le Grazie e le Ninfe, e dalle divinità della giovinezza: Gioventù e Mercurio. Nella parodia di Laubanus non troviamo, a differenza del poeta romano, l'incoraggiamento a venire in compagnia di altre divinità (Hor.: "tecum [...] properentque"), ma l'affermazione che insieme a Cristo apparirà

[15] V. K. Meller, *"Noc przeszła, a dzień się przybliżył". Studia o polskim piśmiennictwie reformacyjnym XVI wieku*, Poznań 2004, pp. 203 e sg.

[16] È la ventesima opera del libro I che nell'edizione citata porta erroneamente il numero diciannove.

[17] Cfr. S. Commager, *The Odes of Horace. A Critical Study*, New Haven–London 1962, p. 250.

("veniet") lo Spirito Santo, la Misericordia, la Fede con sua figlia Amore e Vita e Redenzione.

La stessa ode oraziana I 30 divenne modello poetico anche per Maciej Kazimierz Sarbiewski che di fronte alla fame e alla guerra che affliggevano la patria compose una poesia a Maria Vergine (II 26: *Ad D. Virginem Matrem*)[18]:

Aurei regina Maria caeli,
Moesiae valles, Hypanimque late
Nubium curru super et nivosis
Vise quadrigis.

Aureus tecum Puer, et coruscis
Aureae pennis properent catervae,
Et Salus et Pax, et aperta pando
Copia cornu.

Sarbiewski, come il poeta slesiano, conserva la struttura oraziana dell'inno cletico, genere che i Romani del resto presero dai Greci[19]. Introduce dunque un elemento invocatorio unito all'elogio della divinità e alla preghiera, omette invece la sanzione, cioè la giustificazione dell'arrivo (nel poeta romano era l'abbondante incenso offerto da Glicera). La Venere pagana fu sostituita dalla Madre di Dio (i protestanti non veneravano Maria, perciò nell'opera di Laubanus viene invitato solo il Bambin Gesù), e nella seconda strofa, la presenza nel corteo celeste accanto a Gesù, delle personificazioni della Salvezza, Pace ed Abbondanza, sembra essere costruita secondo la stessa tecnica di cui si servì il poeta slesiano. Soltanto le dorature, il cielo dorato, il Bambin Gesù e le schiere degli angeli che arrivano sulle ali dorate, qualificano la poesia di Sarbiewski come poesia pienamente barocca.

Come si rileva, le poesie erotiche di Orazio si prestavano senza difficoltà alla trasformazione in poesie religiose. Gli autori neolatini provavano senza dubbio gusto nel cristianizzare contenuti indecenti o disinvolti, il che rendeva il grande poeta pagano un ottimo strumento per la divulgazione delle idee religiose[20]. Melchior Laubanus utilizzava a questo scopo non soltanto i canti erotici, ma anche molto serie e sentimentalmente più profonde odi agli amici. Appropriandosi

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[18] È stata utilizzata l'edizione indicata nella nota 7.

[19] Cfr. A.W. Mikołajczak, *Antyk w poezji Macieja Kazimierza Sarbiewskiego*, Poznań 1994, pp. 32–35; Nisbet, Hubbard, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 343.

[20] Krystyna Stawecka ritiene che le opere di Orazio raramente siano state il modello per la poesia religiosa latina del XVI secolo (*Religijna poezja XVI wieku w Polsce. Zagadnienia wybrane*, Lublin 1964, p. 102); questa opinione è ripetuta da Mikołajczak (*op. cit.* [n. 19], p. 32). Vale la pena osservare però che anche se il volumetto di Laubanus apparve nel 1607, dunque già nel XVII secolo, la maggior parte di poesie raccolte dovettero essere create ancora nel secolo precedente, questo significa che a Orazio ci si ispirava.

del modello compositivo oraziano, delle idee e delle frasi del poeta romano, riconsiderò il più delle volte i problemi della relazione fra Cristo e il peccatore, della grazia e della redenzione in Cristo, cioè le tematiche più importanti per i protestanti. Cerchiamo di analizzare su un esempio concreto in che modo Laubanus inserisce i nuovi contenuti nella costruzione strutturale-linguistica presa in prestito da Orazio.

La quinta parodia del I libro intitolata *De efficacia Christi crucifixi sacramento cenae fidelibus obsignata* costituisce la rilettura poetica del canto I 5 di Orazio *Quis multa gracilis*. L'eroina della poesia erotica romana che fa da modello, è la ragazza dal "nome parlante" di Pirra, dai capelli fulvi, dalla quale non si allontana mai (*urget*) un giovane con una ghirlanda di rose in testa[21]. È per lui che Pirra, per sembrare bella in modo naturale, si veste in abiti semplici ed intreccia i capelli fulvi (vv. 4–5: "cui flavam religas comam, / simplex munditiis?"). L'oggetto dell'adorazione nella poesia di Laubanus, l'equivalente letterario della ragazza, diventa Cristo crocefisso dal quale non si allontana (*urget*) il peccatore spaventato dai suoi propri delitti (*peccator*), al quale Cristo tende generosamente la mano concedendo la grazia (p. 233: "Cui promptam adicies manum / Praelargus veniae?"). Nella lirica romana il destino del giovane cambierà quando verrà a sapere quanto è infedele la ragazza con cui ha a che fare, poiché egli è ancora "inconsapevole dell'ingannevole soffio di vento" (vv. 11–12: "nescius aurae / fallacis"), ma questa sarà un'esperienza triste (*flebit*) . Il destino del peccatore che sa in che tempi peccaminosi vive ("conscius aevi / Culpati"), (a differenza di quello del giovane) si tramuterà invece in buono. In due opere il soggetto lirico individua un gruppo di sciagurati e contrappone il destino che li minaccia alla sua situazione. In Orazio appartengono a questo gruppo quelli che non conoscevano ancora l'infedeltà di Pirra (vv. 12–13: "miseri, quibus / intemptata nites"), a differenza del poeta che era già uscito, anche se come naufrago, dalle pene amorose. Laubanus chiama sciagurati quelli che disprezzano la croce ("Miseri, quibus / Crux despecta Tua est!"), mostra invece se stesso come colui che si nutre del pane eucaristico, dal quale ricava forza e potenza. L'idea di inserire Cristo al posto di Pirra può suscitare stupore; una soluzione forse migliore la troviamo ad esempio nella terza poesia della raccolta del gesuita *Septem sidera*, attribuita un tempo a Copernico[22]. L'equivalente letterario della seduttrice oraziana diventa qui Maria, che distinguendosi come Pirra con la modestia dell'abbigliamento e la semplicità dell'acconciatura, abbraccia il piccolo Gesù (*sidus III*):

> Quis fulta posuit te, Puer, in
> Quis laedi tenerum frigoribus velat?

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[21] Cfr. presentazione di questa ode nel libro di Commager, *op. cit.* (n. 17), pp. 65 e sgg. V. anche E. Castorina, *La poesia d'Orazio*, Roma 1965, pp. 189–191.

[22] V. G. [= J.] Krókowski, *De "Septem sideribus", quae Nicolao Copernico vulgo tribuuntur*, Cracoviae 1926.

Virgo summa Maria,
Quae flavam religat comam
Simplex munditiis[23].

La parodia 20 del libro II della raccolta di Laubanus costituisce un buon esempio di trasformazione di un'ode ad un amico, sul vero significato dell'amicizia, in un testo religioso. Come modello letterario viene adoperato qui il canto oraziano II 17 *Cur me querelis exanimas tuis?*, dedicato a Mecenate che dopo una lunga malattia è in preda alla malinconia e ancora di più alla paura della morte. Il poeta slesiano conserva la struttura del dialogo, che è in un certo senso resa obbligatoria dalla presenza nell'opera del destinatario: il posto di Orazio che cerca di convincere Mecenate che andranno insieme all'altro mondo e che gli dei non vogliono affatto la sua morte (vv. 2 – 3: "nec dis amicum est nec mihi te prius / obire, Maecenas") lo occupa adesso Cristo che assicura che né lui stesso, né Iddio padre desiderano la dannazione del peccatore (p. 280):

Nec Patri amicum est, nec Mihi, te male
Perire, peccator, meorum
Sontica materies dolorum.

Laubanus basa la parodia 20 del libro II su un dogma essenziale della teologia protestante, quello della redenzione, Cristo appare qui come intermediario fra Dio e l'uomo e come il Redentore che venne nel mondo per salvare il peccatore attraverso la sua passione e la morte[24].

Il poeta della Slesia non soltanto conferisce un tono cristiano alle odi di Orazio, ma spesso trasforma il modello antico in modo che rimanga fedele all'antica tradizione pagana. Vale la pena a questo punto menzionare la sesta parodia del libro III intitolata *Ad Sophrosynen. Poculis valedicens* (pp. 200 e sg.)[25]:

Vixi cululis nuper amiculus,
Et dimicavi stultus amystido
Frequentiori, nunc et artem
Pestiferam et stolida arma pono.

Gressûsque ad aram Sophrosynes fero
Mutatus. Heic, heic ponite turpia
Carchesia et trullas et obbas
Faucibus ebriulis minaces.

O quae salubrem, Diva, colis modum et
Vitam carentem multibibâ lue

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[23] Cfr. Budzyński, *Horacjanizm...* (n. 4), pp. 159 e sg.

[24] Cristo è dunque inteso come "strumento dell'amore redentore di Dio". V. O.H. Pesch, *Zrozumieć Lutra*, trad. di A. Marniok, K. Kowalik, Poznań 2004 [*Hinführung zu Luther*, Mainz 1982].

[25] Nell'edizione citata la numerazione delle pagine è errata: dovrebbe essere 300–301.

Praesens capistro pertinaci
Stringe gulam Bromio efferatam.

La poesia sopracitata è la riproduzione poetica del canto III 26 *Vixi puellis nuper idoneus*, ovvero l'addio oraziano all'amore. Il poeta romano rinunciando alle avventure amorose e al servizio a favore della Venere appende nel suo tempio l'arma usata un tempo, le fiaccole che illuminavano la strada che portava all'amata, le sbarre che servivano a buttar giù la porta della casa del suo bene e gli archi. Laubanus invece saluta nella sua opera le coppe, ordina di deporre sull'altare della dea Temperanza (la greca Sophrosyne) le armi, i piatti, le mestole, le caraffe, chiedendole di stringere con le briglie la gola propensa all'ubriachezza, così come Venere nella poesia di Orazio doveva flagellare con la frusta Chloe, ragazza altezzosa e inavvicinabile.

Vale la pena sottolineare che il cambiamento della divinità invocata dal poeta avviene qui nel quadro del pantheon antico: il posto della dea dell'amore è occupato adesso dalla dea della saggezza, ma nel contempo Laubanus conserva l'umorismo raffinato del poeta romano. Cosa che purtroppo non riuscirà a Sarbiewski che nell'ode III 32 (*Ad amicos*) saluta la poesia per dedicarsi agli studi teologici. Tuttavia, similmente a quanto fece Laubanus, l'autore di Sarbiewo rimase nell'ambito delle divinità antiche: le scienze qui appartengono a Temide che ha il compito di interrompere l'operato della modesta Minerva che simbolizza l'artigianato poetico, secondario rispetto alla legge, alla filosofia e alla teologia (vv. 11–12: "modestae / Pelle, Themi, studium Minervae").

A volte Laubanus prende in prestito da Orazio lo schema di costruzione, di verseggiatura e di lessico e lo riveste di pensieri analoghi, che scaturiscono da circostanze simili a quelle che accompagnavano la creazione della poesia romana. Tale situazione si verifica nella parodia 17 del libro I indirizzata all'umanista breslaviano Iacobus Monavius dopo la scomparsa della figliola di un anno di età, Magdalena[26]. Come modello di composizione l'autore slesiano si servì dell'ode I 24 di Orazio *Quis desiderio sit pudor aut modus*, nata come poesia funerea, ossia una sorta di consolazione per Virgilio dopo la morte del suo amico, anch'esso poeta, Quintilio Varo[27]. Tutte e due le opere cominciano con una domanda retorica sulla cessazione della sofferenza e del pianto dopo la perdita di una persona cara e con la preghiera alla musa di intonare il canto funereo. La Melpomene oraziana, protettrice della tragedia e quindi di ogni dolore, viene sostituita nella poesia di Laubanus, che voleva forse far mostra della sua conoscenza della cultura, dalla figlia di Zeus, Telsinoe, considerata insieme alle sorelle Arche, Melete e Aoide una delle più antiche muse. Qui viene messo in primo piano, accanto

[26] V. biogramma di Monavius nell'opera di Iöcher, *op. cit*. (n. 8), pt. 3, Leipzig 1751, col. 610.

[27] V. L.P. Wilkinson, *Horace and His Lyric Poetry*, Cambridge 1968, p. 35; Commager, *op. cit.* (n. 17), pp. 287–290. Commentario dettagliato in: Nisbet, Hubbard, *op. cit.* (n. 13), pp. 279–289.

alla persona defunta, colui che più la piange, il padre della ragazza (in Orazio, Virgilio) ed è esposto il motivo della devozione vana, assolutamente inefficace di fronte alla morte (p. 247)[28]:

> Nobis illa quidem flebilis occidit,
> Patri flebilior sed tibi Monavi,
> Qui frustra pius heu! funereis tuam
> Plangis Magdaleam modis.

(Cfr. Or. v. 9–12: "multis ille bonis flebilis occidit, / nulli flebilior quam tibi, Vergili. / Tu frustra pius, heu, non ita creditum / poscis Quintilium deos".)

In luogo di Mercurio, che nel modello pagano accompagna l'anima nel mondo sotterraneo, nella poesia di Laubanus c'è l'arcangelo Gabriele, ma la differenza più importante riguarda l'idea espressa alla fine dell'opera. Orazio raccomanda di sopportare quello che non si può cambiare, Laubanus presenta al suo destinatario la visione cristiana dell'incontro ravvicinato con la persona morta, costruendo perciò, nel quadro della poesia, un'atmosfera completamente diversa.

Prendendo sempre la poesia romana come modello, nacque la settima parodia del libro II, composta in occasione del ritorno dall'Italia in Slesia dell'amico, l'avvocato Ioannes Baptista Reimanus, basata sull'ode oraziana II 7 di benvenuto a Roma del compagno d'armi di gioventù Pompeo (*O saepe mecum tempus in ultimum*). Simile situazione lirica si intravede anche nella parodia 20 del libro II, la cui base poetica è costituita dal canto II 20 con il motivo della metamorfosi in cigno, l'uccello simbolo di Apollo. Orazio, rivolgendosi in quest'ode a Mecenate, esprime la convinzione dell'immortalità della propria poesia, e di conseguenza della propria persona, resa famosa nei più remoti angoli del mondo grazie al canto (vv. 5–8):

> ...non ego, pauperum
> sanguis parentum, non ego quem vocas,
> dilecte Maecenas, obibo
> nec Stygia cohibebor unda.

Laubanus assimilò bene l'atmosfera dell'opera, come si vede già dal titolo della parodia: *Ad seipsum. Credo vitam aeternam.* Il posto del destinatario dell'ode romana, Mecenate, è preso qui dal Salvatore (*Salvator*), p. 287:

> ...non ego sontium
> Semen parentum, non ego, cui faves,
> Benigne Salvator, peribo,
> Nec gelidâ cohibebor urnâ.

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[28] Questo motivo è spesso sfruttato dagli autori antichi. Appare per es. in *Troiane* di Euripide e nell'ode II 14 di Orazio.

Al motivo oraziano della gloria, la cui portata è illustrata attraverso l'enumerazione dei popoli e dei luoghi in cui arriverà il poeta sotto forma di uccello[29], corrisponde nella poesia di Laubanus alla convinzione che la sua anima sarà riconosciuta nell'aldilà dal progenitore Adamo, da Abramo, dai profeti e dai dodici apostoli. Entrambi i poeti esprimono infatti nelle loro opere una professione di fede: Laubanus in Dio e nella vita eterna dopo la morte, Orazio nella grandezza delle proprie realizzazioni poetiche e della loro durata eterna.

A volte lo slesiano prende dal modello antico qualche elemento caratteristico oppure l'incipit che trasforma, adattandolo ai bisogni della nuova poesia realizzata secondo una concezione propria, non oraziana. L'inizio della poesia erotica II 4 con incoraggiamento rivolto ad un certo Xantia affinché non si vergogni del suo amore per una schiava[30], diventa nella parodia quarta del libro II l'esortazione ad un certo Ioachimus Spechtius di non vergognarsi dell'amore per un poeta. Laubanus sostituisce gli *exempla* oraziani di eroi che amavano delle schiave: Achillle, Aiace, Agamemnone con gli esempi di eminenti personaggi dell'antichità entusiasti di scrittori: Alessandro Magno affascinato dalla musa di Omero, Scipione l'Africano dal talento del poeta della Calabria, cioè Ennio, Ottaviano Augusto dalle opere di Publio Virgilio Marone.

La base strutturale della decima parodia del I libro ispirata dal canto invernale *Vides ut alta stet nive candidum*, costituisce il motivo delle raccomandazioni rivolte al giovane Ioannes Simon Adamus, affinché non sprechi il tempo e si dedichi completamente ai libri e agli studi scientifici (pp. 238 e sg.):

> Quod paeniteret post, fuge persequi, et
> Quam tempus ansam cumque dabit, libris
> Impende nec doctos agonas
> Sperne lupos neque diciplinae.

Bisogna ammettere che in questa rappresentazione parodistica rimane poco dell'originale romano. Il destinatario collettivo oraziano definito con il "nome parlante" di Taliarco[31] diventò un destinatario specifico e il paesaggio invernale sparì del tutto cedendo il posto all'immagine di giovani allegri che non ascoltano le esortazioni degli insegnanti (p. 238: "Vides ut acri nunc ovet indole / Iuventa"). Anche il modello di vita proposto da Orazio che consisteva nello sfruttare bene il tempo che ci è dato, dedicandolo ai piaceri come i banchetti o gli amori fu trasformato completamente. Il poeta insegnante si rendeva perfettamente conto che lo stile di vita da lui proposto era assolutamente in contraddizione con il concetto oraziano, perciò nella conclusione ancora una volta fa riferimento alla

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[29] V. Commager, *op. cit.* (n. 17), pp. 309 e sgg.

[30] V. Castorina, *op. cit.* (n. 21), pp. 227 e sg.

[31] V. Nisbet, Hubbard, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 121. Cfr. analisi di questa ode nel libro di Castorina (*op. cit.* [n. 21], pp. 114–116). V. anche Wilkinson, *op. cit.* (n. 17), pp. 129–131.

poesia romana, sostituendo l'immagine dell'incontro amoroso con la ragazza con l'incoraggiamento allo studio della letteratura classica, cosa che potrebbe procurare un piacere quasi erotico. Non per caso il poeta slesiano risale all'antico lessico amoroso scrivendo del fascino dell'idioma attico e latino (*venus*), che „dovrebbe arrossire sulle labbra" (*purpuret*) e della fiaccola dell'antichità (*fax antiquitatum*), che dovrebbe ardere.

Con la stessa tecnica fu creata la parodia 22 del libro I definita come palinodia del giovane che abbandona la pigrizia per la diligenza e la virtù (*Palinodia adolescentis a nequitiâ ad diligentiam et virtutem se revocantis*). Il modello letterario per l'eroe di Laubanus, pigro e poco amante dei libri (p. 251: "Deses librorum cultor et infrequens") è il non troppo zelante adoratore degli dei (vv. 1: "Parcus deorum cultor et infrequens") dell'ode I 34 di Orazio che rappresenta un supposto cambiamento delle idee del poeta sulle questioni religiose. Il punto comune di queste due opere come delle altre due menzionate prima è ancora una volta soltanto il finale, che contiene il motivo della Fortuna per la quale non di rado gli affari umani sono soltanto un semplice gioco.

I tentativi di impregnare di un contenuto nuovo lo schema strutturale e stilistico preso dal poeta romano portano a volte ad effetti addirittura sorprendenti. L'ode oraziana II 13 rivolta all'albero che quasi schiacciò il poeta mentre passeggiava nelle sue vicinanze[32], è trasformata da Laubanus in un idillio in occasione della morte prematura del giovane Victorinus Thilon *In praematurum obitum Victorini Thilonis puelli elegantiss[imi] eidyllion.* L'autore slesiano si rivolge naturalmente non all'albero ma alla saetta che colpisce un piccolo usignolo allevato con cura dalla madre, e maledice colui che preparò la saetta e la estrasse dalla faretra, imputandogli la capacità di compiere le più terribili malvagità, come disonorare il santuario di Diana e macchiare i fiumi sacri con il sangue divino delle Naiadi nonché l'odio per le divinità benigne come Cipride o le Camene (pp. 270 e sg.):

> Ille et feroci te poliit manu
> Quicumque latro et sacrilego impetu,
> sagitta, contorsit volucrum in
> Cordolium lacrimasque silvae.
>
> Illum et Dianae crediderim impiê
> Turbasse nymphaeum et sacra flumina
> Sparsisse divino cruore
> Naîadum. Ille Cyprin Camenasque
>
> et ceteras miti ingenio Deas
> Odit, pharetrâ qui expediit truci
> Te triste telum, te vibrandum in
> Lusciniae caput, heu, pusillae.

[32] Sul tema dell'ode all'albero scrive ad es. Commager (*op. cit.* [n. 17], pp. 139–141; 315 e sg.).

A volte però l'ingegnosità creativa illimitata di Laubanus, almeno nella percezione dei lettori, sembra portarlo fuori strada. Un tale effetto è prodotto dalla terza parodia del libro I, nata come poesia sepolcrale per il soldato slesiano David a Stange che perse la vita in Ungheria nel 1604 lottando contro il nemico. Laubanus trasforma la poesia oraziana di augurio per il viaggio (*propemptikon*) indirizzata a Virgilio che si reca verso l'Attica (I 3)[33]. Il poeta romano nell'apostrofe alla nave affida la sicurezza dell'amico alle divinità marine, protettrici dei naviganti (Venere, Dioscuri, Eolo), pensando soprattutto al ritorno felice e al mantenimento in vita "dell'altra metà della sua anima"(vv. 6–8: "finibus Atticis / reddas incolumem precor / et serves animae dimidium meae"). Laubanus si rivolge alla terra (*tellus*) che deve proteggere il morto fino alla risurrezione quando suoneranno le trombe celesti (p. 230):

> Tellus, quae tibi creditum
> Debes Stangiaden, caespite florido
> Serves exanimem precor,
> Vivum classica dum summa resuscitent.

Il posto delle divinità marittime di Orazio è occupato adesso da Venere in quanto dea che porta la vita; il sole e il caldo primaverile sono chiamati dal poeta a rendere felice la terra con i fiori che serviranno anche per decorare la tomba. L'equivalente del topos del primo navigante diventa nella parodia di Laubanus l'antico topos del primo inventore della guerra[34], l'autore slesiano sostituisce l'audacia oraziana della stirpe umana (vv. 25–26: "audax omnia perpeti / gens humana") con l'audacia delle divinità della guerra: Bellona e Apollo. Al termine della poesia ritornano invece i fulmini di Giove, in Orazio gli audaci non permettono, per così dire, che il dio supremo metta da parte le saette perché la razza umana merita sempre la punizione, in Laubanus la razza umana sottrae a Giove le saette in quanto armi che loro possono utilizzare follemente contro gli altri e contro se stessi. Tale trasformazione del modello antico sembra un'idea abbastanza strana, e anche di cattivo gusto dato che nell'ode oraziana si trattava di mantenere in vita un caro amico mentre nella parodia al posto di Virgilio c'è una persona morta.

* * *

Dopo aver provato a presentare, su esempi scelti, la pratica poetica di Melchior Laubanus vale la pena tentare di definire la parodia in quanto il fenomeno letterario. Ovviamente qui non si tratta della definizione generale della stessa, che è stata già formula da diversi studiosi, accentuando non tanto la parodia nata

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[33] Cfr. analisi della poesia nel libro di A. Wójcik, *Talent i sztuka. Rzecz o poezji Horacego*, Wrocław 1986, pp. 156–158. V. anche Commager, *op. cit.* (n. 17), pp. 118–120.

[34] Conosciuto per es. dall'elegia di Tibullo (I 10, 1–4). Cfr. Jan Kochanowski, *El*. III 14, 23–24.

come poesia creata sulla base di un qualche schema, ma piuttosto la parodia così come la intendiamo ai giorni nostri, cioè un'opera di imitazione caricaturale di un'altra[35]. Sulla base delle riflessioni sopra esposte possiamo cercare soltanto di rispondere all'interrogativo: che cosa è la parodia secondo la concezione di Laubanus[36]. Prima di tutto occorre affermare che essa costituisce la replica poetica di un'opera, ad esempio di una lirica oraziana. Il poeta slesiano quindi non raccoglie i diversi motivi dei canti di Orazio, non introduce neanche reminiscenze dei versi di altri poeti romani. Tale opera non sarebbe stata quella che Laubanus desiderava, la parodia di un modello concreto, bensì un'ode, di cui il poeta creò ben quattro libri[37]. Lo slesiano, come si può supporre, definirebbe come parodia il già citato canto II 26 *Ad Virginem Matrem* di Sarbiewski, ma qualificherebbe ad esempio la famosa poesia II 19 *Vitas sollicitae me similis caprae* di questo poeta come un'ode, poiché il gesuita unì in un insieme due modelli: la poesia lirica di Orazio I 23 (*Vitas inuleo me similis Chloe*) e quella biblica del "Cantico dei cantici".

La parodia nella pratica letteraria di Laubanus è la trasformazione di un'opera concreta a livello di *inventio* (il poeta sceglie un tema simile, imita la composizione generale dell'opera), *dispositio* (imita la struttura delle sue singole parti) ed *elocutio* (sfrutta frasi o parole specifiche)[38]. A seguito delle diverse modificazioni nasce un testo nella sostanza simile oppure assolutamente diverso dal modello romano, che rimane comunque insuperato e suscita grande ammirazione fra gli autori neolatini. Sembra che Laubanus non si senta molto obbligato ad adattare l'opera pagana ai bisogni cristiani. Crea volentieri *parodiae sacrae* o *parodiae Christianae* secondo lo spirito protestante ma altrettanto volentieri mette in mostra la sua conoscenza dell'antichità e impregna con altri motivi o *exempla* il modello che è facile da cristianizzare, rispettando comunque le convenzioni secondo le quali fu creato.

Laubanus si prefisse indubbiamente un obbiettivo didattico. Lo scrive nettamente nell'introduzione rivolta al lettore (*Praefatio ad lectorem,* c. A 7 r.: "Parodiae

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[35] Pianko (*op. cit*. [n. 1]) si concentra esclusivamente sulla parodia in questo secondo significato. Dziechcińska dedica poco spazio alla parodia in quanto l'imitazione di un'opera concreta (*Parodia, kierunki jej rozwoju...* [n. 1], pp. 282 e sgg.), anche H. Markiewicz, *Parodia a inne gatunki literackie. (Problemy terminologiczne)*, in: idem, *Przekroje i zbliżenia dawne i nowe. Rozprawy i szkice z wiedzy o literaturze*, Warszawa 1976, pp. 112 e sg. Cfr. un articolo di Michele Hannoosh, *The Reflexive Function of Parody*, Comparative Literature XLI 1989, pp. 113–127.

[36] Agnieszka Borysowska nel libro *Jezuicki vates Marianus. Konterfekt osobowy i literacki Alberta Inesa (1619–1658)*, Warszawa 2010, pp. 61–65 cerca di spiegare come capiva il concetto di parodia il poeta gesuita Albert Ines.

[37] Nell'ode I 6 di Laubanus per esempio osserviamo l'accumulo di motivi e di frasi imprestati da diverse opere di Catullo, Orazio e Properzio. Cfr. osservazioni su questo canto sparse nell'articolo di I. Bogumił, *Melchior Laubanus o Muzach i poezji*, in: J. Rostropowicz (a cura di), *Tradycje kultury antycznej na Śląsku*, vol. II, Opole 2003, pp. 65–85.

[38] Cfr. Mikołajczak, *op. cit.* (n. 19), pp. 31 e sgg. Cfr. anche elenco di temi, che scelgono gli autori neolatini di parodie oraziane nell'articolo di Niehl, *op. cit.* (n. 2), pp. 25 e sg.

ordinem et seriem Horatiani archetypi requirebant, qua Goldbergae, qua Dantisci, per otium festinatae in gratiam discentium, quibus post odarum enarrationes usum μιμήσεως in simili argumento ita ostendere hactenus placuit") avvertendo di preparare per i suoi studenti altri materiali che servirebbero all'analisi di odi di Orazio, di volumi dell'*Eneide* o di alcune opere di Cicerone. D'altra parte Laubanus inserisce le parodie nella raccolta *Musa lyrica* e le pone sul frontespizio accanto alle odi o accanto alla poesia falecea, nobilitandole in un certo senso. Eleva il materiale didattico al livello di poesia. Senza dubbio il parodiare stava diventando alla soglia del XVII secolo sempre più popolare, è possibile dunque che anche l'autore della Slesia abbia voluto aderire a questa corrente della moda letteraria. Bronisław Nadolski scrive, contrariamente alla confessione del poeta stesso, che Laubanus creava delle parodie non per gli studenti ma per il proprio esercizio in latino perché temeva che la sua lingua si distinguesse troppo da quella dei poeti romani e che fosse troppo ordinaria[39]. Il poeta neolatino non utilizza però tanto il lessico oraziano. Come ad esempio accade nella parodia 16 del libro I *De Ecclesiae orthodoxae stabilitate adversus quosvis hostes*, dedicata a Paulus Melissus[40], che è la replica poetica dell'ode I 22 *Integer vitae scelerisque purus*, dove sembra si trovino più vocaboli presi dalla poesia originale rispetto alle altre parodie[41]. La creazione delle parodie, come si può supporre, era per Laubanus un altro modo di elaborare il testo antico, diverso da quello delle odi, non privo a volte di una certa dose di divertimento, un gioco letterario con l'originale. Sul patrimonio dell'antichità ci si inclina già dal Medioevo fino al XVIII secolo per imitare, trasformare, competere, cercare idee e ispirazioni.

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[39] Nadolski, *op. cit.* (n. 8), p. 37.

[40] Paulus Melissus Schedius (1539–1602) era conte del Palatinato Renano, dalle sue mani Laubanus ricevette la corona poetica. Fra le opere di Melisso si trovano fra l'altro due libri di parodie che costituiscono una parte della raccolta pubblicata nel 1595 a Francoforte sul Meno. Materiale di base: K. Goedeke, *Grundriss zur Geschichte der deutschen Dichtung aus den Quellen*, vol. II: *Das Reformationszeitalter*, Dresden 1886, pp. 107 e sg.; Jöcher, *op. cit*. (n. 8), pt. 4, Leipzig 1751, col. 230, sotto la voce "Schede". Cfr. anche Robert, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 56 e sgg.

[41] Pp. 246 e sg.: "Grex amans veri **scelerisque purus** / **Non eget** mundi auxilio nec hastis, / Nec monarcharum manu amiciore, / Paule, potentum. / **Sive** damnatae rabiem cohortis, / **Sive** sensurus truculentiorem / Cerberon, **vel qua** misere et renatos / Noxia vexat. / **Namque** eum caelo Mediator alto, / **Dum** Patris dextrae propior potenti / Casibus cunctis sedet exsolutus, / Servat **inermem**. / **Quale** munimen **neque militaris** / Turcia in regnis habet universis, / Papa nec fallax gerit orthodoxo in- / fensus ovili. / **Pone** nos, caecis **ubi** nullus oris / Est locus vero generosiori, / **Quod latus mundi** tenebrae et **malignus** / Fascinat error. / **Pone sub** regno **nimium propinqui** / Hostis **in terrâ** Superis **negatâ** / Ipse nos Christus sua membra fulcit, / Ipse tuetur". Con il grassetto sono state indicate le parole trasferite qui dal modello antico. Cfr. per es. il canto I 7 con l'incipit *Innocens vitae similisque puro* di Joachim Bielski.

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RETHINKING THE CULTURAL SETTING OF CAESAR'S "I AM CAESAR, NOT *REX*": A NOTE*

by

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Abstract: This short paper deals with a well-trodden topic, Caesar's avoidance of embracing the title *rex*. At the centre stands his famous saying "I am Caesar, not *rex*", which was explained mainly by Roman domestic policy. However, this point of view helps only partly to understand his reasons for refuting the title; in the following lines I propose that Caesar's dismissal of the title *rex* may also have been affected by his political experience with eastern and western foreign kings on the outskirts of the Roman Empire.

When Caesar returned from the *Feriae Latinae* in the Alban Hills and arrived at Rome on January 26, 44 BC, the crowd welcomed him as king. He, however, rejected their praises by alluding to the *cognomen* Rex of the Marcii family: "Caesarem se, non regem esse" (Suet. *Iul*. 79, 2; Caspari: *Regem*)[1]. Most modern scholars see behind the pun a veiling of his true intentions to become king in

* I wish to thank the journal's Editor Jakub Pigoń for helpful comments. Translations of Livy's *History of Rome* and of Cicero's *Letters to Friends* are taken from the Loeb editions of F.G. Moore 1943 and D.R. Shackleton Bailey 2001 respectively.

[1] For an introduction to the topic, see Kraft 1952/1953: 39–58; Dobesch 1966: 71–103; Rawson 1975; and now Luke 2012; for the bigger picture in the 40ies, Jehne 1987; Meier 2014; regarding the wordplay, Deutsch 1928; and on the title *rex* in general, Sigmund 2014. Furthermore, it is not unusual for Caesar to make a self-reference; we know of at least three other statements where he did so. The first "Quid times? Caesarem vehis!" (Flor. II 13, 37) was uttered during his attempt to reach Brindisi with a little boat in 48 BC. The second "se Caesarem esse fidemque praestaturum" (*Bell. Hisp*. 19, 6) was expressed during his siege of Ategua in 45 BC; cf. Tschiedel 2012: 43, n. 24. The third came after the battle of Pharsalos: "Hoc voluerunt; tantis rebus gestis Gaius Caesar condemnatus essem, nisi ab exercitu auxilium petissem" (Suet. *Iul*. 30, 4). This particular form of self-display of Caesar invalidates the assumption that his saying in the Suetonian Life was a fabrication by Suetonius himself; for that and with further literature, see Sigmund 2014: 347 with n. 263.

Rome[2]. Richard Billows stands in opposition to this view, writing that: "we surely have to accept Caesar's public acts rather than unsubstantiated rumours. Caesar had made it clear that he did not wish to be king [...]. All the actual title *rex* could have brought him was further hostility..."[3]. Ancient authors like Plutarch, Appian and Cassius Dio[4], demonstrate that these rumours were spread by his political enemies and that they were also the masterminds behind the acclamation[5]. Recently Trevor Luke has argued that this incident and the wordplay cannot be reduced to the problem of evading political libel[6] or to the question of whether Caesar aspired to kingship. On the contrary, Caesar forsook being king for the Republic's sake whilst he searched for an adequate model for being the first man in Rome[7].

But there were not only political reasons to reject the designation *rex*; it can be shown that Caesar even had a cultural motive for refuting it. One point should be made clear from the outset, that Caesar's joke is not entirely Roman in its context. Reducing his saying to a discussion of a change of the Republican regime, neglects the fact that the Romans of the Late Republic generally saw kingship as a foreign phenomenon, which provided Caesar with one further reason for avoiding the title.

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[2] Cf. Kraft 1952/1953: 40, n. 187; Dobesch 1966: 71 f., n. 107; Luke 2012: 267–269. Some believed that Caesar sought to become a Roman *rex*, reviving the bygone monarchy; other thought that he wanted to establish a Hellenistic monarchy, e.g. Welwei 1967: 58–68 (= id. 2004: 184–194); an overview is provided by Gesche 1976: 154–158.

[3] Billows 2009: 246. See also Kraft 1952/1953: 39 f., n. 186, 45; and Rawson 1975: 148–150, 158 f. Even without the title *rex*, Caesar's honours and his behaviour were kingly to his contemporaries: e.g. "ecce tibi, qui rex populi Romani dominusque omnium gentium esse concupiverit idque perfecerit" (Cic. *Off*. III 83); βασιλέα τε αὐτὸν ἀπέφηνεν ἀκόντων, εἰ καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν οὐκ ἐδέχετο (App. *Civ*. II 150), cf. Jehne 1987: 209. Hereof Sigmund (2014: 179) writes that Caesar's manner aimed at "Austesten, wie weit er bei seiner Selbstdarstellung gehen konnte und wie groß die allgemeine Akzeptanz einer Königsherrschaft war"; cf. also his remark that Caesar "wie ein König, aber qua Diktatur in einem verfassungsrechtlich eingebundenen Amt [herrschte]" (p. 177).

[4] Plut. *Caes*. 60, 1 f.; App. *Civ*. II 108; Cass. Dio XXXXIV 9 f.

[5] Gardner 2009: 66. Cf. Jehne 1987: 183, n. 81; 282 f. with n. 74; and Meier 2014: 48–50, who speaks about a "gescheiterten Reperaturmaßnahme" by Caesar.

[6] Following Erskine 1991, their origin should be seen in Rome's encounters with the Hellenistic kings of the East in the second century BC; see also Rawson 1975, who describes the ambiguous meaning of the title *rex* and its development: "on the one hand, there was the Greek belief, now familiar in Rome, that a king was a supremely good ruler [...]; on the other hand, there was the idea – both Greek and Roman – that kings and liberty were irreconcilable, and kings above all associated with cruelty" (p. 149) and notes that in the first century BC "*regnum* and a *rex* [...] had become a more present threat at Rome" (pp. 156 f.). In addition Sigmund (2014) shows that during the middle and late Republic a contrast existed between an antimonarchic cultural memory and a monarchic representation of senators; for other meanings and uses of *rex* in the late Republic, see Sigmund 2014: 9–21, 138–164.

[7] Luke 2012: 281; cf. North 2008, who comes to a similar conclusion in the refusal of the diadem at the Lupercalia.

Let me start with his own writings: in the *De Bello Gallico* Caesar calls some of the chieftains of Germanic, Gallic and British tribe's *rex/reges*; for example Ariovist who is entitled *rex Germanorum* (*Gall*. I 13, 10)[8]. Furthermore, Caesar used the title as an instrument for his own political purposes, as in the cases of the installed kings Commius, Tasgetius and Cavarinus, who he found (for a short time) to be steerable tools (*Gall*. IV 21, 7; V 25, 1 f.; V 54, 2). This interference in the inner affairs of a Celtic tribe was not only a common method by which Caesar gained control over them, but was also imitated by people who were unpopular among their tribe like Dumnorix, who declared himself king as elected by Caesar (*Gall*. V 6, 2). Aside from Caesar, the senate had a similar attitude towards some of these foreigners; the usual formula for those allies was *rex sociusque et amicus*[9]. These foreigners and the Romans certainly had different ideas of kingship, but the terminology *rex/reges* used by Caesar and the senate exhibits a comprehension of the structure of their leadership[10]. At the same time all these forms of leadership encapsulated in one term only conveyed a foreign and more often a barbaric form of rule to Caesar and the Romans[11]. Therefore, to call himself *rex* would not be compatible with his own view, which was also the Roman view[12]. If we consult Liv. XXVII 19, 3–5, it should become clearer what is meant:

> Circumfusa inde multitudo Hispanorum et ante deditorum et pridie captorum regem eum ingenti consensu appellavit. Tum Scipio silentio per praeconem facto sibi maximum nomen imperatoris esse dixit, quo se milites sui appellassent; regium nomen, alibi magnum, Romae intolerabile esse. Regalem animum in se esse, si id in hominis ingenio amplissimum ducerent, taciti iudicarent, vocis usurpatione abstinerent.
>
> Then the crowd of Spaniards, both those previously surrendered and those captured the day before, flocked round him and with great unanimity hailed him as king. Thereupon Scipio, after silence had been secured by a herald, said that his highest title was that of general-in-command; with that his soldiers had addressed him: the title of a king, elsewhere in high honour, was not to be endured at Rome. As for his

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[8] Other foreigners with the title *rex* mentioned in the *BG* are: Voccio, king of Noricum (I 53, 4); Galba, king of the Suessiones (II 4, 7; II 13, 1); the ancestors of Piso Aquitanus (IV 12, 4); Mandubracius, king of the Trinovantes and his expeller Cassivellaunus (V 20, 1); the four kings of Cantium (V 22, 1); the two kings of the Eburones, Ambiorix and Catuvolcus (V 26, 1 f.; VI 31, 5); Vercingetorix, king of the Arverni (VII 4, 5); Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobroges, and his father Ollovico (VII 31, 5; VII 46, 5); cf. Barlow 1998.

[9] See Braund 1984: 23–27.

[10] Dunham 1995: 112; Burns 2003: 99 f.

[11] E.g. Cic. *Fam*. IX 15, 4; cf. Sigmund 2014: 40–42. On Caesar's image of the barbarians in the *BG*, see Dauge 1981: 105–110; and now Grillo 2012: 108–110.

[12] A similar notion, but in reference to the Hellenistic monarchs, is made by Kraft 1952/1953: 44: "Sich als diadembekrönter *rex* unter diese Marionettenfiguren [*scil*. hellenistischen Monarchen] einzureihen, paßt wenig zu einem Caesar...".

> having the spirit of a king, if they thought that was the noblest thing in the nature of man, let it be their silent verdict; from the use of the word let them refrain.

After Scipio's victory at the Battle of Baecula in 208 BC, the defeated and captured Iberians hailed him as king, which he rejected. According to Herbert W. Benario, this passage probably alludes to the political situation of Augustus in the thirties and twenties but at the same time recalls Caesar[13]. The similarity between the two events – Caesar's arrival at Rome and the aftermath of Scipio's victory – cannot be denied. In both the central figure is acclaimed by a large group of people as king, and in both cases he subsequently refuses with an almost identical explanation: to hold another position or to be given a different title, but definitely not to be a king. Scipio proceeds one step further, explaining in a more general way why he denied the title of *rex*: first, it opposes the Roman understanding of reign and second, that it may be the highest awarded title somewhere else, but not in Rome. Without wanting to snub the Iberians, he implies that *rex* refers to their barbaric system of ruling. Livy appears to confirm this interpretation when he later calls the Iberians *barbari* (XXVII 19, 6).

Yet the same holds true for Caesar's case[14]. I would further suggest that there was even a cultural motive for him to deny the appellation; if he agreed to be called *rex*, he would stand on the same cultural stage as the barbaric tribes that he had subdued and made pliable with the title of king. A joke by Caesar, recorded in a letter by Cicero from 54 BC, illustrates his contempt for the title very well: "M. <Cur>ti filium, quem mihi commendas, vel regem Galliae faciam; vel hunc Leptae delega, si vis..." (Cic. *Fam*. VII 5, 2). Caesar asks Cicero mockingly if he should make M. Curtius' son a Gallic king or rather send him to one of his friends, Q. Paconius Lepta. Of course, *rex Galliae* is not a real job, but just a joke. Cicero quoted it verbatim on behalf of another protégé, this time C. Trebatius Testa (Cic. *Fam*. VII 5). However, the saying shows, in connection with the aforementioned passages of the *De Bello Gallico*, that the title was nothing other than a pawn in his hands – an instrument for foreign affairs and for political sneering. A remark by Cicero in a letter to L. Papirius Paetus from 46 BC proves this attitude of Caesar and also the Roman political predominance against Eastern kings who ruled kingdoms which were by no means barbarian (Cic. *Fam*. IX 15, 4):

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[13] Benario 1999: 6; see also Erskine 1991: 107, 118; and Rawson 1975: 154. Polybius writes on the same episode (X 38 and X 40), but without speaking like Livy about the different perceptions of the title *rex* in Rome and elsewhere. For a closer reading of both passages, see Aymard 1954; and now Levene 2010: 157–159.

[14] Although the title *rex* was ineligible, Caesar conveyed like Scipio a *regalis animus*, see on Caesar Rawson 1975: 148 f., and on Scipio Sigmund 2014: 234 f.

> Romae cum sum et urgeo forum senatus consulta scribuntur apud amatorem tuum, familiarem meum; et quidem, cum in mentem venit, ponor ad scribendum et ante audio senatus consultum in Armeniam et Syriam esse perlatum, quod in meam sententiam factum esse dicatur, quam omnino mentionem ullam de ea re esse factam. Atque hoc nolim me iocari putes. Nam mihi scito iam a regibus ultimis adlatas esse litteras, quibus mihi gratias agant, quod se mea sententia reges appellaverim, quos ego non modo reges appellatos, sed omnino natos nesciebam.
>
> When I am in Rome, up and down the Forum, decrees are drawn up at the residence of your admirer, my very good friend. What is more, when it happens to occur to him, I am put down as present at drafting, and I hear of some decree, allegedly passed on my motion, reaching Armenia and Syria before I know that there has been so much as a mention of the matter concerned. You must not think I am joking. Let me tell you that letters have been brought to me before today from monarchs at the other end of the earth, thanking me for my motion to give them the royal title, when I for my part was unaware of their very existence, let alone of their elevation to royalty.

The *amator tuus*, *familiaris meus* is Caesar[15], who repeatedly put down Cicero's name as backing decrees without informing him. Cicero complains about this singlehanded method of *appellatio* of foreign rulers. In his view Caesar does as he pleases when he awards new *reges*. Then, in dead earnest, he mentions receiving letters of thanks from those who are to him totally unknown kings. Again Cicero criticises Caesar here albeit very delicately; this time for granting the title of king to apparently completely insignificant sovereigns. At the same time his statement is not just an individual criticism; it also reveals a sense of political disdain and cultural superiority to foreign kingship. That was very Roman indeed, as shown by Benjamin Isaac[16]; it arose from the Roman expansion efforts in the second century BC and increased considerably in the first century BC[17].

Taken together, Caesar used, as other did[18], the title *rex* as a mockery, but usually it was a political tool for him to bestow the title of king upon foreigners, as he did during his proconsulate in Gaul and his dictatorship after Pharsalos. Therefore, and considering his almost autocratic position at the beginning of 44 BC, calling himself *rex* would have been not only inappropriate due to the Roman aversion for the title, but also improper given the Roman relationship to foreign kings. Since his rise to the top of the Roman Empire set him above the Roman client kings, he had to find a different way to describe his position if he

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[15] On that, see Tyrrell, Purser 1918: 427, n. 4.

[16] Isaac 2004: 304–323.

[17] In this context Rawson (1975: 157 f.) suggests that a cause for Roman arrogance was the decline of the Hellenistic kingdoms in the first century BC; Sigmund (2014: 52), on the other hand, argues in favour of a Roman *odium* towards foreign kings.

[18] Cf. Gardner 2009: 60.

did not want to be placed on the same level with them. So, even from a wider cultural perspective, the title *rex* was not suitable within the Roman sphere and for that reason, *inter alia*, it was inappropriate for Caesar.

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THE VOCATIVE IN GREEK AND LATIN: SOME REMARKS ABOUT SERGUEY SHARYPKIN'S ARTICLE

by

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ABSTRACT: In "Eos" CI 2014 Serguey Sharypkin published an article dedicated to the status of the vocative, and actually of the noun forms in vocative, in Greek and Latin. In conclusion the Author states that the vocative is not a case but it is a form of calling and addressing someone, which in certain usages, i.e. with predicatives in the 2nd person or in the imperative, behaves as a case and may be described as a case. He substantiates his opinion by claiming that only in the aforementioned contexts the vocative form manifests a syntactic agreement with the verbal predicate in sentences, while in all other usages it is deprived of such syntactic relationship. The present paper contains some polemical remarks concerning the theoretical status of the case as an inflectional category and the functional status of the vocative forms, as well as the alleged syntactic relationship between the vocative forms and the verbal predicatives, as described by S. Sharypkin.

In the second fascicle of "Eos" CI 2014 Serguey Sharypkin published an interesting article entitled *Zum kategorialen Status des Vokativs. Der Vokativ in den klassischen Sprachen* (pp. 285–310). It constitutes an in-depth analysis of the grammatical status of the vocative in the Ancient Greek language and in Latin, which was conducted against a broad comparative (Indo-European) background, including the diachronic perspective. By adducing the opinions and positions of other scholars regarding the problem in question, the Author presented his own original methodological and interpretative concept, which in my opinion deserves to be discussed. Therefore below I present a number of reflections and critical remarks concerning S. Sharypkin's article, and at the same time I would like to thank the editors of "Eos" for enabling me to publish them.

The structural axis of the aforementioned article concerns the pursuit of an answer to the question which the Author himself asked in the opening part of the article in question, namely: Is the vocative a case? If so, what type of case is it? If not, what is it? ("Ist der Vokativ ein Kasus? wenn 'ja', was für ein Kasus ist es? wenn 'nicht', was ist er dann?", p. 285). As he provides an answer to the first of these questions, the Author reaches the conclusion that the vocative is not a case ("Der Vokativ ist kein Kasus", p. 310). From the line of reasoning that is presented, it follows that the argumentation which speaks in favour of such

a conclusion amounts to the following: from the syntactic point of view, the vocatives or vocative syntagmata stand beyond the sentences within which they are located ("stehen die Vokative bzw. die Vokativgruppen, syntaktisch gesehen, außerhalb der jeweiligen Sätze", p. 297); the vocative does not manifest any syntactic relationships with the sentence in which it was used ("[der Vokativ] besitzt keine syntaktischen Beziehungen zum Satz, in dem es untergebracht ist", p. 299). Therefore, this argumentation makes reference to the syntactic criterion – to be more precise, to whether the vocative form is or is not syntactically linked with other elements of the sentence in which it is located. In order to verify the plausibility of such argumentation and thus the validity of the conclusion which is drawn from it, one must check whether the vocative actually does not fulfil the definitional criteria of the case, i.e. to make reference to a (particular) definition of a case as such. In this regard, there is no doubt that the case is a concept which is definable in morphological categories, and such a definition of a case, which treats the case in reference to morphological criteria, is provided by the Author of the article himself:

> Der Kasus stellt eine morphologische Kategorie dar, die durch ein System einander gegenüberstehender Reihen von Formen ausgedrückt ist, wobei diese Formen der Wiedergabe der Beziehung einer Größe zu einer anderen dienen. In den klassischen Sprachen werden durch die Kasusmorpheme auch zugleich der Numerus und (nicht immer) das Genus formal gekennzeichnet (p. 286).

Therefore on the basis of the definition formulated in this manner one should inquire whether the lexical form of the vocative is an exponent (of the value) of such an (abstract) category, which expresses itself through the system of lexical forms (of the same lexeme), which indicate the mutual functional diversification by the intermediation of morphological means (morphemes). In my opinion, the answer to this question must be positive, which is proven by the existence of forms such as *domine*, *Marce*, etc. in the Latin language or ἄνθρωπε, γεωργέ in Greek, which without doubt belong to the formal paradigm of the lexemes *DOMINUS*, *MARCUS* and ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ, ΓΕΩΡΓΟΣ (respectively), and which preserve the formal and functional separation in reference to all other lexical (inflectional) forms which represent these lexemes. The situation is not altered by the fact that for a large group of nominal Latin and Greek lexemes the forms of the vocative are homonymous in reference to the forms of the nominative, because the quantity of the values of a given inflectional category is a systemic property (as was indicated in the aforementioned definition), and hence it is defined by the number which constitutes the maximum of the values which may be expressed within its framework by lexical forms representing the lexemes of a given class (i.e. the lexemes which belong to a given part of speech). If it were otherwise, one could e.g. assume that the nouns of the second Latin declension do not have a dative (only an ablative), or the reverse: they do not have

an ablative (only a dative), because in their formal paradigm there are no two dissimilar forms, to one of which one could ascribe the status of (a representative of) the dative, and to the second – the ablative. Therefore, such instances of syncretism (homonymies) within the inflectional system also have a systemic nature and they do not limit themselves exclusively to the opposition: nominative/vocative; therefore they do not constitute a basis for postulating an elimination of a value from the system. As we can see, the vocative is surely a case, and to be more precise: within the category of a case there is a value such as the vocative, and in the formal paradigm of each nominal lexeme there are such lexical (inflectional) forms which express this value.

As far as the functional aspects are concerned, the differences between lexical forms which represent various values of the category of case consist in the distinctness of the relational functions performed by these forms within the semantic and syntactic structure of the utterance (the sentence). Thus in the case of the homonymy of lexical forms, the basis for the identification of the value which they represent is the function (determined by this value), which they perform within the utterance (the sentence). Such a situation occurs in the case of homonymous forms representing the aforementioned Dat./Abl. of the second declension, and also in the case of forms representing the Dat./Abl. plur. of all declensions or the Nom./Acc. neutr. sing. and plur. of all declensions. There is no reason why such a situation would not also occur in the case of homonymous forms representing the Nom./Voc. In conclusion: since we assume that the case is a concept in the field of morphology (inflection, to be more precise), the criterion for considering whether given lexical forms represent some value within the category of the case or not has to be based on the morphological factor, and the functional characteristics associated with these forms should simply be noted.

However, the Author asserts that the vocative is not a case, and in answering the question of what the vocative actually is he claims that it is a form of calling and addressing someone ("es ist eine Anrufs- und Anredeform", p. 310). Therefore he identifies it as a lexical form of a pragmatic function (and he does so correctly). However, he does not define either the syntactic status of this unit or its general grammatical (inflectional) status. As far as the syntactic status is concerned, he merely points out that it does not enter syntactic relations with other components of the sentence (syntactic parts). But the form itself is also a component of the sentence. What type of component is it? It is known that the sentence does not consist merely of elements constituting its objective layer, which creates the so-called represented world and which is constituted by syntactic elements (subject, attribute, predicate, complement, adverbial), between which there are syntactic links and which thus constitute its syntactic structure. A sentence may contain also such components which lie beyond its syntactic structure and which constitute its so-called textual layer, serving the author of the utterance in realising a particular send/receive

strategy. This strategy enables the achievement of the desired communicative goals, such as creating the rhetorical consistency of the text by the appropriate incorporation of the subsequent segments of the utterance into a context, ascribing an appropriate modal perspective to the expressed content, the appropriate contouring of the structure of the utterance, expressing emotion, influencing the emotions of the recipients or activating their attention. Nowadays one generally ascribes the status of textual operators to these components, and due to the diversification of the particular functions which they perform one distinguishes e.g. the operators of inter-utterance reference (*then*, *therefore*, *moreover*; Lat. *igitur*, *itaque*, *ergo*, etc.), modal operators (*perhaps*, *maybe*, *without doubt*, *probably*, *may it...*, *let it...*; Lat. *forte*, *certe*, *plane*, *potius*, *utinam*, *ne*), the operators of presupposition (*even*, *finally*, *only*, *already*, *still*; Lat. *etiam*, *demum*, *modo*, *iam*, *tandem*), emotive operators (*oh*, *ah*, *hey*, *damn it!*; Lat. *heus*, *hem*, *eia*) and finally the appellative operators which are constituted exactly by the vocatives performing various pragmatic functions indicated on p. 286 of Sharypkin's article, in paragraphs 1–4. Let us add that the operators may have also a complex nature by assuming the form of syntagmata (including sentence syntagmata) independently of the syntactic structure of the sentence to which they belong, e.g. "bloody hell..."; "as far as my attitude to this matter is concerned...", etc. In a similar manner the appellative operators may take the form of appellative expressions (syntagmata) with the vocative as a constituent (principal) element, e.g. Lat. *Video, patres conscripti...*; *Pater noster, qui es in caelis, sanctificetur...* (cf. *Vokativgruppen*, p. 297).

Therefore the nouns in the vocative constitute appellatives (appellative operators) in the structure of the sentence or constituent elements of appellative syntagmata. And this is what the difference between nouns in the vocative and nouns in other cases consists in – that the nouns in the vocative primarily form appellatives, whereas nouns in other cases primarily constitute syntactic elements (subject, complement, etc.). However, this difference cannot furnish a basis for denying the vocative the status of a case. It is so firstly because the nouns in other cases may also secondarily perform functions other than the functions of syntactic elements. In his article the Author himself adduces e.g. the so-called *nominativus* (and also *genetivus* and *accusativus*) *exclamationis* or *dativus ethicus* (p. 306), which perform pragmatic functions as emotive operators; therefore we would have to say that in these expressions there is no nominative, genitive or dative because they do not perform the function of a syntactic element of the sentence in which they are located. And secondly, even if we assumed that the vocative, due to its primary performance of the function of an appellative operator in the sentence (and not of a syntactic element), is not an inflectional form representing a particular value of the category of the case, the following question arises: what is it then? An inflectional form representing some value within some other inflectional category? Then

what type of category would that be? And if it is not any inflectional form representing an inflected lexeme within some inflectional category at all, it means that it is a separate lexeme, therefore one should enhance existing dictionaries by inserting all vocatives as separate entries (lexical units). As we reject this absurd option we must therefore assert that because the morphological properties of vocative forms determine their status as inflectional forms representing a definite value within the category of the case (and number), one should ascribe to this category, in reference to nominal lexemes, a broadly conceived function of an index of the position occupied by a given nominal form within the semantic and syntactic structure of the utterance (sentence). In this regard the nominative (primarily) indicates that the form which is marked with this value occupies a position which is basic for nouns, i.e. the position of the grammatical subject in the syntactic structure of the sentence. This constitutes the foundation for the oppositeness of the nominative (*casus rectus*) in reference to the remaining cases, i.e. the so-called oblique cases (*casus obliqui*), which are indices of other (than the grammatical subject) positions occupied in the sentence by nominal forms which occur in these cases, i.e. positions which are secondary for a noun. Within the oblique cases the vocative opposes the remaining *casus obliqui* by the fact that it constitutes the index of the use of the nominal form in the function of the appellative, i.e. a textual operator which is located beyond the syntactic structure of the sentence, whereas the remaining oblique cases signalise the use of nouns in the function of non-subjective elements of the syntactic structure of the sentence, i.e. in the function of a complement, attribute or an adverbial. Doubts concerning the status of the vocative as a case result mainly from the fact that vocative forms oppose the remaining case forms as the ones which do not co-constitute the syntactic structure of the sentence. However, the status of a given lexical form as an inflectional form is determined by its morphological features, i.e. its position in the network of regular formal and functional oppositions constituted by the remaining lexical forms of a given lexeme, instead of arbitrarily established functional characteristics of a given inflectional category as such (in this case one that is narrowed down to signalise the position exclusively within the syntactic structure).

However, S. Sharypkin, who shares the aforementioned doubts, asserts that in certain usages the vocative behaves (functions) as a case and it may be described as such ("Der Vokativ ist kein Kasus – es ist eine Anrufs- und Anredeform, die sich jedoch in einigen ihrer Verwendungen wie ein Kasus verhält und dementsprechend als Kasus beschrieben werden kann" – p. 310). The scholar is inclined to make this assertion because in his opinion, the vocative form manifests a syntactic relationship with the verbal predicate in sentences, in which the predicate appears in the 2nd person (cf. Position 3, pp. 299 f.) or in the imperative (cf. Position 4, pp. 300 f.), i.e. in sentences of the following type:

Αἰνότατε Κρονίδη, ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες;
"Fearful son of Cronos, what is the word that you have spoken?"

Tityre, tu silvestrem Musam meditaris.
"O Tityrus, you compose pastoral poetry."

Κατάβα, πανοῦργε.
"Go away, scoundrel!"

Discede, miselle.
"Go away, you poor thing!"

In terms of an argument in favour of his thesis the researcher makes reference to the fact that if the value of the category of the number of the verbal predicate in these sentences changes, also the value of the category of the number of the vocative must change, and therefore:

Αἰνότατοι θεοί, ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπετε;
Amici, vos silvestrem Musam meditamini.
Κατάβητε, πανοῦργοι.
Discedite, meselli.

This change is supposed to prove that between the vocative and the predicate a syntactic relationship of congruence is established, and this consequently is intended to indicate that in such sentences the vocative, apart from its pragmatic function, also performs the syntactic function of a subject. This is how the process is described by the author himself: "Der Vokativ kongruiert hier freilich mit dem wichtigsten Glied des Satzes – mit dem die Funktion des grammatischen Prädikats ausübenden Verbum. Die Kongruenz ist zweifelsohne ein Mittel, um syntaktische Beziehungen herzustellen" (p. 300). Further, the Author refers to analogous examples elsewhere:

> In der dritten Position drückt der Vokativ die Funktion des Subjektes aus, anders gesagt – die eines Agens. Das Verb nimmt dabei die Form der 2. Person an:
>
> *Bene legis, amice.*
> "Du liest gut, Freund."
>
> An dieser Position ist der Vokativ mit dem finiten Verb nicht nur pragmatisch, sondern auch syntaktisch verbunden, was in den oben angeführten Beispielen gezeigt wurde. Ähnlich sieht der Sachverhalt an der vierten Position aus. Hier ist der Vokativ ebenfalls mit der 2. Person des Verbs verbunden, der Unterschied besteht im Modus der Verben:
>
> *Lege bene, amice!*
> "Lies gut, Freund!"
>
> Das würde uns das Recht geben, dem Vokativ den Wert der 2. Person zuzuschreiben. Genauer gesagt, hängt der Vokativ von einem in der 2. Person stehenden Verb ab,

> ähnlich wie der Nominativ mit einem Verb in der dritten Person kongruiert. [...] Der Vokativ ist also offenbar in beiden Positionen mit dem sich anschließenden Satz syntaktisch verbunden. [...] Es ist klar, dass es in der dritten und vierten Position nur um die grammatischen Funktionen des Subjekts gehen kann (pp. 306 f.).

The sentences which are interpreted in this way are opposed by the Author to the utterances whose vocative form is an independent one, i.e. one that lacks a direct sentence context (cf. Position 1, p. 296) and to such utterances in which it constitutes a component of the sentence with a predicate in the 1st or 3rd person (cf. Position 2, pp. 296–299). The following are examples of such utterances:

> *Storax!*
> "Storax!"
>
> Μαῖα δὴ κάτω βέβακεν, ὦ πάτερ.
> "Mother went away to the underworld, father."
>
> *Ego te, o Luci, meis istis manibus educavi.*
> "I educated you, O Lucius, with my own hands."

In reference to these utterances the Scholar states that the vocative forms which are used there perform exclusively pragmatic functions. As far as it is obvious in reference to the independent (extra-sentence) use of the vocative, the statement about the lack of syntactic relations of vocative forms within sentences with a predicate in the 1st or 3rd person ("Bei allen [...] angeführten Beispielen stehen die Vokative bzw. die Vokativgruppen, syntaktisch gesehen, außerhalb der jeweiligen Sätze" – p. 297) is once again coupled with argumentation which refers to the test of the change of the category of the number of the subject (!) and the predicate, which now bears different fruit from that found in the case of sentences with a predicate in the 2nd person, i.e. the value of the category of the number of the vocative form does not change here. Sharypkin writes on p. 297:

> Wechseln wir zum Beispiel in einem dieser Sätze den grammatischen Numerus des Subjekts und des Prädikats, wird dies keinen Einfluss auf die Form des Vokativs (der Anrede) haben:
>
> > *Ego te, o Luci, meis istis manibus educavi.*
> > *Nos te, o Luci, nostris istis manibus educavimus.*

This fact enables the Author to formulate quite a radical conclusion: "An den Positionen 1. und 2. schert er [*scil*. der Vokativ] offenbar aus dem Kasusrahmen aus. Sein Gebrauch hängt von der extralinguistischen Situation ab, in der sich die Gesprächspartner befinden" (p. 299). I will also indulge in critical reflection in reference to the aforementioned means of interpreting the sentences with vocative forms that are analysed and the conclusions that are drawn from it.

Firstly, I would like to direct the attention of the reader to the question of the identification of the grammatical subject in the aforementioned sentences with a predicate in the 1st or 3rd person (Position 2). By conducting the announced test of the change of the category of number of the subject and predicate on the basis of a selected example, i.e.: *Ego te, o Luci, meis istis manibus educavi / Nos te, o Luci, nostris istis manibus educavimus*, the Author of the article himself indicated quite clearly (although only implicitly) that in both sentences it is pronouns (i.e. *ego* and *nos*, respectively) that constitute the subject. And this is true. Let us ask the same question about the subject in reference to sentences with the predicate in the 2nd person (Position 3) and in the imperative (Position 4), upon which an analogous test was conducted, e.g. in reference to the following pair: *Tityre, tu silvestrem Musam meditaris* / *Amici, vos silvestrem Musam meditamini*. It is difficult to doubt the fact that here the pronouns *tu* and *vos* (respectively) constitute the subject as well. And there is no reason to perceive in these sentences some other (second?) subject in the form of a vocative (*Tityre*, *amici* respectively) only on the basis of the fact that it expresses the same value of the category of number and person as the predicate, for this compatibility is not a result of the existence of a syntactic relation of congruence between these two components of the sentence (i.e. between the vocative and the predicate), but it is a result of the co-reference, i.e. the identity of the referent of the subject constituted by the pronouns *tu*/*vos* on the one hand, and the addressee of the appeal expressed by the vocatives *Tityre*/*amici* on the other hand. Evidence that this is not a syntactic relationship is furnished by the fact that if there is a lack of such co-reference, such congruence does not occur (cf.: *Ego te, o Luci, meis istis manibus educavi*). It is also difficult to accept the notion that only in this single type of sentence the syntactic relationship of predicative congruence is limited to the value of the 2nd person, since this relationship is based on the inflectional (and not a selective) category of the person of the verb, and its essence consists in informing about the status of the referent of the subject within the communicative act, and therefore its identification not only as the recipient of a message but also as the sender or an object which is located beyond the communicative act itself.

The thesis concerning the lack of a syntactic relationship between the vocative and the verbal predicate continues to be relevant also in reference to all of the remaining sentences with the vocative and predicate in the 2nd person (Position 3) or in the imperative (Position 4), i.e. in reference to sentences such as:

Αἰνότατε Κρονίδη, ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες;
Bene legis, amice.
Κατάβα, πανοῦργε.
Discede, miselle.
Lege bene, amice.

Also in these sentences the subject is not constituted by the vocative forms which appear in them, but by the personal pronouns which are not expressed surface-wise (σύ, *tu*, and also ὑμεῖς and *vos* in the transformational variants of these sentences with the predicate in the plural). The surface-wise omission of a lexical exponent of the subject is a common phenomenon in Greek and Latin (as in the case of many other languages, including Polish) and it concerns the process of the economy of communication. In very traditional or school grammars this is referred to as the so-called implied subject and generally speaking we come across it in the situation when the referent of a (potential) subject is identifiable in a contextual or a situational manner. Sentences with such an implied subject (one that is not expressed surface-wise), also known as sentences with an unoccupied subject position, should obviously be distinguished from the sentences which do not open a slot of the subject position, such as e.g. *sic itur ad astra*, but in the sentences which are discussed by S. Sharypkin this position is without doubt open and it may be occupied without hindrance (e.g.: *Tu bene legis, amice*).

However, according to the Author, an additional argument in favour of the existence of syntactic links between the vocative and the predicate in sentences in which this predicate occurs in the 2nd person or in the imperative is supposed to concern the notion that if such a sentence is transformed by imparting to it the form of reported speech, in these structures the equivalent of the vocative will have the status of a real, nominal subject in nominative. In reference to the first class of these sentences, i.e. the sentences with the predicate in the 2nd person (Position 3), the scholar claims the following: "Man kann auch zu Recht behaupten, dass der Vokativ des Hauptsatzes, wenn man diesen Satz in die indirekte Rede transformiert, in dessen Struktur als wichtiges Glied, das heißt als Subjekt im Nominativ, zum Tragen kommt" (p. 300). In order to illustrate this statement the Author puts forward sentences, which are supposed to constitute such transformations of original sentences with vocatives into reported speech, i.e. for example the following sentence:

Dico, quod Tityrus silvestrem Musam meditatur.

as a reported speech transformation of the following original sentence:

Tityre, tu silvestrem Musam meditaris.

In his conclusion the Author states the following: "An dieser Position ist also [...] eine Transformation möglich, in welcher der Nominativ den Vokativ ersetzt, was ebenfalls ein Zeugnis der syntaktischen Funktion des Vokativs wäre" (p. 300).

He writes in a similar manner about sentences with the vocative and with a predicate in the imperative: "Auch bei der Transformation des Satzes, wo die direkte Rede zur indirekten Rede wechselt, wird das im Vokativ stehende

Substantiv offenbar zum Subjekt des Satzes, indem es zum Nominativ überwechselt" (p. 301). Among the examples which illustrate this kind of transformation there is e.g. this sentence:

Dico, quod misellus discessit.

presented as a transformation into indirect speech of the sentence:

Discede, miselle.

Commenting on the aforementioned argumentation we should above all express doubt as to whether the sentences presented actually constitute such transformations of original sentences with vocatives, which might be referred to as their transformations into indirect speech (*indirekte Rede*). It seems that the sentence: *Dico, quod Tityrus silvestrem Musam meditatur*, if it actually constitutes a transformation into indirect speech at all, it is rather a transformation of the following sentence: *Tityrus silvestrem Musam meditatur* (and not of *Tityre, tu silvestrem Musam meditaris*). In a similar manner the sentence: *Dico, quod misellus discessit* may be interpreted as an instance of expression of the following sentence in indirect speech: *Misellus discessit* (and not of *Discede, miselle*). The problem consists in the fact that the direct address of the recipient, expressed by the noun in the vocative, is impossible to render in indirect speech addressed to a different recipient. However, if we wanted to relate to a third party the content expressed in the following sentences: *Tityre, tu silvestrem Musam meditaris* and *Discede, miselle*, then this relation (*indirekte Rede*) would have rather the following form: *Dixi Tityro, quod silvestrem Musam meditatur* and *Dixi* (*isti*) *misello, ut discederet* (respectively). If this relation was supposed to be addressed to the same recipient, the vocative appellative could be repeated, i.e.: *Dixi, quod tu, Tityre, silvestram Musam meditaris*; *Dixi, ut discederes, miselle*, but in these sentences the appellatives would assume a slightly ambiguous nature in reference to the level at which they function (*Dixi, ... Tityre / Tityre, ... meditaris; Dixi, ... miselle / discederes, miselle*). In this situation one should state that the test of "transforming into indirect speech" does not manifest any difference between the way the vocative forms function in sentences with the predicate in the 2nd person or in the imperative, and in sentences with the predicate in the 1st or 3rd person (Position 2, pp. 297–297). Therefore it cannot prove their "syntactic" function in the first series of these sentences, in contradistinction to the second series, in which these elements were supposed to be deprived of this function. As we return to the transformations suggested by the Author of the article, it is difficult to perceive the legitimacy of drawing conclusions as far as the status of the vocative in one (i.e. the original) sentence on the basis of a different sentence which does not contain a vocative and which constitutes

a transformation of the first sentence, referred to with the general term *indirekte Rede*, but performed according to formal rules which are not clear.

In conclusion, the vocative, conceived of by the Author of the article as a nominal vocative form, is, in my opinion, a case due to its morphological properties, and also due to its functional features which amount to constituting an appellative operator in the sentence. The latter characteristic is the basis for its functional opposition toward forms which represent both the nominativus (*casus rectus*), as well as other values of the category of case (*casus obliqui*), which occupy other positions in the sentence. And there are no reasons to negate its status; there is also no need to seek additional arguments for ascribing to it the status of a case "only in certain usages". Regardless of whether it occurs in sentences with predicates in the 1st or 3rd person, or in sentences with predicates in the 2nd person or in the imperative, its status as a component of a sentence is the same, i.e. it is not an element of its syntactic structure (a syntactic component), but an appellative operator functioning in the plan of the transmit/receive strategy. Thus it does not enter syntactic relationships with any other elements of the sentence except those which may potentially constitute an appellative expression (*Vokativgruppe*).

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EXOTIC ANIMALS IN THE LIFE, CULTURE AND IMAGINATION OF THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD: BIG CATS*

by

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After Alexander the Great's Eastern campaigns, new information about real and mythical creatures that inhabited distant countries began to appear in the Mediterranean world. Later expeditions by the Ptolemaic rulers to the African hinterland contributed to an even greater extent with regard to what was known about these exotic countries and also provided information about the importation of exotic animals to the Mediterranean region. The term "exotic" is used in this dissertation in accordance with the translation of Greek ἐξωτικός given by LSJ – "foreign", "alien", but is also merged with the Greek and Latin terms θαῦμα and (in plural) *mirabilia* – a "marvel". Thus, amongst the exotic animals of the Hellenistic period we can identify big cats, such as the lion, leopard, tiger and cheetah. These four named species constitute the research subject of the dissertation.

The dissertation focuses on the zoological knowledge of felines in Graeco-Roman antiquity and confronts it with currently known scientific facts. The aim of this comparison is to reveal how accurate the knowledge of big cats

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was in antiquity and to verify ancient lore in which big cats occurred. Within the discussion, the big cats appear under their Greek and Latin names λέων, πάρδαλις, πάνθηρ, τίγρις, *leo*, *pardalis*, *panthera*, *tigris* in order to avoid confusion and any erroneous translations. The secondary aim of the dissertation is to consider how Greek and Latin zoonyms can be translated into modern languages and which species of big cats, in terms of modern science, were mentioned by ancient authors.

To gain a meaningful picture of the presence of felines in antiquity, various fragments of ancient testimonies had to be carefully investigated. This includes the works of historians and geographers (Agatharchides, Diodorus, Strabo), philosophers (Aristotle, Theophrastus, Philo of Alexandria), encyclopaedists (Pliny the Elder, Solinus) and also scientific poems (Oppian of Apamea), *collectanea* (Aelian) and early Christian writings (Physiologus). Iconographical testimonies such as the Marisa frieze and the Palestrina mosaic, as well Delos and Pompeian mosaics and paintings are analysed along with the textual sources.

Scholarly discussion on the subject of exotic animals, including big cats, has up until now been quite limited. The subject is discussed and can be found in compendia such as the works of O. Keller[1] and G. Jennison[2] (with one of its appendices devoted to the leopard, its zoonyms and their identification), and J. Toynbee[3]. More recent publications include *The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life*[4] and K. Kitchell's *Animals in the Ancient World from A to Z*[5]. Significant contributions in this field include the numerous publications by the Belgian scholar L. Bodson[6] as well as the works of two Polish scholars, G. Malinowski[7] and K. Morta[8]. As for the iconographical aspect, a monograph by P. Meyboom[9] about the Palestrina mosaic is an important contribution. The role of lions in ancient culture has received some scholarly attention (i.e.

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[1] O. Keller, *Thiere des classischen Alterthums in culturgeschichtlicher Beziehung*, Innsbruck 1887 and *Die antike Tierwelt*, vols. I–II, Leipzig 1909–1913.

[2] G. Jennison, *Animals for Show and Pleasure in Ancient Rome*, Manchester 1937.

[3] J.M. C. Toynbee, *Animals in Roman Life and Art*, Ithaca, N.Y. 1973.

[4] G.L. Campbell (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life*, Oxford 2014.

[5] K.F. Kitchell, *Animals in the Ancient World from A to Z*, New York 2014.

[6] E.g. L. Bodson, *Ancient Greek Views on the Exotic Animal*, Arctos XXXII 1998, pp. 61–85.

[7] G. Malinowski, *Zwierzęta świata antycznego: studia nad "Geografią" Strabona*, Wrocław 2003.

[8] K. Morta, *Świat egzotycznych zwierząt u Solinusa*, Wrocław 2004.

[9] P.G.P. Meyboom, *The Nile Mosaic of Palestrina: Early Evidence of Egyptian Religion in Italy*, Leiden 1995.

Lonsdale[10], Brown[11], Usener[12]), especially during the Archaic period and in the Homeric poems. Discussions about spotted felines occur in only a few articles or chapters (i.e. Buquet[13]). As for the zoological aspect, Grzimek's[14] encyclopaedia is the main reference.

The starting point and the background for the discussion are the Homeric poems. Feline epithets and comparisons in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* give a picture of λέων (or λίς) and πάρδαλις as living in a forest and feeding on farm animals. The former is characterised by its mane (both male and female) while the latter by its spots. Most significant in these works however are the descriptions used with regard to the character of big cats considered as brave and mighty. These are the qualities of a good warrior, which would become topical in the following centuries. Homer's picture is further compared with vase paintings of felines of the Archaic and Classical periods. The images of lions are tendentious but cheetahs can be recognised in several black and red-figured vase paintings of spotted cats.

The main part of the dissertation begins with an analysis of one of the most important testimonies in the area of animals in antiquity, namely Aristotle's books on animals. The philosopher's biology is based on three categories (γένος, εἶδος, διαφορά) by means of which he described and compared living beings. He also systematised the animal world by detailing three features: anatomy, biology and character (μόρια, πράξεις, ἦθος). The chapter discussing Aristotle's references to big cats (mainly λέων and πάρδαλις) is divided into parts, named *moria, praxeis, ethos*, and one additional category – geographical distribution. This division also became a pattern for the analysis of all ancient sources discussed in the subsequent chapters of the dissertation.

In the Aristotelian classification lions and also *pardaleis* are wild four-footed and many-toed animals living on land; they eat meat and have sharp teeth in both jaws. These qualities distinguish them from other groups of animals. Aristotle describes the bones and internal organs of the lion, invoking their dissections. However, on the basis of the information he provides, one can assume that the philosopher was not personally well acquainted with the anatomy of the lion. He also describes the way the lion moves and its procreation; his observations on

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[10] S. Lonsdale, *Creatures of Speech: Lion, Herding, and Hunting Similes in the "Iliad"*, Stuttgart 1990.

[11] W.L. Brown, *The Etruscan Lion*, Oxford 1960.

[12] K. Usener, *Zur Existenz des Löwen im Griechenland der Antike: Eine Überprüfung auf dem Hintergrund biologischer Erkenntnisse*, Symbolae Osloenses LXIX 1994, pp. 5–33.

[13] T. Buquet, *Les panthères de Timothée de Gaza dans l'encyclopédie zoologique de Constantin VII*, Rursus VII 2012 [http://rursus.revues.org/971; DOI: 10.4000/rursus.971].

[14] B. Grzimek (ed.), *Grzimek's Animal Life Encyclopedia*, vol. XIII: *Mammals*, Van Nostrand 1972.

these matters are very apt, in contrast to the inaccuracies of the anatomical data. His treatises also describe the character of the big cats and preserve their topical image, an image that had been present in Greek literature since Homer's *Iliad*.

Some of the information evoked by Aristotle demands broader discussion and thus this information is considered in detail in the subchapters. The first issue is the disappearance of the lion from the Greek mainland, a subject which divides scholars between those trusting Aristotle's testimony, according to which lions inhabited the mountains of Macedonia during the philosopher's lifetime[15], and those opposing his evidence[16]. On this matter, the author of the dissertation agrees with the opinions of K. Usener and R. Lane Fox that the lion could be found on the Greek mainland until at least the 4th c. BC. This opinion is based upon revised zooarchaeological data confronted with iconographical and textual sources (both literary and epigraphic). The second subchapter discusses the story of a lioness conceiving only once in her life, which was first recorded by Herodotus and then repeated, but was criticised as erroneous by Aristotle. This conviction is traceable as a moralising example in a Buddhist text, *Milindapañha* (VIII 4). Of further concern is the use of τίγρις, a zoonym evoked only once in Aristotle's works, and its possible relation to the manticore. In all probability, the early instances of the word *tigris* (Nearchus, *FGrH* 133 F 7 [= Arr. IX 15, 3] as indicated by Meyboom, Aristotle, *HA* 607 A, 1–9) referred to a cheetah, whereas the animal which is nowadays known as tiger (*panthera tigris*) could have been identified under a different zoonym. The last animal that requires more inquisitive study is a story told by Aristotle that a panther is an animal that produces a beautiful fragrance by means of which it lures its victims. This myth was raised by M. Detienne[17] in an exciting discussion of insanity and erotic passion in his *Dionysos Slain*. However, Detienne did not exhaust the topic. One of several traces which can reveal the origin of the story is the habitat of *pardaleis* in Cilicia and Pamphylia, regions abundant in fragrant spices. Another trace leads to the civet. The differentiation of the zoonyms πάνθηρ and πάρδαλις is also important in this case. There is a small feline-like animal, the civet, which has a Sanskrit name *pūtīka* (or *pūtī*, which means 'stinking'). This could be mistaken with *puṇḍarīka* (etymologically related to πάνθηρ).

The second part of the dissertation analyses testimonies from the Hellenistic period. Its aim is to confront the level of zoological knowledge at the time and

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[15] Usener, *op. cit*. (n. 12), R.J. Lane Fox, *Introduction: Dating of the Royal Tombs at Vergina*, in: idem (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon. Studies in the Archaeology and History of Macedon, 650 BC–300 AD*, Leiden 2011, pp. 1–34.

[16] E.N. Borza, O. Palagia, *The Chronology of the Macedonian Royal Tombs at Vergina*, JDAI CXXII 2007, pp. 81–124.

[17] M. Detienne, *Dionysos Slain*, transl. by M. Muellner, L. Muellner, Baltimore 1979.

its subsequent development during the period of great geographical discoveries within the ancient world.

The first step of this part is to identify all the regions mentioned in the sources which were inhabited by big cats. Expectedly, the sources mention many lands now bereft of felines: North Africa, Anatolia and the Caucasus. Surprisingly, however, an animal named τίγρις could be found in Africa according to Hellenistic testimonies (cf. Ptol. *Geogr.* IV 8 [9], 4). This does not testify that tigers indeed roamed Africa, but rather shows how fluid ancient zoonyms were and that τίγρις could also designate another feline rather than the tiger, namely the cheetah.

Even more surprising are some descriptions of the appearance of the creatures being discussed. The name πάνθηρ in some instances may not in fact stand for a big cat, but a smaller feline-like creature. In case of the πάρδαλις, its hallmark was ποικιλία – its spots were emphasised in each description and compared to the appearance of islands on the sea or cities scattered on the land. In the case of the τίγρις the animal's fur also becomes its characteristic feature and is compared by Theophrastus to Calamander wood (Theophr. *Hist. pl.* V 4, 7). The next proper physical description of this Indian beast is made several centuries later by Solinus (Solin. XVII 5). Authors usually concentrate on the animal's ferocity and magnitude (Arr. *Anab.* VIII 15, 4). As for the lion, its mane is admired in literature and Agatharchides discerns four types of lions regarding their coat (Agath. frs. 68 and 69). Most troublesome in this topic are μύρμηκες – the lion-ants and their reversed genitals. However, lions do have their genital organs reversed (unlike dogs), thus this may actually be a proper description of the lion's anatomy. In Christian writings the μύρμηξ appeared as a hybrid of a lion and an ant and was attributed with a symbolic meaning. This matter is further disputed in the subchapter devoted specifically to the μύρμηξ.

Amongst the descriptions of the physical appearance of the felines, several can be regarded as fabulous. These include black lions (Plin. *HN* VIII 62) or *leopardi,* begotten by a lion and a *pardus* (Plin. *HN* VIII 42). But in fact the former could be lions that had very dark manes, while the latter could be an existing feline hybrid – the leopon. Romans in particular could have been familiar with it as this hybrid is not uncommon when lions and leopards are kept together in captivity. Moreover, this is the only big cat hybrid which can occur in natural conditions, although this is much more probable in captivity. Also, a Pompeian mosaic from the House of Faun could suggest evidence for ancient knowledge of another feline hybrid, produced through a lioness and a tiger – a tigon, as it depicts a striped lion with a mane (ridden by a cupid).

The next chapter regards the zoological observations after Aristotle. It repeats the pattern of the chapter about big cats in his zoological books and as a consequence the data is divided into Aristotle's categories. However, the character of the post-Aristotelian data has changed, and therefore the majority of information is descriptions of the behaviour and character of big cats. It is related to

a philosophical discussion which began to flourish in the Hellenistic period between Platonists, who distinguished *logos* (reason and thinking) in animals that was analogical (but not identical) to the human *logos*, and Stoics who denied it.

Strikingly, the quality of the information improves and realistic observations of the lion include its manner of walking and the sharpness of its tongue. There is also a story by Aelian (Ael. *NA* IX 1) that describes lions helping the old or weaker members of the pride, which is true. Yet, erroneous information occurs as well. Democritus claims that the lion is the only animal born with its eyes open, although in Aristotle's zoology the truth can be found, that the lion is blind at birth (naturally, occasional exceptions can appear). Fabulous stories are also repeated – such as the one of the tigress mother who pursues the kidnappers of her cubs. This tale stimulated the imagination of its readers. The tigress become a synonym of a good mother in Roman literature and the narrative was even illustrated in a mosaic adorning the floor of a villa in Piazza Armerina (the Great Hunt mosaic).

The last chapter is a summary of the visual representations of big cats in the Hellenistic period. Although Pliny (*HN* XXXVI 40) writes that some of the images of big cats were created as a result of artists observing them, regarding the region and period in which the work of art was made, they all bear signs of strong stylisation. The best and the earliest of the Hellenistic works are mosaics from the island of Delos, which was an important place on the trade route between Asia and Rome at the time they were created. On this basis we can assume that the artists were acquainted with the big cats. As for other works, although Aristotle highlighted while describing the physical features of the lioness that she does not have a mane, the Hellenistic artists (as did their Archaic and Classical predecessors) depicted the lioness as having one. Ancient authors misinterpreted feline zoonyms as much as they mixed spotted felines with one another. As a result it is not possible nowadays to translate those terms unambiguously. Also, in the case of the zoonym τίγρις, which is nowadays always translated as tiger, the identification of the animal described by this name is not obvious, since in antiquity in some cases it could also stand for cheetah.

The work ends with the final conclusions. The research on big cats conducted in this dissertation shows that the words of Homer about them were constantly repeated during all ancient periods, especially their topical courage. The Hellenistic period however, brought significant observations regarding the behaviour of these animals and their life. Many of them seem sometimes improbable. However, the analysis of modern research concerning the zoology and behaviour of big cats led to conclusions that the majority of data provided in ancient sources is based on accurate observations. However, some of them have often been erroneously interpreted. Many of the fable-like stories found in ancient texts through the course of investigation appeared to be plausible and compatible with modern observations of feline behaviour. Although on the subject of

descriptions it may seem that ancient authors wrote fantastic, coloured or even fabricated information, most of it is in fact close to the zoological truth, and testifies to their good acquaintance with the world of animals.

The work is supplemented by three annexes. The first one is the etymology of ancient feline names, which is in order to depict that it was not only Greek and Latin nomenclature that were incoherent and unequivocal in naming the big cats. In Sanskrit, for example, from which some of the zoonyms could have been borrowed, the feline names are even more ambiguous. The second annex shows the modern taxonomy of big cats, listing the various subspecies of lions, leopards and tigers. The third annex is an addition to the chapter about Aristotle and quotes all the passages in which felines are mentioned theat were discussed in the dissertation.

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THE OFFICE OF *A RATIONIBUS* IN THE ROMAN ADMINISTRATION DURING THE EARLY EMPIRE*

by

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During the Early Roman Empire financial administration was, alongside military and judicial administration, one of three major pillars of Roman government[1]. The actual functioning of central financial institutions responsible for the income and expenses of the state, both strictly imperial ones (the *fiscus Caesaris* and the *patrimonium Caesaris*) and those under the ruler's rigorous control (the *aerarium populi Romani/Saturni* and the *aerarium militare*), the formal and actual division of those institutions and the changes within administrative structure during the principate (the appearance of the *ratio privata* and/or the *res privata*) remain controversial to this day[2]. The *officium a rationibus* is one of the least researched yet most important offices of the imperial financial administration. Because of the imperial freedmen and equestrians who held the post of *a rationibus*, as well as due to the great political and administrative significance of the office, its history was largely determined by the political and administrative history of the early Roman Empire. Under the principate the office carried very high prestige with it; evidence for that includes the huge fortune and political clout of M. Antonius Pallas and Ti. Iulius Etruscus, as well as the sum of the yearly salary awarded the equestrian *procuratores a rationibus*, active from the rule of Trajan onwards (initially they earned 200,000, later 300,000 sesterces).

It is worth emphasising that little information has been preserved on the *officium a rationibus* in ancient sources (particularly in narrative ones). Most of

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1 Bleicken 1981: 135.

2 E.g. Kienast 2009: 381; Burton, Millar 2012: 579; Scheidel 2015: 235. Cf. Alpers 1995; Rathbone 1996; Lo Cascio 2000; Eich 2005; Schmall 2011.

what we know about the office, most often described in modern literature as "the ministry of finance", comes from Statius' poetic description and the accounts of Tacitus and Pliny the Younger, who concentrated mostly on the abusive conduct of the imperial freedman Pallas. Ancient authors were seldom interested in issues such as the hierarchy or specific duties or powers of offices, since they were of no interest to their readers[3] who were more intrigued by other more "sensational" matters, such as the perversions of emperors, political and other scandals, palace intrigues, conspiracies and wars waged. The authors assumed their audiences would be familiar with socio-political details of the Early Roman Empire, not excluding administrative details, and were anyway apparently not overly interested in how exactly the Roman government worked[4]. Moreover, it is likely that the Romans did not conceive of the functioning of their *officia* in terms typical of modern models, based at least in part on a clear hierarchy and a strict division of duties and prerogatives. More information, not so much on the *officium a rationibus* as on individual officials, can be found in epigraphic sources which mainly formed part of honorific or funerary monuments and often list the careers of officials. *Cursus* inscriptions are of paramount importance in researching the administration of the early Empire, because unlike narrative sources, they tend to still be published today. This is beautifully exemplified by the inscriptions I have used, published recently in *L'Année épigraphique*, which detail the careers of new members of the *officium a rationibus*[5].

While research into the *officium a rationibus* has been conducted since the 19th century, that is from the beginning of inquiry into *Altertumswissenschaft*, it has not yet attracted major attention from scholars. Contemporary literature on the subject certainly lacks a separate general study of the history of *officium a rationibus* under the principate. Not counting short encyclopaedic works, that office has only contextually featured in the reflection of historians, the subject matter of whose works could be subdivided into five rough categories: (1) the administrative, political, and economic activity of imperial slaves and freedmen; (2) the role of equestrians in central and provincial administration (mainly prosopographic studies); (3) the Roman administrative financial (or fiscal) system; (4) the organisation of the imperial palace; (5) the history of Roman administration in general. A dangerous tendency to somewhat unthinkingly repeating earlier findings without critical analysis of the sources can be observed in modern literature on the subject. It seems symptomatic that scholars today when writing on the history (and especially on the powers) of the *officium a rationibus*, keep drawing on the early 20th-century monograph of Roman administration by O.

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[3] Carney 1971: 2; Oost 1958: 125; Weaver 2005: 252.

[4] Saller 1980: 46.

[5] *AE* 1990, 69, 70; *AE* 2010, 284; *AE* 2012, 186. See also Camodeca 2012: 305–321.

Hirschfeld, and on S.I. Oost's minor paper on M. Antonius Pallas, the best known *a rationibus*, written in the 1950s[6].

In spite of numerous studies, many contentious issues remain unsolved, including the origin and exact duties of the *a rationibus* office, its structural transformations and its relationship to other financial offices. It is not quite clear whether during the early principate the office was only tied to the emperor's financial administration (*patrimonium* and *fiscus*), or also to that of the state (*aerarium Saturni*). Many questions still remain unanswered. What was the actual position of that office within the administration? How was it formed, and was it uniform throughout the Roman imperial times? Did the *a rationibus* always work close to the emperor as did court officials? Was the administrative and political position of the *officium a rationibus* influenced by the imperial freedmen, and, from Trajan's reign on, the equestrians who held it? Which career steps led the equestrian *a rationibus* to their posts? Were the *a rationibus* specialised according to the emperor's personal policy? Was there really a "process" whereby equiestrians replaced freedmen as *a rationibus*, or were instead two *a rationibus*, one *eques* and one imperial freedman subordinate to him, active side by side as per the concept of "dual procuratorships" (*collégialité inégale*; *Pseudokollegialität*)? Chronologically, too, the functioning of the *a rationibus* seems uncertain. Clearly, then, many research questions surrounding the activity of the *officium a rationibus* remain unresolved or obscure; hence the idea of writing a monograph on that important imperial office, which will stop the yawning gap in historical literature. My doctoral dissertation is comprised of four chapters with an introduction, a section on conclusions, an index of sources (narrative, epigraphic, juridical and numismatic), a list of bibliographical references and an index of figures.

Chapter One, "Selected Methodological Issues", deals with the theoretical toolbox of a historian of the Roman administration during the principate, and especially with selected problems surrounding the critical reading of sources (narrative, juridical and epigraphic), as well as methodological approaches. Terminological reflection, largely ignored in literature so far, is a vital component of the chapter. Demonstrating the semantic distinctions between the several terms used to refer to the *a rationibus* and discussing their historical and cultural background are the fundamental objective of that part of the dissertation, in which I conclude a majority of modernised terms (such as *Reichsfinanzministerium*) for ancient institutions (including the office of the *a rationibus*) are risky to use, precisely because of the temptation to mis-apply certain present-day concepts and so establish a false continuity between modern and ancient structures. Based on an analysis of original terminology (both Greek and Latin), I find it most

[6] Hirschfeld 1905; Oost 1958. Cf. Demougin 2005: 374 f.; Claes 2014: 167, n. 21.

appropriate (or methodologically least problematic) to use the terms attested to in Ancient sources: *officium a rationibus* / *rationum*, and καθολικός[7].

In Chapter Two, "The Functioning of the *a rationibus* Office within Roman Administration: Historiographic Issues", I analyse the image of the administrative role of the *officium a rationibus* in European (mostly German and French) historical literature from the second half of the 20th century onwards. In that respect I recount the findings of the forerunners of research into Roman administration, as well as the influence of the two views found in historiography, the bureaucratic and the non-bureaucratic, on presenting the story of the office of *a rationibus*[8]. The issue seems vital, because historians of antiquity have often looked for regularities or patterns governing the functioning of Roman administration, and it can be concluded that the tendency to look at Roman institutional solutions through the prism of "bureaucracy", well entrenched in scholarly discourse, has been decisive here, although Th. Mommsen's 19th-century legalistic approach has had its effect as well. In the "bureaucratic" trend, scholars saw Roman administration primarily as a kind of an organised, formal system. It was only in the 1970s and 1980s that scholars revised the way these issues had been viewed until then. Historians such as P. Garnsey, F. Millar, R. Saller, and P.A. Brunt began to question the until then dominant tendency to analyse the early Imperial Roman administration through the lens of an elaborate and organised bureaucratic system. As S. Demougin aptly noted, they pointed out two fundamental and closely related elements: the role of the emperor, and the problem of patronage[9]. Scholars ceased to expound on the stable and organised activity of Roman institutions and the strict division of the duties of their officials. In the context of my chosen topic such concerns are valid, since both these theories, bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic, have considerably influenced writings on the history of the *officium a rationibus*. Some scholars have shown that office as part of the bureaucratic structures of the "emperor's office" (*Kanzlei*), pointed to emperor Hadrian as the reformer who gave it over to equestrians, and written on the process of imperial freedmen being phased out of administration in the 2nd century. Unfortunately all these claims lead to a simplistic concept of the work of that office, which in Chapter Two I try to rectify.

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[7] The Greek title of καθολικός equivalent to the Latin *rationalis* was also an equivalent for the Latin expressions *a rationibus* and *procurator summarum rationum*; Mason 1974: 58, 141; Eich, Petzl 2000: 191–193. Other Greek equivalents of *rationibus* included [ἐπὶ]τροπος [ἀ]πὸ τῶν λόγων (*AE* 1913, 143a–b), ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου λόγων (*CIL* III 6574, 7126 = *IK* XIII 651 = *ILS* 1344; *AE* 1997, 1425), ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν κ[αθόλου] and perhaps ἐπίτροπος καθολικός (*AE* 1976, 676 = Eck 1977: 230; *IGR* IV 1627 = Eich, Petzl 2000: 190–194). Moreover, the expression ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου λόγων, confirmed not only in epigraphic but also narrative sources (Euseb. *Hist. eccl.* VII 10, 5), could refer to an *a rationibus* or a *procurator summarum rationum* alike.

[8] This chapter can also be found in a slightly changed form in Kłodziński 2015.

[9] Demougin 2001: 25.

At the beginning of Chapter Three, "The Duties and Role of the *a rationibus* in Roman Administration", I focus on describing two imperial financial institutions, the *fiscus* and the *patrimonium*, each related to the functioning of the office of interest to me; it has been necessary to discuss the evolution of these two in detail because of the effect it had on the structural transformation of the central financial administration. Later on in the same chapter I analyse the specific duties and prerogatives of the office and its administrative structure, not merely reinterpreting our basic source in this respect, namely a passage from Statius' *Silvae*[10], but also drawing on epigraphic analysis to demonstrate the complex nature of the tasks assigned to the *a rationibus*. As a central financial and budgetary institution connected primarily to *fiscus Caesaris*, the *officium a rationibus* managed (or administered) the imperial income and expenses, but it was not the emperor's cash registry and did not manage his accounts in the technical sense. It seems those technical tasks were carried out by the *procurator a loricata*, who closely co-operated or shared duties with the highest financial office. If there was a strict division of duties among the several offices of the central financial administration, it is difficult to demonstrate. The responsibility of the *a rationibus* was mainly to balance the income and expenses involved in the work of the several imperial and state financial institutions. They would control the status (that is, the expenses and income) of the emperor's assets (*patrimonium* and *fiscus*), calculate the cost of maintaining the army and minting the coin, plan imperial expenses related to public construction, and oversee the work of mines (including those in Spain and in the provinces on the Danube) and the income from grazing the emperor's cattle in Italy and from the huge imperial estates in Africa Proconsularis.

The *officium a rationibus* was active from the beginnings of the principate (likely as early as Augustus' reign) till the end of the 2nd century[11], even though equestrian *a rationibus* can be still confirmed early in the 3rd century (under Caracalla). As a result of Septimius Severus' reform of the central financial administration, the office transformed into a new administrative structure: the *collegium rationalium*[12]. In my opinion there are absolutely no arguments for the notion that there were already *rationales* active under Marcus Aurelius, when the office of *procurator summarum rationum* was created next to the *a rationibus*[13]. Thus it would appear that in the late 2nd and early 3rd century the title of *a rationibus* was gradually replaced by that of *rationalis*, and there was no specific administrative

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[10] Stat. *Silv*. III 3, 85–105.

[11] The first *a rationibus* official to be attested to for certain is the imperial freedman Anthemus, active during the reign of Tiberius: *CIL* VI 8409c.

[12] See *CIL* VI 1585b = *ILS* 5920.

[13] Contrary, Weaver 1972: 264 f.; Pflaum 1974: 65; Christol, Demougin 1990: 193; Domergue 1990: 300; Herrmann 1997: 117, n. 27; Eck 1998: 84 f., 92; Eich 2005: 162, 168 f.; Hirt 2010: 124; Moore 2012: 221, n. 3.

practice of using the two titles (*a rationibus* and *rationalis*) interchangeably from the 2nd century on. In the same chapter I investigate the notion, formulated by H.-G. Pflaum, and developed further in later literature, of a "system of dual procuratorships", whose purpose was to explain the parallel presence of freedmen and equestrians in several branches of the procuratorial administration. In my view there are no sufficient grounds to believe the principle applied to the *a rationibus* as well. Near the end of Chapter Three I touch upon the important issue of the careers of the equestrians who held the post, as well as the question of the so-called "specialisation", that is the experience in finances gained by the individual *a rationibus* during their civil service. To that purpose I follow the military and civil stages of the *cursus honorum* of twenty equestrian officials. The problem of "specialisation" has been investigated for many years and forms an important part of the reflection on the role of patronage and merit in the advancement of officials in the Roman administration, as well as on the personal policies of Roman emperors. In early historical literature (Hirschfeld, Stein, and Pflaum), it was stressed that Roman administration (and especially its procuratorial part) functioned according to bureaucratic principles (since Roman officials were professionals), the same as the "civil service in a modern sense"[14]. However, more recent scholars (such as Brunt, Saller, and Birley) saw the issue in question differently, arguing that "such specialism was alien to Roman tradition"[15]. Now my analyses indicate the prestigious office of *a rationibus* was not just a random piece in the gradually forming equestrian procuratorial administration; in my opinion there are reasons to believe that when individual officials were chosen to be nominated to this highest ranking post, their experience (*experientia*) in financial matters could have been an important factor next to their social standing, personal abilities, patronage (*suffragium*) and the emperor's will. The *a rationibus* included such officials as T. Statilius Optatus, called an *homme d'argent* by Sabine Lefebvre[16], and I believe in their case what we see is exactly a form of directional administrative specialisation.

The dissertation is completed by Chapter Four, "Some *a rationibus* Officials", which includes a prosopographic catalogue of *a rationibus* and *procuratores a rationibus* and so lays a foundation for all the discussion of the first three chapters. Making such a catalogue for the office under discussion was justified for two major reasons. First, historical material on the *a rationibus* is extremely representative. The *a rationibus* belonged to the political and administrative elite of the *Imperium Romanum* and so come up rather often in sources (mainly epigraphic ones), which is crucial in prosopographic research[17]. Second, the last scholars to have made such lists of officials, as early as in the 1960s, were K. Wachtel for

[14] Saller 1980: 52.

[15] Brunt 1975: 141. See also Saller 1980; Brunt 1983; Birley 1992: 16 f.

[16] Lefebvre 1998: 264.

[17] Cf. Sablayrolles 1999.

slaves and freedmen, and Pflaum for *equites*[18]. An incomplete list of fifteen accounting officials (both imperial freedmen and equestrians, but only those active until the reign of Hadrian) can be found in the dissertation submitted in 1970 by Walter Seitz[19], and as early as the second half of the 19th century there were attempts by L. Friedländer and É. Cuq[20] to list all the *a rationibus* active during the principate. Therefore it was obviously necessary to both make a new and up-to-date list of *a rationibus* and to analyse it. The existing biographical and other notes on *a rationibus* and *procuratores a rationibus*, scattered in diverse and technical studies and often in need of updating, did not allow new conclusions on the way that office functioned within Roman administration.

Before the main body of that prosopographic chapter, I discuss certain basic methodological assumptions and issues, whereas its core part is a presentation of the known highest ranking officials to bear the title of *a rationibus* (variously referred to in literature as *Leiter des Ressorts*, *directeur d'un bureau palatin*, or "the head of *a rationibus*"): eleven imperial freedmen and twenty-six *equites*. Finally, the last section of the chapter describes the internal structure of the *officium a rationibus*, that is its subordinate officers (who appear in literature as *Unterbeamten*, *fonctions d'employés subalternes*, and "sub-clerical officials"): in other words, the slaves and freedmen who were the *tabularii*, *proximi* and *adiutores* in the office. There is also a separate list of the *servi et liberti Augusti* who also held the title of *a rationibus*, whom I have not included among the officials proper and whose function in the *officium a rationibus* was probably very minor. That list of all the officials known to have worked in the office of *a rationibus* allowed me to verify many opinions present in historical literature.

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[18] Wachtel 1966: 117–121; Pflaum 1961: 1019. See also Pflaum 1982: 109; Ijsewijn 1987. Cf. Liebenam 1886: 90; Hüttl 1933: 194; Christol, Demougin 1990: 199–201. Biographical notes on some *a rationibus* can also be found in *PIR*, *PIR*², and *RE*.

[19] Seitz 1970: 72–87.

[20] Friedländer 1888: 171–177; Cuq 1884: 394–397. L. Friedländer (1861: 6–9) was the first in modern historical writing to list *procuratores a rationibus*, but such accounts by 19th-century authors cannot in general be termed actual prosopographic studies, and only Friedländer's work was a real attempt at making a list of *a rationibus*.

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C E N S U R A E L I B R O R U M

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James J. Clauss, Martine Cuypers, Ahuvia Kahane (eds.), ***The Gods of Greek Hexameter Poetry: From the Archaic Age to Late Antiquity and Beyond***, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2016 (Potsdamer Altertumswissenschaftliche Beiträge 56), ISBN 978-3-515-11523-0, 458 pp., €69.00.

Greek mythology has been defined as a vast collection of tales and semihistorical legends mixed with folktale themes and enlivened by poetic invention. A new book has been published in order to shed light on the last and by no means the least important part of this multi-faceted phenomenon. At first sight it looks like a post-conference volume, which it is not. It started in 2013, when Marios Skempis began organising a multi-authored book on the gods in Greek hexameter poetry. He could not finish his project, and he handed over the undertaking to those who finally edited the new work. In the preface we read that the contributors were partly invited to participate, and partly solicited to fill in gaps.

The book covers an enormous amount of poetic output. Two dozen contributors discuss Greek hexameter poetry from the archaic period to late antiquity. Hesiod is amply treated; there are chapters dedicated to *Theogony*, *Catalogue*, and *Shield*. The same goes for Homer; there are papers on the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, the *Homeric Hymns*. And the longest paper in the volume relates in detail the gods in Cyclic Epic. The book's following part contains chapters on Hellenistic poetry: Apollonius' *Argonautica*, Aratus' *Phaenomena*, Callimachus' *Hymns* and *Hecale*, and finally Moschus (we read not only about his *Europa* but are also informed about the much less well-known *Eros the Runaway*, the "wanted man"). Then we arrive at imperial poetry: not only the "post-Homeric" poets, i.e. Quintus of Smyrna, Triphiodorus, or Colluthus, are to be found. There are also chapters on Nonnus (to be precise, one and a half) and on Eudocia, the *Argonautica of Orpheus*, the *Sibylline Oracles*, and on the *Cynegetica*, early but erroneously attributed to Oppian. In addition, there is a brief epilogue on the reception of some of these texts among the Romans and by some modern authors. Two big themes are treated in this short section (Homer's gods and Virgil's *Aeneid*, and the gods in Ovid's *Fasti*); then we read about Tennyson, and finally about Derek Walcott and Alice Oswald. This last part, entitled "Beyond the Greeks", is the least comprehensive, and some may look in vain here for their beloved poets or poetry. But we get a near-comprehensive survey in the three preceding parts on archaic, Hellenistic, and imperial poetry.

It is hardly possible to relate, let alone judge, the contents of volumes of this size. Most companions that have been published since the end of the preceding century are equally difficult to evaluate. Instead, a few observations may indicate to the reader what he or she may expect. The following remarks concern the form and relate to the contents of the chapters, some of which are ground-breaking, perhaps even seminal; others sound familiar, being characterised by a broad sweep, while again other texts are minutely finished, brilliant miniatures.

First, their form. Due to the fact that some contributors are senior colleagues while others are considerably younger, the individual chapters differ greatly from each other in their approach. It is obvious that some have already worked extensively on their subjects, while others are at the beginning or at an early stage of their academic career. However, something else can be observed. Some papers focus more on ancient texts than others do. The authors of these papers, which are thoroughly written, start their argument by citing from ancient sources. The chapter on Sibylline oracles by Jane Lightfoot may serve as an example; it contains, for instance, a dozen pages on Euhemerism, giving insight into things one had no notion of before. One may also single out Adam Bartley's elegant paper on Artemis' quadriforme nature in "Oppian", i.e. Hellenistic, traditional, oriental, and imperial.

Other contributors, however, begin differently by discussing modern secondary literature. This is stimulating, it goes without saying, but the process may confuse a reader unfamiliar with the subject itself. Moreover, a few of the authors are also given to modish parlance, a mannerism that does not necessarily make their argument more convincing. Time and again, unstructured paraphrasis, void of attraction, fills many pages, but there is no disputing matters of taste.

Second, the contents. As already mentioned, great classical themes are treated. Important figures such as the Zeus of the *Iliad* (and his divine entourage) or the Poseidon of the *Odyssey* are treated as it is proper for them (by Jim Marks and Richard P. Martin, respectively), while the gods in cyclic epic are elaborately as well as skilfully treated by Christos Tsagalis. The chapters are of varying sizes, though. While few exceed 20 pages, some are considerably shorter. Being more inclined to browse through these, a curious reader is more than once surprised by the stimulating insight to be gained, for instance, on double motivation – another great classic, this time observed and analysed (by Laura Miguélez-Cavero) in Triphiodor. Once belittled as one of "the last irregular heartbeats of a moribund culture", Triphiodor appears now in a very different light. A breath of fresh air frees us from long-established aesthetic clichés. Other papers are equally inspiring. One also feels rewarded, for instance, while reading Ivana Petrovic about Callimachus' hymns as a group. Opposed to the maladjusted Homeric Olympian family, a subject of a pleasant caricature in the eyes of an intellectual as early as Xenophanes, Callimachus' hymns depict harmonious and ordered family life – an image that seems to correspond to the Hellenistic ideal of kingship, as the circumspect author rightly states.

As can be guessed from these brief remarks, an impressive array of themes emerge in this work. The volume, however, neither covers all Greek hexameter poetry nor discusses individual poems exhaustively. Thus, the book may well serve as a starting-point for further research, as the editors intend it to be. What is missing, though, is a continuous discourse, a kind of constant narrative, in short, a narrator who organises the material. In this respect, the monograph by D.C. Feeney, *The Gods in Epic: Poets and Critics of the Classical Tradition* (Oxford 1991), more than once cited in this book, set a good example, then in his times. Now we hear from a variety of learned voices, who time and again seem to live in worlds quite apart from each other. Surely, this reflects modern scholarship. Luckily, as a sort of introduction to this ever-interesting panorama, the editors provide the reader with abstracts of what is to come. Covering a highly informative 17 pages, their concise remarks are most welcome to those who wish to see in an instant whether the volume is of any use for their particular purpose. And indeed, the editors convincingly contextualise what their contributors have to say. Many more modern companions should begin in the way this book does.

If non-epic texts had been included, the work might have become indigestible. It is a pity, however, that we are never told how gods and goddesses interact in non-epic texts, i.e. texts composed with the aid of other metrical schemes than the dactylic hexameter. Time and again, this absence is a bit annoying, since texts such as Sappho's so-called hymn to Aphrodite (fr. 1) or Alcaeus' prayer, for instance, to the Dioscuri (fr. 34) invite comparison with epic texts on various levels and for many reasons. Their light-heartedness, their openly displayed assurance of the poetic "I", their smooth "easy-goingness" single them out. Of course, lyric as opposed to epic may always appear like that. Furthermore, it is attractive simply because it looks more "authentic", or at least, lyric texts pretend to be less distanced, thus encouraging a mis-reading. Yet, a chapter on these literary techniques might have been of use to some readers. Had this volume been dedicated to one epoch only, it might have been feasible to include all relevant texts, whether they were written in epic metre or conceived as lyrical texts. Perhaps someone could create such a volume one day, too.

Not only in lyric but also in epic texts, a remarkable closeness of men to the gods characterises the world of Greek myths, an essential fact that the book's concept somehow neglects, or does not highlight. Again, this is a pity, because from the first book of the *Iliad* this closeness forms a central and defining part of the human-divine relationship. From the *Iliad* onwards, the gods' influence ranged from psychological encouragement to physical assistance, but we read little about this aspect. Recently, a rather popular journal such as "Le Point" dedicated a single issue to these aspects,

a fact that illustrates their importance. Published last summer, "La Grèce et ses dieux" united texts such as the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* and even extracts from Colluthus in translation. Explained by scholars, they became accessible to a wider public.

Poets were attracted by this closeness, became attached to it, reworked it again and again (as Homer does in his repeated encounters between Achilles and Thetis). They did so because it gave them the chance to make their characters move on from one stage to another. Some poets even send their heroes on an emotional journey, from which, for instance, Achilles never returned, while Orestes made it *in extremis*, both being guided by divine forces. Moreover, it is highly entertaining to observe how poets differ in their treatment of their heroes, is it not? How cool, for instance, Orestes' madness may seem in distant Aeschylus, and how equally intensely the audience must have felt it in Euripides. Of this we do not hear much either.

Having said that, however, one must not forget that even such a well done book as this cannot treat everything we need to know to fully appreciate its theme. Reading this book, one simply wishes for more of the same, high quality.

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Johanna Leithoff, *Macht der Vergangenheit. Zur Erringung, Verstetigung und Ausgestaltung des Principats unter Vespasian, Titus und Domitian*, Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2014 (Schriften zur politischen Kommunikation 19), 266 pp., illustrations, ISBN 978-3-8471-0289-2, €45.00.

The Flavian period (69–96) is very much in vogue. Hardly a year passes without two or three books being devoted to the subject, if not in their entirety, then at least covering selected periods or issues. Here, one should mention – without going back too far – such publications as the work edited by N. Kramer and Chr. Reitz (*Tradition und Erneuerung. Mediale Strategien in der Zeit der Flavier*, 2010), J. Gering's *Domitian, dominus et deus? Herrschafts- und Machtstrukturen im Römischen Reich zur Zeit des letzten Flaviers* (2012), *Ne quid popularitatis augendae praetermitteret. Studien zur Herrschaftsdarstellung der flavischen Kaiser* by Chr. Ruffi (2012), *Domiziano. Fine di una dinastia* by U. Morelli (2014), *Nero und Domitian: Mediale Diskurse der Herrscherrepräsentation im Vergleich* by S. Bönisch-Meyer *et al*. (2014), J.O. Ley's *Domitian. Auffassung und Ausübung der Herrscherrolle des letzten Flaviers* (2016) or the collective study of the period edited by A. Zissos (*A Companion to the Flavian Age of Imperial Rome*, 2016), not to mention dozens of papers. What most of these publications share is a departure from a "straightforward" narrative written from the standpoint of "event-based" history in a linear arrangement or relying on a biographical approach. Instead, preference is given to inquiry into the rule of Vespasian, Titus and Domitian in terms of particular issues. Predominant aspects include structures of power, as well as the ideology and (self)presentation of individual emperors. After all, it is aptly noted that the lowly lineage of the new dynasty, unrelated to any of the old aristocratic families, left an evident mark on the "publicity" undertakings of the Flavians. Such efforts were intended to forge a desired image in the eyes of the Roman population and lend legitimacy to their being in power.

The book discussed here follows that path, but in a fairly original fashion. Namely, the author is interested in the extent to which "experience of the past", relating to state and society, but also directly to the new dynasty, affected the manner in which they exercised power and influenced the (systemic) shape of the principate in the Flavian era. In other words, this is about how "the Flavii took advantage of references to the past in their political dimension" (p. 77). This, however, is only the first step. "In essence, the monograph seeks to determine the degree to which discernible instances of drawing upon the past did successfully reach the contemporaries, or find out how much they correspond with our own point of view or how they become mutually interlaced [in our present-day consciousness]" (p. 14). At the same time, the author notes that in a society afflicted by the disaster of civil war, "looking to the past may have had constitutive significance", especially as in the universe of Roman notions vital importance was attached to a singularly construed *memoria*, dominated by illustrious examples (*exempla*) of great ancestors (*maiores*). In this context, "the definition of the past reflects the expectations of the present times.This inescapably invites the question how [...] the 'new' principes – Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian – tried to live up to the resulting Roman sensibility and Roman patterns of thought and action, while simultaneously exploiting that trait [i.e. the particular understanding of *memoria*] for their own ends" (pp. 10 f.). Admittedly, prior to becoming emperor Vespasian had been a senator, but he had originated from the milieu of municipal elites, so there were no *imagines maiorum* he could boast. "For the first time in around hundred years the leadership of the state (*res publica*) was assumed by an individual from outside the family circles of the Iulii and the Claudii" (p. 9). Naturally, one is thus inclined to ask how Vespasian continued the legacy of his predecessors, the political system he came into, i.e. the empire (principate), and thus to what extent he relied on earlier solutions. Johanna Leithoff (= L.) is aware that in undertaking such studies she does not enter virgin territory; the author underlines that the attitude of the Flavii to the events of the past, sometimes the fairly remote past, has been addressed by numerous researchers, but it has never been their principal concern. It tended to

be examined alongside a range of other issues or in the context of such issues. This is the reason why the book is worthy of attention.

The work is divided into three chapters. Let us note, however, that the reader may "lose their bearings", since the author provided all units of the book with consecutive Roman numerals, from I to VII. This means that the chapters the author refers to as chapters one, two, and three (cf. p 15) are in fact numbered II, III, IV, because the introduction ("Einleitung") is marked as I. Consequently, the conclusion is assigned number V, the list of illustrations number VI, and the indexes – VII. The widespread practice is to not number the parts which do not constitute the thematic core of the book, which makes the situation perfectly clear.

Successive chapters explore themes indicated in the subtitle, respectively the attainment (*Erringung*), consolidation (*Verstetigung*) and shaping (*Ausgestaltung*) of the principate under Flavian rule. It is therefore no surprise that the first (= II) chapter is entitled "The Contest for the Principate and the Significance of the Jewish War" (pp. 17–75). It has been divided thematically into two parts: the civil war (= II.1), focusing on the individual adversaries involved, and the Jewish war (= II.2), viewed in the light of its importance in image-building and the legitimisation of the new dynasty, Vespasian and Titus in particular.

With respect to the civil war, the main focus is on the conflict with Vitellius, since he was Vespasian's primary rival. The author emphasises that the victor's treatment of the defeated and above all deceased emperor was exceedingly restrained in its measures. No *damnatio memoriae* was promulgated, there was no retaliatory action against members of Vitellius' family; Vespasian went as far as taking care that his daughter was married (Suet. *Vesp*. 14; cf. p. 40). Anti-Vitellian action was not directly concerned with the person of the former opponent, but it sought to "undermine the potential of the late princeps as a symbol and source of legitimacy (of power)". Given the underlying concept of the work, it is important that Vespasian drew conclusions from Vitellius' approach to Galba and Otho. The figure of Vitellius is also associated with the question of the fire on the Capitoline Hill which raged on December 19th, 69. The somewhat later tradition (Flavius Josephus, Pliny the Elder) was unequivocal in placing blame for the burning of the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus on Vitellius, yet it seems that the matter was not as evident as these authors asserted. Consequently, the destruction of the Capitol and its subsequent rebuilding played a crucial role in forging the image of the new dynasty virtually from the first day of their assumption of power (cf. pp. 41–43).

As regards the Jewish war (pp. 55–75), its impact on the image of the members of the dynasty is beyond any doubt. The author focuses on analysing edifices erected to commemorate the victory, which simultaneously served to demonstrate the *virtus imperatoria* of Vespasian and Titus, and indirectly of Domitian as well. L. also disputes the thesis claiming that the Jewish war theme was uniformly present in the case of each of the Flavian emperors. The difference is conspicuous, the author observes, when one compares the first two rulers with Domitian, even though the latter did not neglect to exploit its chief purpose, which was to provide a foundation for the dynasty's legitimacy (cf. pp. 67–75). Among other things, the book discusses the Colosseum (pp. 58 f.), the best known of Flavian constructions, Templum Pacis (pp. 57 f., cf. also 197–205), which performed the function of a singular museum glorifying the dynasty (this was where the spoils from the Temple of Jerusalem were deposited), as well as triumphal and commemorative arches (pp. 59–61). The author emphasises that all these structures owe their creation to the victory in the Jewish war, celebrated with a magnificent triumph in 71. The only exception is the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, which burned down in 69: its construction started before the fall of Jerusalem. Still, it should be remembered that the later notorious Jewish tax (*fiscus Iudaicus*) was instituted for the sake of that very temple. Thus, the triumph over Judaea became associated with the Capitoline Hill, twice at that: after another fire which destroyed the temple in the year 80, its reconstruction was largely financed from the Jewish tax (p. 65).

Energetic construction undertakings which aimed to demonstrate the merits of the dynasty were accompanied by coinage series with the legend IVDAEA and IVDAEA CAPTA, as well as

issue of coins OB CIVES SERVATOS which alluded to the civil war. L. aptly concludes (p. 62) that the simultaneous release of those coin series into circulation deftly interwove the glory of victory over the Jews with an implicit message about the appeasement of the much less glorious internal conflict. "The closest analogy to the adopted strategy [of self-presentation] may be found in the actions of Augustus when he intensively publicised his defeat of Cleopatra, in order to obscure the memory of earlier civil wars he had waged. The similarity is palpable in the coinages AEGYPTO and IVDAEA CAPTA as well as in the closure of the Temple of Janus on Vespasian's orders. In his case, the concurrence of rise to power thanks to civil war and to victory over an external foe seems to be [...] a condensed iteration of the Augustan model" (p. 64).

Given the above, the reign of the third Flavian emperor represents an interesting case. It is widely known that he put great effort into building his image, underscoring his own achievements, including *virtus militaris / imperatoria*. However, he remained true to the principal image-shaping communication of the dynasty, i.e. the victory over the Jews (cf. p. 75). The construction and the arrangement of Titus' arch demonstrates that quite distinctly: the figure of Domitian is also represented on the relief showing the triumphal procession. Here, the author advances an interesting thesis (p. 68), observing that the Templum Gentis Flaviae, a mausoleum of the Flavian house erected towards the end of his reign in a deliberate act contributing to the "overall image" (*Gesamtbild*) of the dynasty, contained a reference to the victory in the Jewish war in the palm motif found on its reliefs: the palm symbolised Judaea. It is worth noting that the concept of the Templum Gentis Flaviae (p. 68, cf. pp. 187–197), where the remains of the Flavii were laid to rest, clearly corresponded with Augustus' idea (Mausoleum Augusti), even if it "competed" in a way with its prototype.

Chapter two (= III), devoted to the consolidation of the new order in the context of the ideal of republican freedoms (*libera res publica*, pp. 77–132), is concerned first and foremost with the relations between Vespasian and the senatorial aristocracy. "Ensuring himself its approval was the most important task of the new emperor". This was due to the fact that the character of rapport between the princeps and the Senate determined the nature of principate as a political and legal system (p. 77). Paradoxically, it involved the experiences of the past because it was the senators, especially philosophers originating from senatorial circles, who were the mainstay of the republican idea, hence by default the Senate should have been in opposition to imperial authority. The author quoted the well-known example of Helvidius Priscus, a philosopher and the only senator whom Vespasian condemned to death (III.2, pp. 90–113). Following source accounts, Helvidius is contrasted with Eprius Marcellus, a delator from the Neronian times, with whom he fiercely contended in the Senate. Helvidius clashed with the latter trying to demonstrate the Senate's significance as a bulwark of *libertas*, and at the same time remind Vespasian that good advisors make good rulers (p. 101). The ideal of *res publica* was the background to all this. According to L., Helvidius' conflict with Vespasian should be perceived as a dispute concerning "appropriate balance between the Senate and the princeps, while its relevance (at the time) resulted from the circumstances in which Vespasian ascended to power" (p. 122). In Domitian's era, discussed chiefly based on the example of Helvidius the Younger (III.3, pp. 113–123), who was sentenced to death (in 93) along with six other people, the situation was altogether different. However, the dissension was not related to the manner of coming to power. The son of Helvidius Priscus and others faced charges in a *de maiestate* trial which had not taken place under Vespasian, even less under Titus. The author shows that in the assessment of the contemporaries, their death was due to the emperor's wantonness. It is therefore no surprise that the victims – both the exiled and the murdered ones – became a key to the evaluations of the ruler and accepted as a token of the decline of *libertas senatus*" (p. 122). The final subchapter (III.4, pp. 123–132) addresses that very *libertas*. L. remarks that in 69/70 the situation resembled the circumstances after the assassination of Caligula in the year 41: it seemed that the Senate was regaining the "freedom" it enjoyed in Republican times, and that it would henceforth be able to take sovereign decisions (p. 127). There is no doubt either that officially the Flavii drew upon that ideology. "It was in that period that the

Genius of the Roman People (*Genius Populi Romani*) was coupled with the Genius of the Senate (*Genius Senatus*)" (p. 128). The latter was usually found in various representations jointly with the Genius of the Roman People. "The watershed year of 68/69 marked the beginning of the later universally adopted convention of representing both Geniuses alongside one another. The Genius of the Senate became a complement to the Genius of the Roman People but it never reached that degree of distinctiveness and religious veneration. Perceived in conjunction, both lent substance to the formula *Senatus PopulusQue Romanus*" (p. 131). The author believes that it was the Flavian era which witnessed the emergence of "a notion of ideal past, when the senate, thoroughly capable and free to shape public opinion, tended to and fostered the good of the community, of the 'Roman Republic'" (p. 132). Consequently, in spite of occasional friction, the Flavian period saw a fundamental change take place in the relationships between the emperor and the Senate. "In the context of the *Genius Populi Romani*, the debate on the role of the Senate [in the state] became more concrete under Flavians, which enabled the princeps to take steps towards internal integration. This tendency persisted long after Domitian's death" (p. 132).

The most extensive part of the book, chapter three (= IV, pp. 133–219), plays a special role in its structure. It is concerned with the principate of the Flavii acquiring a particular "nature", which arises from their approach towards the past, understood as a legacy after the reign of the Julio-Claudian dynasty ("formation of the Flavian principate in the light of legacy left by the Julio-Claudian dynasty"). The chapter comprises three subchapters, which discuss the attitude of the new rulers to Nero (IV.1, pp. 134–146), Claudius (IV.2, pp. 147–175) and Augustus (IV.3, pp. 176–214). As regards Nero, L. highlights the fact that Vespasian and his sons distanced themselves from the figure and the reign of the said princeps. Nero is a *malus princeps*, a tyrant whose action brought detriment to the people. In order to build the Domus Aurea, which was to serve the emperor exclusively, Nero confiscated the houses of the poor (*miseri*). Vespasian and Titus, by founding the amphitheatre (Colosseum), the baths of Titus and the temple of Claudius, showed their concern for the people of Rome. Works of art gathered in the Golden House were supposed to indulge the tastes of Nero and his closest circles, while those deposited in Templum Pacis, including the treasures from Jerusalem, were made accessible in an act of Vespasian's *liberalitas* to the broad masses of the *populus Romanus* (cf. pp. 135–137). "Distancing himself from Nero was a conscious decision on Vespasian's part, intended to have a wide public appeal. It found its fullest manifestation in surrendering the Golden House (Domus Aurea) in favour of a radical rearrangement of the space it occupied. The essentially negative image of Nero conveyed by ancient authors shows how effective that severance with the person of the last princeps from the Julio-Claudian dynasty really was" (p. 143, cf. p. 146).

This is accompanied with consistent efforts to restore emperor Claudius to the collective consciousness as a good ruler. Vespasian's first step in that respect was the decision to finalise the construction of the temple of Claudius, a project abandoned by Nero and even partially dismantled on his orders (pp. 149–152). "Completion of the Templum Divi Claudi by Vespasian offered a splendid opportunity [...] to draw upon the most respected – after Augustus – princeps of the Julio-Claudian dynasty, while at the same time demonstrating his own *pietas* [towards a *princeps bonus*]. In paying homage to Divus Claudius, Vespasian set a direction which would later be followed by Titus and especially Domitian, in that they deified numerous deceased members of the (imperial) family" (p. 151). Claudius became a paragon to be emulated in other respects as well. One of the foremost of these is the extension of the *pomerium*, the boundaries of the City, and then the exercise of censorship (pp. 152–169). L. draws attention to the fact that the reign of Claudius saw a concurrence of three elements: censorship of the ruler, extension of the *pomerium* of the City, and finally the celebration of *ludi saeculares*. Later, this would be repeated only under the Flavians (censorship and extension of the boundaries during Vespasian's reign and *ludi saeculares* under Domitian). However, if Vespasian and Titus, partly due to the fact that the latter grew up with Britannicus, Claudius' son, explicitly drew on the legacy of that emperor, Domitian gave priority to the Augustan model.

Still, these are merely preferences or a different placement of emphasis. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Augustus was present all the time in the image-building projects of the new dynasty. This issue is addressed in the last subchapter (pp. 176–213: "the long shadow of Augustus").

This notion is well established in historiography. The author does not find it at all surprising, since "for us Augustus is the beginning and simultaneously the central figure of the principate, an individual who by and large defines our understanding of the term 'empire'. It is hardly astonishing that all subsequent principes are measured with the same [Augustus'] yardstick [...]. Nor can there be any doubt that in evaluations of the reign of Vespasian, Titus and Domitian, the times of Augustus are adopted as the model paradigm, while Flavian principate tends to be described as 'Augustan'" (p. 176). L. obviously aims to confront that thesis with the findings of her studies. Once again, the author returns to the humble origins of the Flavii (pp. 177–179). It is underscored that unlike Galba and Vitellius (p. 178), Vespasian did not try to deny his lineage and never strove to create a fake genealogy which would have gone back to the mythical times. Paradoxically he "used the appeal [...] of the modest descent, putting emphasis on his merits and achievements. Domitian did the opposite, openly favouring genealogical elevation of the *gens Flavia*, which manifested itself not only in his accepting Sabine origin of the house [cf. pp. 179–187, 196], but also in numerous acts of deification of various members of the family, Vespasian and Titus in particular" (p. 187). Therefore, the author asserts, the notion of Sabine roots of the family dovetails perfectly with the idea of the Templum Gentis Flaviae, which in itself was anchored in Augustus' conception.

The erection of the Templum Gentis Flaviae (pp. 187–197) was a "response to the Augustan times" (s. 187). Despite what the name (*templum*) may have suggested, it was not a temple in the strict sense, but a mausoleum, a site of interment of all the deified members of the *gens Flavia* (Vespasian, transferred from the Mausoleum of Augustus, Julia Titi, the infant son of Domitian). In its essence, the edifice drew directly on the Mausoleum of Augustus on the Campus Martius, where the remains of the members of the Julio-Claudian dynasty had been deposited. The other structure which provided inspiration and reference was the Temple of Divine Augustus (Templum Divi Augusti), built on the Palatine hill, where Augustus had once lived. The Templum Gentis Flaviae was created on the Quirinal, where Domitian had been born (p. 195). This was no coincidence – the allusion to the first princeps is all too evident. The Quirinal Hill offered another advantage: it was associated with the cult of Quirinus and the Sabines, among whom one sought the roots of the Flavii. To L., the temple built there was in a way an allusion to the Templum Divi Vespasiani which stood on the Forum Romanum at the foot of the Capitol, precisely opposite the Templum Divi Iulii (pp. 194 f.).

The author analyses successive edifices linked to the Flavian emperors in a similar vein, attempting to demonstrate their ideological connection with the Augustan era. The Templum Pacis, built by Vespasian on the north-eastern side of the Forum Romanum, was to evoke connotations with the Augustan Ara Pacis and imply a strict causal relationship with the closure of the Temple of Janus, since Augustus was the only one to have done so before Vespasian (cf. p. 203). The Forum Transitorium, started by Domitian and completed by Nerva, is also argued to have been a direct reference to Augustus. L. considers it an allusion to Augustus' Porticus ad Nationes, while the entire artistic arrangement of the Forum was, according to the author, profoundly rooted in the tradition of the founder of the principate (pp. 209 f.). "The example of the Forum Transitorium may serve to determine two role models upon which Domitian drew: Vespasian, which was well within continuing the family tradition, and Augustus, the most outstanding among the principes of the Julio-Claudian dynasty" (pp. 213 f.). The Forum Transitorium represented a linking element between the Forum of Augustus and Templum Pacis.

The book is extraordinary: it shows, in a manner which may at times arouse controversy, the vibrant potential of memory (*memoria*) of the past as it was consistently harnessed to build the Flavian principate, and simultaneously to forge the dynastic identity of victors in the civil war. The author brilliantly interprets a variety of sources, compels the reader to reconsider many of

the established and widely-entertained notions, and provokes reflection. Regardless of whether we concur with the assertion that the "definition of the past reflects the expectations of the present-day", we will certainly accept the view that "the Flavian period was a final stage of a longer transformation process, which strengthened the conviction that the new system is stable and would last" (p. 219), while not precluding the necessity of adjusting it so as to meet the demands of the times. One could hazard the opinion that in the very extensive body of publications devoted to the Flavian era, the book by Johanna Leithoff has already deservedly achieved a prominent place, and I find it quite likely that it will inspire further studies pursuing their inquiry in like spirit.

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Dariusz Słapek, Ireneusz Łuć (eds.), ***Marcus Antonius. History and Tradition***, Lublin: Maria Curie-Skłodowska University Press, 2016, 290 pp., ISBN 978-83-7784-797-8, zł 35.70.

Among contemporary Polish researchers of antiquity, particularly with regard to Classical Studies, there are not many whose main area of investigation is the late Roman Republic. A series of conferences recently commenced by the scholars associated with the Department of Ancient History of the University of Maria Curie-Skłodowska in Lublin, however, offers a perspective of improvement in this field. The book co-edited by Dariusz Słapek and Ireneusz Łuć results from the second of the said events[1].

Famous individuals of ancient Rome hardly lack their modern biographers and biographies[2], but *Marcus Antonius*... was designed to be a product "of a collective authorship of a biography" ("Introduction", p. 15). The collective authorship itself, perhaps, would not be anything out of the ordinary, given the general nature of joint publications. Nonetheless, in the case of a biography, in terms of the customary covering a person's *vita* and *res gestae*, and introducing it by means of a coherent methodology, things look quite different. The scholars who started the series of conferences were undoubtedly not unaware of that and for them the character in question became a point of departure for discussing various aspects of republican (but not only) Rome. The editors of the present volume state that the least they wished to accomplish, therefore, was to present "the ending of the Republic from an original perspective of an outstanding, but after all defeated, leader and politician". I cannot help but notice that the makers of the television series "Rome", which is the subject of the last contribution (see below), a decade earlier must have had similar motivation. In a way, both enterprises were successful, but not without some weaknesses.

All the contributions, written either in English (thirteen) or German (two), are subdivided into four sections, which inform the reader about the contents of the chapters on the one hand, and, less obligatorily, determine the authors' approach as belonging to one of the following domains: history or tradition. First, I shall briefly summarise each chapter, calling attention to some problematic issues where appropriate, and next I would like to discuss in more detail some points on which I hold a different view. The first section, "War and Politics. The Interchangeability of Roles", is located on the former side of the spectrum, comprising three texts which consider Antony's military and political career.

The joint monograph begins with Norbert Rogosz's (= N.R.) chapter "Marcus Antonius as the Tribune of the Plebs (49 Year BC)". The author observes (p. 20) that one cannot reconstruct in detail the activity of Mark Antony (henceforth A.) at the time when he held the office of the tribune of the plebs. Caesar probably helped him gain the *tribunicia potestas* in order to have someone to look after his affairs in the senate after one of his close adherents, C. Scribonius Curio, left the office. N.R. pays close attention to A.'s role in communicating Caesar's proposals to the members of the senate, and then in providing him with a pretext to start the civil war. In conclusion he

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[1] The conference devoted to Mark Antony was held on 8–9 December 2014, and was preceded by one dedicated to L. Cornelius Sulla (15–16 April 2013). Cf. D. Słapek, I. Łuć (eds.), *Lucius Cornelius Sulla. History and Tradition*, Lublin 2014. The idea was welcomed by the historians from the University of Silesia in Katowice, who took on the organisation of a conference on Pompey the Great (23–24 November 2015) and Julius Caesar (21–22 November 2016). The latest conference ("Spartacus. History and Tradition") took place in Lublin on 5–6 June 2017.

[2] Cf. e.g. M. Gelzer, *Cicero. Ein biographischer Versuch*, Wiesbaden 1969; E.G. Huzar, *Mark Antony. A Biography*, Minneapolis 1978; R. Seager, *Pompey the Great. A Political Biography*, Malden [2]2002, to name but a few classic works, the very titles of which betray a biographical approach.

emphasises that this short period had a decisive impact on A.'s career. Contrary to what N.R. states at the outset, he manages to give quite a detailed account of this month in the life of the future triumvir.

In the next contribution, "Marcus Antonius as Commander and Comrade in Arms", I. Łuć (= I.Ł.) succinctly sets forth M.A.'s course through life from the perspective of his military career. The author starts with an outline of A.'s background, including ancestors and his school years. The subject proper is brought to the foreground when A. travels to Greece in the year 58 BC (p. 37). What draws attention is that, according to Plutarch (*Ant*. 2, 4: καὶ διέτριβε τό τε σῶμα γυμνάζων πρὸς τοὺς στρατιωτικοὺς ἀγῶνας), he had started his military training at the age of 25, which seems late for a Roman from a noble family. His military service, on the other hand, began in the East, where he was a *praefectus equitum* under A. Gabinius. I.Ł. tries to explain the proconsul's indulgence towards A.'s resolute behaviour (p. 39) by the former's debt to the grandfather of the latter (M. Antonius the orator), which is chronologically impossible. Huzar (*op. cit.* [n. 2], p. 27) quoted by the author in support of this view speaks of "*an* Aulus Gabinius" (emphasis mine) who "was quaestor [...] under Antony's grandfather". If this might be called a debt, it was one of Gabinii toward Antonii in general. The years A. spent in the East, and especially the conflict with Aristobulos II, gave him the opportunity to gain experience in combat and respect among soldiers. In the year 54 BC, he went to Gaul to serve under the command of Caesar, first as legate, and then, the author assumes, as a member of his staff. There follows a survey of A.'s activity in Gaul after taking the office of quaestor and during the civil war (pp. 43–47). We learn from Plutarch who, according to I.Ł., might have acquired the information from Asinius Pollio, that A. used to exercise, drink, and play the dice with soldiers. After Caesar's death and the battle at Mutina (pp. 48–53) A. found himself in a very delicate political situation. I.Ł. stresses that it was to a large extent due to his military abilities that the battle of Philippi was won, and that it is Cleopatra who should take the credit for the defeat at Actium. The fall of A., on the other hand, was caused by his love for the queen and disloyalty to the soldiers. Octavian's earlier tactical move – to take over Caesar's veterans – contributed largely to sealing his fate.

The paper by Michał Norbert Faszcza (= M.N.F.), "The Problem of Mark Antony's *speculatores*", closing this section, focuses on one detail from A.'s military career, namely the use of the so-called *cohors speculatorum*. The author's aim is to explain the presence of the words *cohors speculatorum* inscribed on the reverse side of a *denarius* minted in Egypt in the years 32/31 BC. First, he expounds the differences between the *speculatores* and the *exploratores* (pp. 60–62). Next, he offers some hypotheses, i.e. either that in the republican times scouting units existed which were analogical to those of the Empire, or that A. had prepared such troop for his campaign in Parthia in the year 36 BC, or that those *speculatores* served a purpose in the navy (pp. 62–66). Without excluding any of the possibilities, M.N.F. ultimately stands for the third one.

Another section, "Between Religion and Ideology. Memory Creation?", is devoted to both A.'s use (or abuse) of religion and the view, held by his opponents and later generations, of the triumvir's (mis)conduct in the sphere of *sacrum*. The contributors' approaches range from ancient history and philology through numismatics to art history. This section opens with a contribution by Henryk Kowalski (= H.K.), "Mark Antony – *vir impius*?", concentrating mainly on the Roman religious system as part of the political propaganda. At the outset, the author sketches the dichotomy between *pietas* and *impietas*, and lists various meanings Cicero ascribed to the latter concept (pp. 75–77). H.K. starts the main part of his chapter by presenting the impiety of A. and his allies from a general perspective (pp. 77–79), and next he gives particular examples of religious negligence on his part. This incudes above all the outrageous behaviour during the *Lupercalia*, and the participation in the process of Caesar's deification (pp. 80–82). The charges Cicero puts forward, namely that A. acts *contra auspicia*, seem to be the most important, especially as A. himself had been a member of the college of augurs since the year 50 BC. Moreover, in my opinion Cicero displayed bias when he referred to the outbreak of the civil war as an impious act on the part of A. H.K. rightly concludes (p. 87) that the invective resting upon impiety was inseparable from

the political propaganda in the times of the late Roman Republic. I would be personally inclined to think, however, that not only "[s]ome of the accusations may have been exaggerated", but the majority of them.

Katarzyna Balbuza (= K.B.) ("Das Feiern der Besiegung Armeniens durch Marcus Antonius in Alexandria: ein Triumph, eine dionysische Pompe oder eine Feierlichkeit *sui generis*?") investigates the question of A.'s celebration of his victory over Armenia in the autumn of 34 BC. Sources on the campaign, as she remarks, are scant, and in the case of this "triumph" in Alexandria they are often self-contradictory and therefore require close inspection. B. first briefly outlines the accounts of Velleius Paterculus, Plutarch, and Cassius Dio (pp. 90 f.). She highlights the fact that most scholars accept the version by Plutarch, who explicitly speaks of a *triumphus* (*Ant*. 50, 6: εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρειαν ἐθριάμβευσεν). The views of those who interpret the event as a Dionysian procession, known from the Ptolemaic tradition, are then summarised (p. 94). K.B. herself is keen to search for a middle ground, which is best rendered by Cassius Dio's testimony: the celebration manifested a new concept of leadership, combining the features of the Roman triumph and of the Dionysian procession (hence "eine Feierlichkeit *sui generis*").

For Agata Kluczek (= A.K.) a *denarius* minted by A. in the autumn of 42 BC became an object of research ("Marcus Antonius in the Space of 'Oblivion' or About the Representation of the Temple on the *denarius* RRC 496/1"). The reverse side of the coin features an image of the god Sol encircled by walls of a symbolically depicted temple. A.K. not only points out the unusual representation of the god, but pays attention to the fact that, apart from this case, there are no other architectural motives in the triumvir's monetary programme. Perhaps it should be understood as a solar halo, portending a great future for an individual (pp. 103 f.). It does not, however, explain the meaning of the building. There is a possibility of linking it to a design for erecting a temple in honour of the divine Julius, but the author rejects this as lacking an analogy in Octavian's mint (pp. 106–108). To A.K. the most likely solution seems to be that the image on the coin is the "first mention" of the temple of Sol *apud Circum Maximum* on the Aventine Hill, which A. has probably been reconstructing. The fact that A. lost the civil war, of course, prevented him from being remembered as a builder of public monuments.

Sławomir Jędraszek has chosen a subject which only indirectly relates to A., namely the propagandist character of some terracotta figurines found in Egypt. The possible influence of Egyptian and Hellenistic art on the Roman statuettes appears to be crucial. Since the objects cannot be precisely dated, we can only guess that those which probably depict the emperor Hadrian assuming the pose of an eastern monarch reflect Roman practice from the end of the first century BC, perhaps begun after Octavian's victory at Actium.

The third section, "Family and Surroundings. From Solemnity to Eccentricity...", comprises four chapters characterising A. in the light of his family connections, bringing his ancestors, wives, and brothers into the foreground. The aim of Tomasz Ładoń (= T.Ł.) ("Mark Antony's Forefathers. Comments on the Role of the *gens Antonia* in the Final Period of the Roman Republic") was to define the role the *gens Antonia* played in the late Roman Republic, especially during the first civil war, which means that he concentrated above all on A.'s father and grandfather (p. 132). The main portion of the chapter starts with a description of M. Antonius the orator's political career from his taking the office of quaestor until his tragic death in the year 87 BC (pp. 133–138; personally, I would be more careful in using Val. Max. as a source of *historical* information; see esp. pp. 131, 133). One should appreciate T.Ł.'s considerations on the vague period of his censorship and absence from Rome (pp. 136 f.). After a brief outline of some minor figures of the Antonii, the author moves on to discuss the two sons of M. Antonius the orator: M. Antonius Creticus (pp. 140 f.) and C. Antonius Hybrida (pp. 141–143). From the conclusion we learn that the *gens Antonia*, not many adherents of which are mentioned in ancient sources, on the whole favoured the *optimates*, with the exception of M. Antonius the orator's dealings with C. Marius. This policy changed in the sixties when, according to T.Ł., the house established relationships with the conspirators surrounding Catiline. It seems to me far-fetched, however, to speak of a collective conduct of the *gens Antonia*

(which applies to the entire chapter), especially as the author himself stresses that our knowledge of the activities of the respective late republican Antonii is based on the separate, individual "biographies" (this is also apparent when one looks at the attached genealogical tree: fig. 1). Finally, T.Ł. emphasises that the military campaigns led by the Antonii were generally successful.

The survey of A.'s ancestors is followed by a chapter by Hanna Appel (= H.A.), "Fulvia and Antony", which takes a closer look at the triumvir's relationship with his third wife (for whom he was her third husband). The author first draws a sketch of her family background and undertakes a critical survey of the sources upon which the often prejudiced reception of this character by the modern scholars rests (pp. 147–150). She is mentioned in connection with A. for the first time as the forger of Caesar's decree bestowing on Deiotarus the lands which he was previously deprived of. H.A. explains Fulvia's support for A. in Brundisium and after the defeat at Mutina as evidence of her loyalty towards her husband (pp. 151–153). H.A. then considers Fulvia's possible involvement in the proscriptions (43 BC), and her response to the protest by women, whom the triumvirs intended to tax heavily. Next, in a very transparent manner, the author determines Fulvia's role in assigning land to the veterans, and in starting the so-called Perusian war (pp. 156–159). Although, whatever her own agenda, she did her best to grant A. supreme power in Rome, it was her death in Greece, after L. Antonius was defeated, that enabled A. and Octavian to restore peace. It follows from H.A.'s discussion that the hostile picture of Fulvia preserved by many ancient sources (Octavian's propaganda aside) results from a conviction that a woman should not engage in politics.

D. Słapek (= D.S.), who also wrote the "Introduction" to this volume, explores the gladiatorial imagery used by Cicero to depict L. Antonius in a study entitled "Lucius Antonius – *gladiator Asiaticus*. Gladiatorial Episode Seen Through the Eyes of M. Tullius Cicero". The chapter opens with a short sketch of the state of research on the Roman invective, where D.S. calls special attention to the conclusions reached by Anthony Corbeill, who urges that the criteria of plausibility should be appreciated when it comes to political arguments *ad hominem* (pp. 165–167). The author continues by enlisting all the passages in Cicero's *Philippics* where an allusion to L. Antonius as gladiator occurs, and puts forward a general idea of Cicero's rhetorical tactics resting on the comparison of the political situation to a gladiatorial competition (pp. 168–171). Getting to the heart of the matter, D.S. first analyses the speaker's references to A. as gladiator, rightly assessing them as conventional; in the case of his brother, however, he argues convincingly that the amount of details and the way in which they are handed down to the audience is a solid argument in favour of the historicity of his gladiatorial episode (pp. 172–178). I think that the motif of L. Antonius' scar / wound (pp. 177 f.) could also be seen as part of the argumentation called *signum*. Cicero himself listed "blood" as its constituent[3]. Additionally, the author tries to account for the expression *gladiator Asiaticus*, suggesting that it might refer to the gladiatorial *munera* organised outside Rome (e.g. in Mylasa, where L. Antonius was supposed to have engaged in such an event).

A similar subject was chosen by Agnieszka Dziuba (= A.D.), who in her chapter ("'The Effeminate Spartacus'. The Rhetoric [*sic*] Description of Marc Antony in Cicero's Philippics") focuses on a rhetorical image of A. as created by Cicero in his *Philippics*. Due to the scale of the problem, she confines herself to two motifs: his alleged effeminacy and his gladiatorial features (pp. 185–187). With regard to the former, she concentrates on A.'s "relationship" with C.

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[3] Cf. Cic. *Inv*. I 48: "signum est, quod sub sensum aliquem cadit et quiddam significat, quod ex ipso profectum videtur, quod aut ante fuerit aut in ipso negotio aut post sit consecutum et tamen indiget testimonii et gravioris confirmationis, ut cruor, fuga, pallor, pulvis, et quae his sunt similia" and Cic. *Phil*. 5, 20: "sanguinem nostrum sitiebat [*scil*. L. Antonius], suum in illa gladiatoria pugna multum profuderat". Belonging to the category of *probabile*, it would also conform to what A. Corbeill postulates. One is also reminded of the scars of M.' Aquilius, tried for extortion in the year 98 BC, exposed by M. Antonius the orator during the trial in a spectacular fashion (Liv. *Per*. LXX; Cic. *De or*. II 194–196 = *ORF*², pp. 227–229. See also Cic. *Verr*. II 5, 3; Quint. *Inst*. II 15, 7).

Scribonius Curio, which served Cicero in undermining his opponent's credibility in order to eradicate him from public life (pp. 187–191). Then A.D. moves on to the Ciceronian description of A. as gladiator or, more precisely, Spartacus (pp. 191–193). In *Phil*. 4, 15 ("Est igitur, Quirites, populo Romano, victori omnium gentium, omne certamen cum percussore, cum latrone, cum Spartaco") the author is unable to determine "the semantic context of the epithet *Spartacus*" and she rejects K. Kumaniecki's view that "*Spartacus* was for Cicero a synonym for the *outlaw*" (p. 193). I think that in this passage Cicero refuses A. any signs of a conciliatory attitude, accusing him of the utmost cruelty and a lack of credibility ("pacis vero quae potest esse cum eo ratio in quo est incredibilis crudelitas, fides nulla?"). We know from Appian that M. Licinius Crassus rejected Spartacus' offer of a treaty[4]. Since the speech belongs to the deliberative kind, it could have been Cicero's aim to juxtapose his rival with the slave leader and thereby suggest a similar solution: A. is just another Spartacus, and the Romans should handle such men with arms and not with words[5]. In her closing remarks A.D. states that accusing A. of effeminacy was a conventional part of the political invective, but comparing him with Spartacus served a specific purpose, namely to suggest to the hearers that A. acted contrary to the Roman customs.

The last section, "After Actium. Memory in the Hands of Strangers", is almost entirely devoted to the traditional as opposed to the historical side of the spectrum. Its scope is broad, covering the periods of the immediate aftermath of the defeat at Actium, the later Roman Empire and even the modern era. It begins with a chapter by Oleh Petrechko (= O.P.), "Mark Antony's *damnatio memoriae* and the Foundation of the Principate". The author's research considers the question of A.'s *damnatio memoriae*, imposed on him by Octavian. First he introduces some modern interpretations of this procedure and its use in republican times (pp. 199–203). In O.P.'s view, the act of condemning the memory of the triumvir was passed by the senate in the time between the battle at Actium and A.'s death. It concerned above all his images and correspondence; it was forbidden, moreover, for anyone of the *gens Antonia* to bear the *praenomen* Marcus. There follows a list of particular cases of *damnatio memoriae* during the Empire, both among the emperors and their enemies (pp. 207–212). The author concludes that the procedure used in republican times was tried out and adjusted by Octavian to the new system. Although such was probably the intention, A. is only mentioned in passing in this chapter.

Paweł Madejski (= P.M.), on the other hand, himself emphasises (p. 215) that his considerations ("Marcus Tullius Cicero, the Avenger of His Father") will only indirectly relate to A. and Cicero. He focuses on the political career of the son of the latter (pp. 216 f.), intending to explain the sources of a prevalent view among the ancients that his taking the office of *consul suffectus* in the year 30 BC was a sort of divine justice. P.M. first briefly surveys the character of vengeance in republican Rome in general (pp. 217 f.), and the potential motives of M. Tullius Cicero, the younger. Then he argues that the son of the great orator played a symbolical role in the hands of Octavian rather than acting on his own initiative (pp. 219–222). For the *princeps*, sharing the consulate with him might have served either to give the impression that the son of the defender of the republic was his ally, or to diminish the feeling of personal guilt about the death of Cicero the father.

Later still are the times to which the chapter by Krzysztof Królczyk (= K.K.), entitled "Tiberius Iulius Sauromates (II.), Freund der Römer und des Kaisers. Ein Nachkomme von Marcus Antonius auf dem bosporanischen Thron", brings us. Ti. Iulius Sauromates II, a remote descendant of A., ruled in the kingdom of Bosporus (*regnum Bosporanum*). The author presents his lineage

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[4] See App. *BC*. I 120: Διὰ δὲ τὴν χειροτονίαν τήνδε καὶ Κράσσος, ἵνα μὴ τὸ κλέος τοῦ πολέμου γένοιτο Πομπηίου, πάντα τρόπον ἐπειγόμενος ἐπεχείρει τῷ Σπαρτάκῳ, καὶ ὁ Σπάρτακος, τὸν Πομπήιον προλαβεῖν ἀξιῶν, ἐς συνθήκας τὸν Κράσσον προυκαλεῖτο. ὑπερορώμενος δ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ διακινδυνεύειν τε ἔγνω. Cf. Cic. *Phil*. 13, 20 f.

[5] I have discussed these issues in a more detailed manner on the occasion of the conference on Spartacus mentioned above (n. 1).

concisely and points to the difficulties in dating his birth (pp. 225 f.). At the time of his kingship (under the emperors M. Aurelius, Commodus, and Septimius Severus), K.K. continues, relations between Rome and Bosporus were friendly, and he, on his part, probably fought against neighbouring peoples. It is hard to say anything certain about his policy after the assassination of Commodus and the outbreak of the civil war, but at that time, we read, he gained some land in the West, in Scythia, and in Tauris, without breaking the alliance with Rome (pp. 227–230). Next, K.K. carries out a meticulous inquiry into when and against whom the so-called *bellum Bosporanum* was waged (pp. 231–237). In his opinion, it was not against the Romans. Finally, he makes the case, mainly based on numismatic and epigraphical material, that Sauromates II wanted to and did pass as a friend of the Roman people, because he knew that the kingdom of Bosporus would never be independent from the Empire.

The book closes with a chapter by Krzysztof Antczak (= K.A.) ("The Portrayal of Marc Antony in *Rome* and the Testimony of Plutarch from [*sic*] Chaeronea") who makes an attempt to investigate the reception of A. in popular culture. He bases his examination on the biography written by Plutarch and chooses as a case study the television series "Rome" (2005–2007). Right at the outset K.A. stresses that both the television makers and the Greek author are to some extent biased in their attitude. The formers are led by their own vision in presenting history on the screen, and the latter focused on those episodes from A.'s life (this was a common trait of the *Parallel Lives* in general) which may have carried a moralising message (pp. 243–246). First the author looks at A. as the character on the screen through the 20th and 21st centuries and briefly describes the series "Rome" (pp. 246–248). In the main portion of the paper, A.'s political connections with Caesar, Cicero, and Octavian are put under scrutiny (pp. 248–252), and then his intellectual culture, as it were, and his relationships with women (pp. 253–255). According to K.A., the series maintains the stereotypical picture of A. preserved in the western tradition and tracing back as far as Plutarch. The reader gets the impression, however, that quotations from the biographer appear only casually, somewhat to confirm or complement the scenes from the series[6]. I think this does not prove that the television makers relied on his *Life of Antony* – Cicero's *Philippics* would provide at least as much evidence to present him as a drunk and a brute. It seems to me that it would be more interesting from the sociological point of view to ask what they did not show in the movies, and why. Fulvia, the third wife of A., comes to mind immediately. Let me also point out that the name of the actor playing A. (James Purefoy) is not even mentioned anywhere.

Now, I would like to discuss a few points where the contributors' and my own views are at issue. This has to be a selection, if only because of the limited space. On pp. 36 f., to begin with, I.Ł. writes: "he [*scil*. A.] started wearing a white toga (*toga virilis*) instead of a toga with a purple stripe on its border (*toga praetexta*)". This is perhaps a slip, but I would opt to translate *toga virilis*, or *pura*, as "plain toga" rather than "white", as opposed to the *toga candida*, for the whitening of which chalk was used[7].

On p. 85 H.K. states that the poet Lucan offered an interpretation of the causes of the civil wars and "he regarded the gods as the driving force". It seems to me, in the case of the poet, an overstatement, especially as Lucan is the only Latin author of a "heroic epic" who gave up the divine apparatus (VII 445–447: "sunt nobis nulla profecto | numina: cum caeco rapiantur saecula casu |

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[6] A valuable account, for instance, of Antony's love affair with Cleopatra as depicted by Plutarch was recently given by B. Burliga, *The Spectacle of Love and Death in Plutarch's Life of Antony*, Scripta Classica X 2013, pp. 107–127.

[7] See the remark of the scholiast to Cicero's *Catilinarians* (*Schol. Clun*. p. 270 St.): "Toga enim aut pura est aut praetexta, id est aut toga aut praetexta toga". *OLD* s.v. *virilis* 3 reads indeed "the plain white toga worn by a Roman on reaching puberty", but I think it still needs to be somehow distinguished from the one candidates for an office wore.

mentimur regnare Iovem"; 454 f.: "mortalia nulli | sunt curata deo"). The very lines which the author quotes in support of his argument (VII 447 f.) are thus meant to be ironic[8]. The passage cited on p. 87 (Cic. *Pis*. 46), on the other hand, does not refer, in my opinion, to punishment after death. Cicero, following a passage from Aeschines' speech and alluding to tragedy, wants to say that the consequence of crime is madness: insanity instead of the torches of the Furies haunts impious men ("hae sunt impiorum furiae, hae flammae, hae faces")[9].

As regards "[t]he theme of dressing up in women's clothes [...] present in the Roman invective" (A.D., p. 189, n. 16), the fragments of the speech *In Clodium et Curionem* should not be considered conventional, since Clodius *was* in fact dressed as a woman when he broke into Caesar's house during the Bona Dea sacred rites[10].

There are also certain formal failings as, for example, the lack of indices. As is usually the case, it will not bother someone who reads the book cover to cover, but would make it difficult for anyone searching for random information about A. It is regrettable as well that the editors did not encourage the contributors to exchange their papers before publication. Some of them at least could have benefitted from doing so. To give but two examples: both I.Ł. (p. 43) and T.Ł. (p. 140) speculate about Caesar's possible service under M. Antonius Creticus; the articles by D.S. and A.D., on the other hand, are at some points devoted to the same subject (the gladiatorial imagery in Cicero's *Philippics*). Every specialist kind of reader would appreciate such cross-references.

On the whole, despite the abovementioned flaws (obviously, it is not for me to judge the language of the contributions), the book serves its purpose well, offering a great deal of various approaches to all sorts of problems relating to the life and deeds of A. and the later reception of this fascinating character. What is more, when turning the pages, one is able to take a glimpse at many aspects of the history, politics, and religion of the late Roman Republic, and to become acquainted with some of its intellectual and artistic movements.

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[8] See e.g. H.L. Le Bonniec, *Lucain et la religion*, in: M. Durry (ed.), *Lucain*, Vandœuvres–Genève 1970 (Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique 15), pp. 161–195; J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, *Continuity and Change in Roman Religion*, Oxford 1979, p. 148: "I think one can say that in most of these passages [including VII 445–459 – D.P.] the gods are introduced for a literary purpose". Cf. P. Asso, *A Commentary on Lucan, De bello civili IV*, Berlin–New York 2010, p. 13.

[9] See A. Weische, *Ciceros Nachahmung der attischen Redner*, Heidelberg 1972, pp. 24 f.; M.R. Petaccia, *Der Orestes-Mythos in der lateinischen archaischen Tragödie und im politisch-religiösen Zusammenhang der römischen Republik*, in: G. Manuwald (ed.), *Identität und Alterität in der frührömischen Tragödie*, Würzburg 2000, pp. 87–111; see also my discussion in „Eos" CIII 2016, 245–270.

[10] See e.g. P. Moreau, *Clodiana religio. Un procès politique en 61 av. J.-C.*, Paris 1982, *passim*; J.W. Crawford (ed.), *M. Tullius Cicero. The Fragmentary Speeches*, Atlanta 1994, pp. 255 f. Cf. S. Koster, *Die Invektive in der griechischen und römischen Literatur*, Meisenheim am Glan 1980, pp. 118 f.

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Miles Hollingworth, *Saint Augustine of Hippo. An Intellectual Biography*, London: Bloomsbury, 2013, 312 pp., ISBN 978-14-411-7372-0, £20.00.

I must confess that I found it extremely hard to even start this review. The "blurb" on the back cover of the book tells me that:

> This is a book whose style and feel are really worthy of Augustine himself – humane and probing, full of telling metaphor and seriousness about the strangeness of human experience. It is capable of doing for a new generation a great deal of what Peter Brown's epochal biography did half a century ago.

This is the opinion of Rowan Williams, the now retired archbishop of Canterbury, and the author of some really important theological contributions to our understanding of Augustine, which only makes my confusion stronger.

What I could, however, take as a point of departure is that Williams begins with – a remark on the book's "style and feel". I do not think that this is mere rhetorical ornament. Albeit Hollingworth (= H.) is a scholar and the author of a study of Augustine's political thought[1], his book is first and foremost "style and feel" and it is "style and feel" that we are left with after reading some three hundred pages of it. A disappointing and irritating experience, at least for a scholar interested in learning something new about Augustine. I tried to read and re-read the pages, looking for some "substance" of ideas and arguments, but it seemed almost impossible for me to find out what this book is really about.

To substantiate this criticism a little, let us look at the content of the two first chapters. Chapter One is entitled "Out of Africa" (a mere foretaste of many more such allusions later on...) and H. proposes an idea that Augustine's "Africanity" is a key to the understanding of his personality and work. This is as good a start as any, but what comes later is rather disappointing. The author ponders about Late Antiquity, pointing out that this was a transitional period in the history of our culture (just like the period we live in), then he points out that Augustine "has shown the European sensibility how to feel the utter incongruity of a human life" (p. 6). An experience of "the homesickness of the heart" is mentioned, as well as the universality brought about by Christianity, its criticism of this world, the ideas of pride and fall connected with the Roman Empire. The chapter, towards its end, repeats the intriguing thought of Augustine the African "as the outsider 'holding up the mirror' to the Western tradition" (p. 10), but apart from those rather vague images of Augustine's "otherness" (to use a Lacanian concept that is quite *en vogue* nowadays) and its supposed advantages, the reader is given no coherent perspective on what that actually means.

The title of Chapter Two, "Augustine's Intellectual Milieu", is even more promising. H. writes about the atmosphere of the Roman Empire in Late Antiquity, and he does so in Latin-sounding but clearly late modern terms, such as multiculturalism, pluralism or cosmopolitanism. The atmosphere of the Empire was disorienting. Christianity tried to overcome this multiculturalism and pluralism by its monotheism and universalism. The new religion questioned traditional links between religion and politics. What follows this loosely connected set of ideas is a delineation of some philosophical schools of antiquity. Pre-Socratic philosophers looked for the single principle explaining the world (only they?), Socrates looked for stability in the world of ideas (perhaps Plato rather than Socrates?), Plato did not create a system and his philosophy was "temperamentally conservative" (not good, but

[1] M. Hollingworth, *Pilgrim City: St. Augustine of Hippo and His Innovation in Political Thought*, London–New York 2010.

what does it actually mean?). Ultimately, the Stoics spread around ideas that became very popular towards the end of antiquity – individuality, universal kinship, cosmopolitanism, the laws of nature. The "conclusion" of the chapter is that Christianity is a religion of exiles and the homesick.

Probably the reader of this review will think that this summary of the first two chapters is a derogatory attack on the author by a frustrated reader. It may be believed or not, but I really tried to extract important ideas from the first two chapters and this was the effect of my work. There are various ideas; some of them seem true, some are debatable, but the main question is how they are connected to each other and to Augustine's intellectual evolution, and this question remains unanswered or, at least, I was not able to understand the answer. The "style" of the book reminds me of the Freudian method of "free associations" during an hour of therapy. One idea leads to another, sometimes links are understandable, but often they are not, and it is extremely difficult to find a classical argument or intellectual order.

Given all that, a brief, general survey of the content is possible. Chapter Three is focused on Augustine's parents and the next chapter discusses his infancy. H. follows a chronological order, based on the *Confessions* – in Chapter Five he deals with Augustine's adolescence and its "traumas of initiation" in order to describe his first conversion to philosophy, caused by reading Cicero (Chapter Six: "Cicero and a Sense of Purpose"). Chapter Seven describes Manicheism and the next one – Augustine's friendship with a youth who also joined the Gnostic movement, but died, causing the future bishop of Hippo much grief. Chapter Nine is about "Christian Conversion" in the year 386, while the following one deals with the early philosophical writings of Augustine. The last chapter deals with the 44 years of Augustine's life, public activity, Church ministry and writing. The book clearly is not a biography in the sense that it gives an account of the life of Augustine, because the greater part of the bishop's life is basically omitted. The pattern clearly reflects that of the *Confessions*, so it is a "biography of the *Confessions*" rather than of its author himself.

What makes this even more difficult to follow is the incessant display of H.'s erudition. The book strives to appear sophisticated and literary – it has a "style". Moreover, citations from various works of Augustine and a wide range of modern and contemporary authors constitute nearly a half of the body of the book. We find extensive quotations from such authors as Freud, Popper, Hobbes, Havel... But those quotations also do not seem to be essential to H.'s argument, they are rather ornaments and encrustations, associations of a widely read intellectual.

An instructive example of how the author deals with the Augustinian concept of *confessio* can be found in Chapter Three. First the concept is compared to Edgar Degas' dancers. Then follows a rather poetic interpretation of that analogy which I will quote in order to illustrate the "style and feel" of H.'s writing:

> It was an ongoing means of catching hold of fragile little testimonies, too sublime for the nets of historical explanation – or for that matter, of any kind of analysis at all. There are some things that are designed to be caught by the human mind: but the understanding of them has nothing to do with the catching: but consists rather of handing them back, intact, to their Maker (p. 44).

The reader of this review will probably think that I am again being very mean to the author, but his book in general makes exactly an impression – in his own words – of "fragile little testimonies, too sublime for the nets of historical explanation – or for that matter, of any kind of analysis at all".

Perhaps, as Williams suggests, H. actually attempted to imitate Augustine's *Confessions* and this is the effect of this. We should say rather "to imitate the way in which he experiences and understands the *Confessions*". But even if this were so, it is a futile attempt. Probably the best chapter of the book is the one on Manicheism (Chapter Seven), because it is a sound, instructive representation of this Gnostic system that could be recommended, for instance, to students. H. also interestingly compares the Manichean "appeal" to the way psychoanalysis and Marxism were attractive to many intellectuals in the 20th century.

One more thing about a "feel" of the book is that there are a lot of references to contemporary ideas. It is openly stated in Chapter One that Late Antiquity resembles our times. But in effect the reader receives not only many quotations from contemporary authors, but also a lot of concepts such as the previously mentioned multiculturalism or pluralism. We are not told what they mean. And given the fact that they are rather "fast food concepts", successfully sold in popular culture and losing their meaning to the point of unintelligibility, I suppose that a reader deserves at least some definition to start with. What makes the use of those ideas worse is that they often lead to rather banal thoughts: "pluralism is good", "nationalism is bad", "people should not think in black and white"...

Gillian Clark called the *Confessions* "a book about Augustine and what matters to him"[2]. I think that is also a fair description of H.'s biography of the bishop of Hippo, if we substitute "Hollingworth" for "Augustine" in Clark's *bon-mot*. Curiously, it bears a strong resemblance to the other 21st century Augustine's biography, that by O'Donnell[3], even though they are written in a completely different vein and have different agendas. O'Donnell's biography is sometimes labelled "a first postmodern biography of Augustine". H.'s book proves that, unfortunately, it is not the last.

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[2] G. Clark, *Augustine: The Confessions*, Exeter 2004, p. 41.

[3] J.J. O'Donnell, *Augustine: A New Biography*, New York 2005.

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Lisa Karen Bailey, *Religious Worlds of the Laity in Late Antique Gaul*, London–New York: Bloomsbury, 2016, VIII + 247 pp., ISBN 978-14-725-1903-0, £90.00.

This book asks an important question as to what the religious life of lay Christians in Late Antiquity looked like. The question is not entirely new. It is difficult to answer, firstly, because the evidence which tells us about religious beliefs, habits, and practices in this period is hardly sufficient (we know little about many aspects of even such basic Christian rituals as the Eucharist); secondly, because this evidence comes mostly from monks and clerics; thirdly, because the few lay people that we can see in the sources usually belong to a tiny elite and their religious behaviours are not really representative of the whole laity; and fourthly, because particular regions of Christendom differed in many respects and it is risky to reconstruct one image of religious life on the basis of scattered evidence, collected from diverse parts of the late antique world.

Bailey (= B.) is conscious of all these problems and clearly did her best to address them. She focuses on one specific region, Gaul, on which she also worked in her earlier research[1]. This part of the Christian world does not have such obvious advantages as papyri or graffiti, thanks to which we can hear the voices of normal people much better than usual, and the archaeological evidence from Gaul is not so very rich. But this region has decent literary evidence, with a number of lives of saints, the corpus of narrative works of Gregory of Tours, two substantial collections of sermons, a rich record of synodal activity, and quite good epigraphic evidence. B. has limited her study to the period between ca. 400 and 700. She omits the earlier evidence, but since this evidence is scant, this was a very low price to pay for leaving aside the period in which the process of Christianisation was just beginning and the situation was changing dramatically. 700 is a boundary as good as any other. Its advantage is that it stops just before the Carolingians.

B. is also aware that she is looking at lay people through the eyes of clerics and monks. Her evidence usually shows the laics as the clergy saw or wanted to see them, or just to show them. Needless to say, consequently the image of lay religious behaviours that we find in their writings is often distorted. That does not necessarily mean that they are idealised; in some sermons we can see people's habits presented in what is probably an undeservedly bad light. Still, B. argues, the late antique democratisation of culture puts us in a privileged position, for we can at least read what normal people were to read or hear, and this is not evident in the study of earlier periods. And even if we learn only what the preachers wanted to show to their congregation as hideous or laudable, this tells us something about the people who otherwise are mute in the extant evidence.

The first chapter of the book ("Laity, Clergy and Ascetics") deals with a definition of the laity. B. is interested in non-ordained and non-monastic Christians, but shows that the limits of this group are blurred. The very terminology used in late antique evidence is confusing. If the terms *laici* and *saeculares* were often used interchangeably, their meaning was not the same, for monks, or most of them, were technically *laici* in the sense that they did not receive holy orders and could not perform ritual acts reserved for the clergy, but they were certainly not *saeculares* or people of the world. Moreover, pious laics, sometimes called *servi dei*, who cannot be exactly categorised as monks, for they did not live in any monastic community, observe a fixed rule, or take vows, in fact led lives modelled on the monastic pattern. Also minor clerics did not have the same status and obligations as bishops, presbyters, and deacons, and in some respects were treated as lay Christians. Another liminal category were people serving or living in a church, at least temporarily, looking for alms or healing. The boundaries between these diverse groups are not always easy to grasp and

[1] L.K. Bailey, *Christianity's Quiet Success: The Eusebius Gallicanus Sermon Collection and the Power of the Church in Late Antique Gaul*, Notre Dame, IN 2010.

can depend on the type of evidence. The self-definition of the clergy did not have to be the same as that which can be found in the secular laws. People's customs did not necessarily reflect their legal status. All these are important reminders that in late antique Gaul, lay and clerical religiosity was no more homogeneous than in any other period.

Chapter 2 ("Environments") deals with the spatial conditions in which Christians conducted their religious life. B. shows what we know, and what we do not know, about the organisation of space in churches. She argues that the separation of the laity and clergy was usually intended, but not always successful; that it started to be even more difficult as churches became multipolar, since the altar was not the only focal point of holiness and in the 7th century side altars appeared. B. presents a complex religious geography with urban churches which were quite strictly controlled by the clergy, monastic shrines, and private oratories in rural estates over which episcopal control was problematic.

The reflection on the space settings of religious life is continued in Chapter 3 ("Urban Case-Studies"). It deals with the civic and ecclesiastical topography of Arles, Lyon, Trier, and Tours, and shows that even in the 6th and 7th centuries we are very far from a unique model of a Christian city. Chapter 4 ("Rituals") is devoted to "formal religious acts that deliberately evoked separation from secularity" (p. 105), namely the Eucharist, processions, and rogations, a ceremony that appeared in Gaul in the middle of the 5th century and combined fasting, prayer and, in theory at least, involved the entire community of the city. B. focuses on those elements of the ritual which emphasised the unity of Christian people and those which differentiated clergy from lay people.

In the following chapters she copes with the most difficult task, namely an analysis of individual religious practices (Chapter 5) and the religious knowledge and beliefs (Chapter 6) of lay people. In the former chapter she draws pieces of information from diverse types of evidence. Hagiography, showing the secular period of a saint's life or presenting virtuous supporting characters, sketches a model of pious lay life. Sermons, though they focus rather on the failings of the laity, sometimes show model habits as well. Epitaphs, even if not necessarily written by lay people themselves, had to be approved by them. In Chapter 6 Bailey seeks to reconstruct the religious knowledge and beliefs of the laity, frankly admitting that we can see them almost uniquely through the eyes of clerics. More securely one can find out what the clerics wanted people to know and believe, and what the preachers expected would evoke disbelief or resistance.

Throughout the book B. argues that lay people had their specific religious needs and were able to find the means of satisfying them. These means, like some ways of using relics or an attachment to private cult places, were not always compatible with those which were promoted by clerics. The admonitions of preachers and synodal canons as well as some mentions in narrative texts show that the clergy were not entirely successful in fixing a model for the organisation of space, time, and religious customs of the faithful. The latter did not reject religion altogether, but tried to bend the rules and often looked for alternative solutions.

B. avows that her aim is rather to emphasise the partly independent character of lay religiosity and not to provide a complete picture of it (p. 18). This is an understandable choice. Still, it inevitably leaves some important spheres of religious life out of the focus of perhaps not so much the research as the systematic presentation. There is no separate chapter about the organisation of time. B. deals with this issue partly in Chapter 6 ("Behaviours"), but tells relatively little about participation in feasts, weekly churchgoing, and receiving communion (how common and often was it?). The cult of saints appears now and again, but the author does not try to say how important it was. She remarks that in some kinds of evidence it does not seem as important as one might suspect (Caesarius of Arles's sermons for instance, p. 123), but leaves this interesting question aside. The issue of the contacts between lay people and clerics or monks, an important element of the religious environment, is not discussed. These contacts were certainly not limited to listening to sermons and it is important to ask how strongly the laics and clerics were separated in daily routine. Also, if B. very perspicaciously shows that the border between these two groups was in many respects blurred, she leaves the reader with the impression that once this liminal zone is passed

we are on firmer ground, even if the levels of religious engagement remain different. This can, but does not have to be entirely true. Perhaps we cannot say much about the specific religious practices of the Franks or Visigoths, but it is worth asking whether we can distinguish any features of female religiosity. Some sources suggest so, usually presenting this religiosity in an unfavourable way. Is it just a cliché or something more? B. touches upon this issue (p. 67), but does not ask a general question. Of course, all the above is just a wish-list, made up of curiosity. The reviewer should not talk too much about the book which he would have written, but did not, all the more so as some of these issues were not addressed simply because there is no evidence. Still, it is worth naming them just to show where our image remains incomplete.

On a more general note, I would also ask the question of what the limits of the religious sphere of life in late antique Gaul were, or more specifically what the lay people considered to belong to the religious and to the secular domains[2]. That the two zones were distinguishable is evident, but their limits are blurred. Was a funeral or a wedding a religious ceremony? How often was choosing and giving a name to a child a religious act? Was going to a healing sanctuary a religious choice?[3]

B. convincingly shows that there was no universal pattern of lay religiosity in Gaul. She writes about the "religious worlds", not a single world. I wonder, though, how stable these worlds were. The author rarely tries to trace the evolution of the phenomena she studies. Does this mean that the customs and beliefs did not change much throughout the period of 400–700? This, again, is a very difficult question, as we are rarely in a position to compare the situation in the same region, with the same type of evidence, but in different moments of history. Yet this is not entirely impossible. And sometimes B. seems to take the long persistence of customs for granted. This can be seen especially in the chapter dealing with religious space. The author refers to the long history of conflicting attitudes toward sacred sites, going back to pre-Constantinian times (p. 54), but does not signal that, at the beginning of the period which she is studying, a profound and radical change took place when the very idea of the holy place appeared in Christianity. When she says that the first Christian churches had been rooms in private houses, she is right, but when she suggests that there is a continuation between this and late antique domestic worship (p. 67), she is not necessarily correct. We do not know anything about *domus ecclesiae* in Gaul in the pre-Constantinian period, and the earliest private chapels are attested only at the end of the 5th century.

It would also be interesting to ask more strongly how common the practices and beliefs attested to in the evidence were. One has to repeat once again that in most cases it is impossible to know. One type of evidence, however, potentially makes it possible to study this issue, at least up to a point. I am thinking about inscriptions. The massive character of this type of evidence has not been fully exploited.

All these issues do not change the impression that B.'s important thesis is convincing. There was a specific lay religiosity and its traces can be seen in the diverse types of late antique evidence. The image of this religiosity is not complete and never will be, but it can be a subject of historical research.

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[2] See studies collected in E. Rebillard, C. Sotinel (eds.), *Les frontières du profane dans l'Antiquité tardive*, Rome 2010.

[3] See A. Rousselle, *Croire et guérir. La foi en Gaule dans l'Antiquité tardive*, Paris 1990.